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
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CHRISTIAN IDEAS IN POLITICAL HISTORY

HOLLAND MEMORIAL LECTURES 1925

BY C. E. OSBORNE, M.A., T.C.D.

RECTOR OF WALLSEND AND HON. CANON OF NEWCASTLE



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DEDICATED
TO
THE MEMORY OF
HENRY SCOTT HOLLAND
TEACHER AND LEADER



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AUTHOR'S FOREWORD

THE following book contains the substance of lectures which were delivered at Manchester in the year 1925, in accordance with the terms of the Holland Memorial Trust. Owing to various circumstances the publication has been delayed. The present volume represents the lectures in a revised and enlarged form. The first chapter and the last have been added. The word "political" in the title is used in a wider sense than that generally customary. It includes those interests in life which have to do with the communal and social side of human existence. With this reference running through the book, the writer has attempted to consider certain historical instances of the conscious efforts, or unconscious tendencies to incorporate the Christian spirit in the organized life and citizenship of civilized existence, or of some department or manifestation of the latter. He has directed attention to the questions of war or arbitration, as ultimate means of settlement of national or racial strife, of the relations of Church and State to one another, and of the attitude of the State to the industrial problem. The book is therefore, from the great range of the interests alluded to, not so detailed in treatment as might otherwise have been the case, and is open to the criticism of having too vast a canvas, and too wide and diffuse a method of treatment.

But while these lectures are not, in any extensive

sense, the outcome of original research, their author has personally consulted most of the books referred to as authorities, in the case of those made accessible to the ordinary student, and has tried to go deeper than merely to the level of second-hand knowledge.

Where he has not been able to procure the use of any work in its original form, he has taken care to refer to the most reliable authorities as to the nature of its contents. He is well aware of the fact that the general subject and the problems involved in it have been and are being dealt with by experts who are thoroughly at home in the details of the history of social and political ideas, and are masters of the periods and problems of which they have treated. This book makes no claim to stand with the productions of such authors.

When, however, the honour of delivering one of the Scott Holland courses of lectures was offered to the present writer, he felt that he ought to do what he could to comply with the request, especially as the name of Henry Scott Holland was that of a teacher and leader no longer with us to whom he, in common with so many others, owes a deep debt of gratitude for inspiration and guidance.

The writer also felt that any deficiencies as to first-hand knowledge of sources for economic history, for instance, may be partly compensated for by many past years of intimate relationship on his part with the modes of life and thought of the workers in some of the large modern centres of population.

As to help from literary sources he desires to acknowledge the great debt which he owes to the monumental or rather forest-like work of the late

Prof. Troeltsch, *Die christliche Soziallehren*. It has supplied continual illumination to his mind in preparing the lectures. He owes his introduction to Troeltsch's works and influence to the late Baron von Hügel, whose friendly advice, so freely given, had been, at an earlier time, at the writer's disposal, and to whom the latter, in common with so many others, owes an inestimable debt.

In regard to two of the works referred to at some length in the following pages as illustrative of certain phases of the subject, i.e. S. Augustine's *De Civitate Dei* and the *Policraticus* of John of Salisbury, the writer has found the recent edition of the former by the Dean of Durham, Bp. Weldon, and that of the latter by Prof. Webb, to be invaluable for the purpose of gaining some insight into the minds of the respective periods of Christianity and civilization which the works in question illustrate, and of which they are, to a large degree, the outcome. The earlier author indeed was for his own period far more than the outcome, being one of its most powerful and formative influences, and still more so, in ever-increasing measure, for the centuries that were to follow.

Besides the present writer's acknowledgment of the debt due to books in regard to the preparation of this volume, he desires also to recognize as a stimulus in such work the personal influence of one who died like Lacordaire, "a penitent Catholic and an impenitent Liberal," and who was at once a great Christian and an ardent and at the same time a wise and practical humanitarian.

Robert Radclyffe Dolling, the friend and fellow-worker referred to, often expressed to the writer

his affection and admiration for Henry Scott Holland, the latter the inspirer of the principles of all the courses of lectures of which this volume is one.

George Tyrrell once wrote, in a letter to the present writer, that Dolling had done him, then absorbed in theology and philosophy, the inestimable service of humanizing his intelligence, and of liberating his heart. "He set my feet," wrote Father Tyrrell, "in the broader ways."

The influences and personalities of such men as those just referred to make the world see that Christianity—at least the Christianity of Christ—is in its true genius and temper as organically human as it is essentially spiritual, and both in the very highest degree, like the ideal Orphic initiate, "the child at once of earth and of starry heaven."

It is this amphibian, rather than dualist, character of the Christian faith and Christian morality which make our religion in its attitude to life a thing of two atmospheres, a creature which like the Christ of the Transfiguration, has not only its feet upon the celestial mountains, but because of that, rather than in spite of that, has also its heart in the world.

C. E. OSBORNE.

CONTENTS

AUTHOR'S FOREWORD	pp. vii-x
-----------------------------	-----------

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY	pp. I-13
------------------------	----------

CHAPTER II

THE PRE-MEDIÆVAL PERIOD

The Pre-mediæval period—Judaic and Platonist elements blended in early Christianity—Stoic sense of human solidarity—Liberty of Association involved in the spiritual independence of the Church—The *Corpus Christianum* grows out of two conceptions, the patriarchal and the organic—It is at once Family of God and Body of Christ—The New Testament attitude towards the State; the Pauline view contrasted with that of the Apocalypse—Each of these the starting-point of a persistent tendency, conciliatory or dualist—Position of Imperial Rome in S. Augustine's *De Civitate Dei*—S. Augustine's definition of the State: comparison with that of Cicero—S. Gregory the Great, rather than S. Augustine, the Father of the Middle Ages—Charlemagne's coronation and the ideals of the Holy Roman Empire
pp. 14-53

CHAPTER III

THE CHURCH-STATE OF THE MIDDLE AGES

Mediæval ideal of harmony and demand for unity—Three elements in the mediæval conception of human nature and history: first, the Stoic *Lex Naturæ*; second, the social teleology of Aristotelian political science; third, the ascetic strain congenial to Augustinianism—*Justitia*, the *regina virtutum*—The Statesman's Book of John of Salisbury: he is man of religion and man of the world—Organic conception of the Commonwealth in the *Policraticus*—The macrocosm of the State reflects the microcosm of the individual nature—Divine Right and Tyrannicide—Mediæval civilization, undemocratic but also unabolutist—Dante's *De Monarchia* looks both behind and forward—Dante, Cusanus, and Erasmus witness for a Catholic and ethical civilization, distinct alike from Feudalism and from the Renaissance Statecraft pp. 54-96

CHAPTER IV

TRANSITION TO THE MODERN STATE

In the later Middle Ages, the laicizing of public life begins—The Catholic theory of the double standard—Troeltsch's appreciation of

Thomism—The Unity of Mankind in S. Paul, Aquinas, and Dante—The Nominalist, William of Ockham, the herald of disintegration—Ockham's *De Imperatorum et Pontificum Potestate*—The Conciliar Movement—Attempted application of mediæval constitutionalism to the Papal Monarchy—Failure of the movement, yet indirect consequences, as Gallicanism—Gerson's principles anticipate those of 1688—Wyclif, the Puritan schoolman and the progenitor of Calvinism—Marsilio's *Defensor Pacis*, in its backward view Aristotelian, in its onward one erastian. A book ahead of its age—The idea of the Modern State emerges from its pages pp. 97-121

CHAPTER V

MYSTICAL AND SOCIAL SECTS—GENEVA'S PROPHET AND PHILOSOPHER

In fourteenth and fifteenth centuries intermittent mystical and social ferment—The Franciscan spirit: in its central aspects a spirit of joy—Fanatical and revolutionary tendencies of the Franciscan extreme Left, the Fraticelli—The mediæval sects. Anabaptists of sixteenth century their later representatives—Communist equality, rather than individual liberty, their ideal—Luther: his greatness and his limitations. The Family as the central Christian institution. Yet indirectly he helps absolutism and ultimately Prussianism, in the German lands—Luther's political influence compared with that of Calvin—Calvin and Rousseau the two Genevan forces in European history—Under Puritanism England becomes a Chosen People—Reaction or development—Religion and art; difficulty of relationship of each to one another pp. 122-150

CHAPTER VI

GENESIS OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION—PROBLEM OF CHURCH AND STATE

The genesis of religious toleration—The problems involved—Religious leaders, though themselves intolerant, oppose the absolutism of the State in the interests of their respective Communion—Thus in Holland, Calvinism supports political liberty—Theological determinism fosters free citizenship—So also with English Puritanism—Yet mystics and rationalists, not the Protestant Reformers, are the pioneers of religious toleration as distinct from political freedom—The opposing ideals of Love and Law in the minds of Castello and Calvin respectively—Three types of advocates of Toleration—The *Politiques* of the sixteenth century—Their religious conformity is mixed with the temper of Gallio—Through them the lay and secular view of life gains ground in modern Europe—Their political preferences are for a strong monarchy—Bodin and Lord Bacon, instances of this—The divine right of kings—The view that Church and State are two sides of one thing is characteristic of Anglicanism, and is a mediæval survival—This view common to the Middle Ages, to Elizabethan Churchmen like Hooker, and modern Broad Churchmen like Dr. Arnold—Many good consequences of the fusion of Church and State, as the recognition of sacredness of secular life—Two bad alternative consequences, religious coercion or creedless erastianism pp. 151-182

CHAPTER VII

WAR, PATRIOTISM, AND THE INTERNATIONAL SPIRIT

The Kingdom of the Prince of Peace—Mediæval aspiration for Peace—So the praise of *Tranquillitas* in Dante's *De Monarchia*—The Holy Roman Emperor is the *Imperator Pacificus*—The same implication in Marsilio's *Defensor Pacis*—In spite of conflict with one another, both Empire and Papacy claim to represent international unity and peace—Pierre Dubois' *De Recuperatione Terre Sancte*, a foreshadowing of a League of Nations with sanction of an economic boycott—Unethical patriotism the keynote of Machiavelli's political philosophy—Erasmus the peace advocate of the Renaissance period—The attitude of Tyndale—International Law: the Spanish Jesuit Jurists, and Hugo Grotius—The latter's *De Jure Belli et Pacis*—The *Grand Design* of Henri Quatre, inspired by Sully—The Abbé de Saint-Pierre's *Mémoires pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe* at time of peace of Utrecht, 1713—Kant's *Zum ewigen Frieden*, 1795—Alexander I of Russia and the Holy Alliance—Is war a biological necessity?—The Prussian school of writers—Need of change of mentality as to right kind of patriotism—The enlisting of the young on the side of peace

pp. 183-218

CHAPTER VIII

THE REFORMATION AND THE REVOLUTION IN RELATION TO SOCIAL EVOLUTION

Religion the storm-centre of the sixteenth century—Territorial politics that of the following period until the 1789 Revolution. The social movement the centre of the present—Shelley and Godwin: the rhapsody and the prose in revolutionary thought—The principle of the rights of the individual underlies the political thought of Shelley; that of the articulated structure of human society that of Burke—Both principles are mediæval—Burke's conception of human society as "the great primeval contract," organic not voluntarist—His political mysticism—Paine's common-sense protest.—His plea for the disinherited—The teaching of Mazzini: Duties rather than Rights—Mazzini true both to Kin and Kind, both nationalist and internationalist—The claim of the Reformation to regulate the life of the modern world—This claim, distinct in Calvinism, weaker in Lutheranism—Calvinism the militant and internationalist force of the Reformation—Close connexion of Puritanism and trade—The *Innerweltliche Askese* of Puritanism—Bunyan and S. Francis compared . . . pp. 219-246

CHAPTER IX

THE ROMANTIC AND THE CHRISTIAN SOCIALIST MOVEMENTS

English Christianity and modern social movements—Reaction against commercialism from the Romantic or Young England School and from the Christian Socialists—Leaders of the latter movement in the Church of England: F. D. Maurice, Kingsley, Neale, Ludlow—Ludlow its starter, Kingsley, as "Parson Lot" its popularizer—The Maurician School compared with the Tractarian one—Connexion of

Sacramentalism with Socialism, as to underlying ideas of each—The right use and meaning of sacraments involves co-operative life—The eucharistic restoration in its social implications—Relation of the spiritual element to the senses and to art—Practical discovery of the social message of the Old Testament Prophets—Maurice as student of the Prophets pp. 247-270

CHAPTER X

THE CHRISTIAN ATTITUDE TO COMMERCE AND LABOUR —SYNTHESIS OF THE SPIRITUAL AND THE SOCIAL

The Christian spirit and the regulation of industrial life—As the modern State begins, economics gradually repudiate control by religion and finally by the State itself—The eighteenth century, as *Sæculum Rationalisticum*, exhibits above tendency—Science directed towards utility—*Laissez-faire*, a modern doctrine—Does it represent absolute law, as of nature?—Or is it a generalization, leaving out ethical considerations?—One-sided interpretation of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*—J. S. Mill renounces the Wages Fund Theory—Darwinism called in to aid *laissez-faire*—Marx and Nietzsche compared in regard to the attitude of each respectively to Christianity in its social implications—Encyclicals on Labour of Pope Leo XIII—Revival of Thomism—Teaching about property in S. Thomas—The Lambeth Reports—The Stockholm Conference—Trend in all Churches towards development of the social element latent in the Gospel—Two processes: the Church rediscovers the humanity of Christ; men of goodwill are discovering the necessity of the spiritual in life . . . pp. 271-300

CHAPTER XI

EPILOGUE	pp. 301-309
BIBLIOGRAPHY	pp. 310-313
INDEX	pp. 314-319

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

THE idealism of the Gospel corresponds to and fits in with the depths and heights of man's moral and spiritual nature.

This idealism, essential to Christianity, is therefore not impracticable, although it is, in its fullness, superhuman and heroic. All that is most distinctively Christian in Christianity is the expression and embodiment of this ideal character. But it is an expression that is conditioned by the elements of human life in which it shares and of which it is the outcome. In a sense congenial to its own essential nature as the religion of the Incarnation, Christianity is "subdued to what it works in," not however by being tamed and secularized, but by blending itself with human society, transforming, purifying, raising it. Christ's religion has two vital capacities, i.e. creative energy and inexhaustible adaptability.

Christianity is realist as well as, at the same time, idealist. It makes social life contributory to the designs of the spirit. It only resists civilization when the latter sacrifices the spiritual to the material. In the Christian system grace is not conceived as destroying nature. It raises it to its own level. It frees, arouses, dilates man's entire moral being, while it disciplines and consecrates his physical one. Hence in its growth towards an ever more perfect realization in humanity of the nature

and character of Christ, the ideal Man, it never stands still. It has that mark which is shared by everything which has in itself the seeds of perfection, i.e. the capacity of continual change. Yet the seemingly chameleon-like transitions which have marked the history of Christianity, especially in its relation to the forms of human society, have had beneath them an inward, though not always fully conscious, purpose or instinct, shaping life according to the vision shewn on the mount. For the vision has never been entirely obliterated, even amid the confused and stormy crises when God seems to pull down with one hand what He has built up with the other, or in those dull times when He seems neither to rule in tranquillity nor to lead in warfare. The experiments made in the attempts at the social realization of the Christian spirit lie indeed behind us strewn and scattered on the stream of time. Few or none of these now appear wholly satisfactory in regard to the mental temper of the present. The *Zeitgeist* can never be appeased or satisfied by hypothetic reminiscences. Yet in each effort to embody the Christian spirit in human life as a whole there was in its own way and for its own period a substantial even if limited advance, a genuine conquest and true spiritual civilizing of man's native barbarism and stupidity. Even the crudest and least wise of such attempts was less foolish than the acquiescence in contentment with the average, and the consequent sinking lower than the average, which would otherwise have ensued. No genuine essay or experiment in the actualizing of the ideals of the Kingdom has ended in absolute and irredeemable failure.

The spirit that has lived and wrought in every stage of the building of God's city, its secret genius and companion, has not been wholly baffled by blindness of circumstance or by perversity of human will. When the Christian spirit has not absorbed the material obstacles that have thwarted and hindered the realization of its "final end," it has penetrated them as a ferment and used them as a means, however imperfect and unexpected, towards conclusions greater than themselves.

The weapons which seem at first to be death-dealing to the religion of Christ have a strange trick of fitting themselves to its hands. Modern biblical criticism and the theory of biological evolution are striking instances of this.

The promise, "No weapon that is formed against thee shall prosper," may be rendered, "Every weapon that is formed against thee shall become a tool for thy use."

Hence come the inexhaustible resourcefulness, the spiritual elasticity, arising as it were with upspringing force from the very dust. "Age cannot wither" the Religion of Christ, nor "custom stale" its "infinite variety."

It is at once a citizen and a pilgrim, a power in the world assimilating what is best in humanity, and a visitant to the world from a higher and eternal sphere. It is at once at home in the world and greater than the world; incorrigible, as it seems to its hostile and impatient critics, adequate as it is to the calls of those situations which seem in regard to it pregnant with disaster—because it bears within its own life

the unexpectedness and the infinite resourcefulness of the life of God.

It is rather to the unforeseen potentialities of the Christian religion than to any one Christian Church as instituted to-day that the needs of the present and of the future as anticipated from the present make their unconscious appeal. The Religion of Christ as a whole, even amid its divisions, is, as an idea, more rich in its capacities than is the presentation made of it up to this by any one of the separate Christian communions. The word "Christian" has about it a more human and evangelic ring than either of the words "Catholic" or "Protestant." Christ, never more alive than He is to-day, is greater than Christendom, and Christendom itself as a whole than any of the sections of its broken unity.

Though the Church has never failed, even at the worst times, to produce true individual types of Christian holiness and to lead responsive souls into personal touch with their Redeemer, the claim involved in Christ's kingship over life as an entirety has been as a rule disregarded by it in proportion to the growth of the practical materialism and even defiant realism of the nominally Christian or non-Christian world. Admitting to the full the crimes and mistakes, the paganism and the rationalism involved in the Renaissance and the international revolutionary movement respectively, neither can be dismissed as wholly evil and as products of anti-christ. The Renaissance included Erasmus, Shakespeare, Rembrandt, Copernicus, as well as unethical statecraft and neo-pagan lubricity. The Revolution sounded a trumpet note in the ears of the youthful Wordsworth. Not all in Rousseau was

sentimentalist. Not all in Shelley was unpractical. The shaft of Voltaire's attack on the Church was winged by his hatred for the cruelty inflicted on Calas. Each in its own way, the better elements of these two great human movements—that of art, letters, criticism, and science, in a word of the awakening modern mind, on the one hand, and that of the effort to break down unjust social conditions on the other—the Renaissance and the Revolution, the latter in the sense of modern democratic internationalism—tried respectively, in the case of the one, to help man to gain and satisfy the desire for knowledge and the sense of beauty, and in that of the other to summon him to walk as a free man in a brotherhood of freedom.

At both periods, the humanist and the humanitarian, the critical and the revolutionary, the official Church as a whole failed to "take the precious from the vile" and to secure the truth as distinct from the errors involved in the ideas which thrilled the minds of men as they called them to development and change.

In the main the European Church, or Churches, at both these great periods, shrinking at the touch of unaccustomed forces, failed to bring forth from their Master's treasure "things new and old," and committed themselves to an attitude either of fierce reaction or of the harassed perplexity of vested interests challenged by criticism. Neither the Reformation nor the Counter-Reformation succeeded in coming to terms with the humanist spirit, whether in the æsthetic or the scientific sphere. The tendency of religious impulses to act the part of the cuckoo nursing towards the other inhabitants of the

nest, to dwarf or exile the imagination, of which beauty is the correlative and satisfaction, as also the reasoning faculty which seeks in the first place to see the object as in itself it really is—this constant strain and tension between the various parts of our nature, the spiritual, the æsthetic, and the rational, is an obvious fact which it is hard to reconcile with the unity of the source from which emerge alike the Good, the Beautiful, and the True. The danger that religion may starve the rest of our nature is no unreal one. Baron von Hügel places this tendency of keenly felt belief to reign in solitude as one of the greatest problems involved in Christianity.

In regard to the later crisis in which Christianity was involved, that which culminated in the revolutionary movements, of which the French upheaval of 1789 was the titanic initiation, another kind of incapacity of coherent relationship meets us. Underlying the inability of the Christianity of the time to treat the Renaissance movement wisely was the perpetual misunderstanding between the senses and the spirit. So also beneath the mutual repulsion of the Church and the Revolution, of the lovers of souls and of the lovers of mankind, lay the divergence between the conception of man as pilgrim spirit, each soul an island in the ocean of being, and of him as a human animal, inhabitant of the earth and citizen of civilization.

The democratic movement of modern times, from the end of the eighteenth century downwards, in spite of the unreflecting character of the rhetoric by which it was often propagated, and of the fanaticism and cruelty which disgraced it in revolutionary France, was, in its origin, a defiance to unjust

conditions and the injustice involved in their perpetuation under traditional sanctions.

It was a refusal to regard injustice as inevitable, whether as involved in a consecrated social state of existence, or as a law of nature. The upheaval for the release of the serf and for the uplift of the people was not merely born of pedantry and sentimentalism on the part of its intellectual supporters, the intelligentsia of humanitarianism, nor of greed and envy on the part of the poor. It had behind it generous impulses and a genuine and well-merited sense of grievance. The development of democracy into an alliance with materialism and atheism was not essential and unavoidable. The movement in France was at its beginning not necessarily even Deist in the anti-Christian sense. In Europe generally, however, including England, the timid hostility of the official Church, or at least of its dignitaries, to any attempt to interfere with the existing order was not only or chiefly due to instinctive and intellectual repulsions of a type as adequate and legitimate as that of Burke in regard to the French upheaval. The more usual cause of opposition was the fear of interference with established interests, a fear not arising from a philosophical, rational, and disinterested type of conservatism, always worthy of consideration, and from the Christian and rightful preference for evolution as against revolution; but rather the offspring of stupidity and nervelessness. Christianity at such a time, whenever it had a sincerely devout element of adherents, regarded itself solely as the pathway to heaven for individual souls, or as far as it had any social content, as a "Lady Bountiful" for the "deserving poor."

When unreligious and frankly, even if soberly, worldly, it was entirely engaged in, and its outlook filled by, the defence and maintenance of the ecclesiastical institution, and that in regard to its political and secular interests rather than its ideal aspect. This is true of the state churches of Europe before and during the revolutionary era. Amid the mistakes in theory and action of the democratic movement generally,—and they have been too often on the largest scale,—as the driving force of that upheaval there has been a feeling that equality of opportunity, even in regard to the simplest needs of life, was not, as it ought to be, within the reach of all. Yet how often what is reasonable in the claims involved in the whole movement—and the above at least is fundamentally reasonable—has met with but little sympathy, sometimes even with opposition, from the official Church, as distinct from the action of Christian individuals.

At this age of crisis, this time in which we now live, not “the earth only, but also heaven” is being shaken. Yet “those things which cannot be shaken” will remain.

How much of our Christianity of use and custom, established either by law or by convention, will come out unscathed from the purging fires?

Or will the fires that might have purged become for us penal?

Will the present world-crisis add another to the turning-points when the Church as a whole “has made the great refusal”?

Upon our power to “seize the opportunity” will depend the answer to the question. It is not so much new methods as a new spirit, a new influx

of wisdom and courage, which is required from the representatives and followers of Christ. The time of crisis is the time of judgment; a judgment that is none the less decisive because it is apparently automatic and inherent in circumstances. The wider range of opportunities amid which nations and men now live forms a call to vision and to service unparalleled in the history of past generations.

The complaints of the Church's failure which reflect man's disappointed expectations are but an inverted tribute to the greatness of Christianity. That from which nothing is expected is not the subject of complaint.

The history of past movements and experiments in the attempted control and inspiration of human life, public and corporate—and not only and solely personal—by the spirit of uncompromising idealism is at once a succession of warnings and of encouragements. In this sphere the figures of the charlatan and the fanatic have been as prominent as have been those of the sane and disinterested lover of mankind. John of Leyden and Mazzini have each played their parts on this stage. Joan of Arc and the wild women of the French Revolution have alike appeared on it.

When we consider the pitfalls which beset disinterested idealism and the narrow ledge that lies between its course and that of reckless and witless fanaticism, we see some good in the English inaccessibility to ideas and distrust of a coherent view. The English mind and genius have no restless tendency to frame events in a synthetic and subjective *Weltanschauung*. They have an innate preference for action over thought, even for "muddling

through " over the application of thin and intolerant abstractions to the complicated *Unio Oppositorum* of actual phenomenal life.

This English characteristic is also capable of defence on higher ground, and even in the world of pure reason, as an instinctive recognition of the impossibility, at least on this side of the Beyond, of any monistic resolution of human life, in its large complicated conditions—complicated by its very nature and not merely by lazy acquiescence in unreason—either into absolute naturalism on the one hand or into absolute idealism on the other. Nietzscheanism and Quakerism alike fail in their respective attempts at simplification. Compromise or eclecticism, whichever we call the everyday instinctive method of unsophisticated humanity, is the inevitable condition of any solid advance, even of any retaining of painfully and gradually gained acquisitions.

Man is a double-natured creature. He cannot live wholly in the air of pure ideas on the one hand or on the other on a soil from which the flight and ascent of the spirit is impossible. He is neither pure angel nor pure animal. He has both a body of flesh and the wings of the spirit. He must manage to use both, if he is to live effectually in a world which eludes resolution into any of the simplifications and the monisms demanded by absolute and abstract rationality. The recognition of this necessity finds its strongest support in that impartial study of human history in its wide scope and its long reaches which corroborates, on the whole, the instinctive and often unconscious refusal of man's mind to force life's tangled irregularities into the

condition of logical tidiness secured by the supremacy of an abstraction.

If of one sphere of life or era of history after another it may be truly said that "the time of the wise is taken up with the undoing the blunders of the good," how much more does this apply to the blunders of the victims of intellectual conceit and of inability to think justly and comprehensively.

Yet all the truth does not lie on the side even of so profound a thinker as Edmund Burke, with his warnings against ill-considered change. At the heart of every widespread and deeply felt movement lies an element of inevitable truth, of unavoidable necessity, as Burke himself admits.

At the present time thought and feeling on the subject of religion are tossed about between the Scylla of an apparently clear-eyed pessimism which pierces through camouflage and the Charybdis of a sentimentalism which practically involves the position that the essence of happiness lies in being well-deceived, that slipshod thinking is excusable and even useful if it succeeds in evading the unpleasantness of facts.

That presentation of Christianity which does not seek hasty simplification, but accepts as essential in our creed its apparently paradoxical character, is one which is, in the long run, the most practical cure alike for hopelessness and for superficiality, in view of the persistent problems by which human life and history is waylaid. These problems are essentially and at one and the same time both social and spiritual. They arise out of that intricate nature of man which a "divine tactic" has made coherent and interdependent, "moving all together if it move

at all." They challenge man's spirit and not his intelligence alone. The vision of wide and prolonged experience, if its lessons are patiently assimilated, is ultimately a wiser guide than the hasty logic which clears up the tangles of the world of fact by ignoring all premises which interfere with its own foregone conclusions. Again and again idealists, pedants, and doctrinaires have blundered fatally with their windy theories, without firmness of footing in the world of fact and experience.

Yet the supreme miscalculation of all is involved in the slackness of mind and will which has at one opening after another in the history of the Church caused the latter to miss the irrevocable opportunity, and to excuse itself by using the axioms of mediocre prudence. Adventure is as necessary a part of the virtue of true prudence as is circumspection. Wisdom takes risks as well as avoids dangers. Her kinship is with the eagle rather than with the bat.

Also, if the common mass appears to be without a soul, official Christianity has too often been without a heart. The supremacy of love transcends the influences alike of cold foresight and of unreasoning passion. The influence of this growing supremacy should have two results in Christianity. It should make the Church human and mankind spiritual.

This supremacy was evident, though within a comparatively narrow range as to its actual sphere of operation and its immediate interests, in the earliest Church. But in later developments of Christian history, forces other than love—forces great indeed but not the greatest—have occupied the throne intended for the latter, and love has sometimes wandered in strange disguises outside

the boundaries of her lawful home. To welcome back this heavenly stranger and to enthrone her in her rightful place in Christianity and, through it, to extend the influence of her law over the whole of life—from within to without, from the heart to the nation, and beyond it, to the commonwealth of mankind—is the work to which the Church of to-day is called.

No external utopia is likely to rise as if at the touch of an enchanter's wand. There are no short cuts to perfection, social any more than personal. Yet the Kingdom is not confined solely to the individual soul. It has its core and seat in humanity, and in the fullness of humanity, not in some lonely fragment of incoherent life. The call and the mission involve each other.

Though the thirst for perfection may never be satisfied in this present sphere of existence, whether in the soul or in society, yet to labour for its satisfaction is the law of man's existence, or at least of the rise of that existence above the lower levels parallel with purely animal life.

"He hath put the world within the heart of man." The macrocosm of the spiritual universe, of life's ideal fullness is the satisfaction which corresponds to the microcosm of man's infinite need. The indomitable and restless instinct of the human spirit is prophetic of the transfiguration of the temporal. The vision, without which the people perish, does not merely derive its meaning from utilitarian experience. It is the reflection of reality. It has its throne not only in man's heart and brain, but also in the very nature of things. It haunts the mind of man because it is organic with his being.

CHAPTER II

THE PRE-MEDIÆVAL PERIOD

CHRISTIAN ethics, writes Troeltsch, at the end of his unique survey of the historical development of the social implications of Christianity, have no merely abstract existence, they are not the expression of a code, but a living, energetic impulse, a mastering of the changing relations of the world's history, a wrestling with the very material of human nature and moulding it to the embodiment of ideal purposes.

The substance of Christian ethics is something energetic and alive, manifested continually in concrete forms and indeed extended in the collective incarnation of a world-wide fellowship, yet never closed up into a legal system of detailed and final regulations. Christianity is primarily a life exhibited necessarily under human conditions and therefore exhibited in human relations. It is no mere compendium of celestial abstractions, but a moving stream of spiritual energy and power, something that is for ever becoming, a prophecy never fully realized, rather than a completed memory. Hence it is vain to seek in the religion of Christ for a finished scheme of civil government and organization which can be fitted on to the ever-varying circumstances of social existence and the changing play of human instincts, passions, and wills. Though Christianity is necessarily a religion of discipline be-

cause it is a religion of growth, yet both outwardly in history and inwardly in the soul it is life rather than rules. The living God is no spinner of systems that are impervious to change, but seems to work towards the accomplishment of His vast design by processes of analysis and dissolution as well as by those of constructive order. Though He is the Ancient of Days, yet from His mind proceeds the energy ever young to which the future belongs.

At its origin, Christianity was no mere block of solid matter, theological and ecclesiastical, projected unexpectedly into an alien environment. Nor in its first extension had it any *tabula rasa*, or clean slate, to work upon. Affinities as well as antagonisms met it in the Græco-Roman world. It found allies, often strange and unwelcome, in the denizens of that thought-sphere of which the Mediterranean civilization was the equivalent and embodiment. In fact, the pagan World State and the conditions of social life of which the latter was the guardian and the expression had manifest capacities of affinity with, as well as of repulsion from, the religion of the cross.

If, on the one hand, the tonic ethical rigour of Christianity proved its Semitic origin, on the other its spiritual elasticity, its potentialities of development, its power of sending out tendrils of attachment from every side of its own being and into every quarter of its environment, witnessed to its inherent humanness, its capacity to become a world religion. It was at once solitary as the Jew and many-sided as the Hellene, a thing at once above the world and yet in the world, a law revealed from above, an energy working from within.

In the political and social worlds, especially, the barriers of the *Pax Romana* were no longer like fortifications of granite forbidding access to outside forces, whether such access was by onslaught or by penetration. The Roman civilization was porous, and influences, even from the farthest East, trickled through its walls. So through all sorts of channels, often undiscernible to the ordinary observer, the life of the New Religion surged into and through the *civitas terrena*, at the last shaking it to its foundations, and reshaping into a new order, the same yet not the same, the spiritual elements of the ancient world, and with and after them its social elements as well. This process of penetration was encouraged by the fact that the Christian spirit, that of a transcendental mysticism and fraternity, of a slave-religion that was also the religion of loftiest spiritual distinction, at once august and homely, had its friends and allies, often entirely unconscious ones, in the very camp of its enemies.

The Mithra cave of the virile soldiers' cult was no mere shrine of demons as the Christians believed it to be. It had its mysterious connexions in thought and sentiment with that other cave, the birthplace of the prince of peace. In thousands of hearts, in the silence of an unformulated desire, the manger and the cross were set up as in the action of a dream. The better spirit of the later pagan world, the spirit which breathes through the mind of Virgil, was on its way to Bethlehem. The racial barriers had fallen. The pooling of the nations had begun. The *Zeitgeist*, the spirit of the age, was catholic rather than patriotic. *Univer-*

sitas rather than *Patria*, the human race rather than the city state, was at once the starting-point and the goal of political thought.

In such an atmosphere the idea of the church acquired the character of a catholicism in which Judaic theism, in spite of its sharpness of outline and its spiritual stringency, was blended with the intellectually elastic and complex world of the later Hellenist thought.

If the first spring of the life of Christendom was from the Jewish theocracy, the rock struck by the rod of Moses, its enrichment and expansion were hastened and even partly caused by the contribution of tributary streams of which the mind of Plato was the source or which had passed through that mind, and been penetrated by its tincture. Plato's Republic, Aristotle's City State were enlarged into the Commonwealth of Humanity. Stoicism formed the transition and link from pagan patriotism to Christian universalism.

In spite of the alliance of Neo-Platonism with the expiring paganism, and of the great modernist effort of such noble souls as Plutarch to vivify the pantheon of polytheism by visaging its inmates as subordinate rays of one immanent divinity, the truest affinity of the Platonic tradition at its best and its loftiest was with the Christian Revelation. The Stoic emperor-saint, Marcus Aurelius, might censure the Christian martyrs for their tragic posings, as he thought them, yet it was the basal Stoic conception of the Law of Nature (*Lex Naturæ*) in which the Christian Church was to find the charter of the original and inalienable dignity of each human being, and

also of the solidarity of mankind. Knit together by the common sharing in that universal Reason which was conceived as penetrating all nature and welling up into conscious life in the spirit of man, Humanity was viewed as fundamentally one in origin and being by the noblest pre-Christian thinkers, the disciples of the Porch. That was the austere philosophy which both in source and character possessed more than a tinge of the spiritually autonomous authority of Old Testament prophecy, for Stoicism, partly Semitic in origin, was Judaic in its rigour though lacking in the Judaic hope. The Christianity of the early Catholic Church has been described as a blend of Judaic and Platonic elements. It might even more truly be regarded as the mingling of the spirit, rather heroic than ascetic, of Galilee and Calvary with the Stoic sense of human solidarity and with the Stoic faith in the value of human personality and of the fundamental equality of man.

Before S. Paul had planted the cross of the slave and of the slave's Redeemer along the Mediterranean lands, Stoicism often by its own wandering preachers, the friars of the later paganism, had helped to broaden and soften, to internationalize and humanize the spirit of what had once been, and still partly was, the hard pagan world. The "spirit of the wide world dreaming on things to come," the World Soul, had as it were descended from its shrine to become a wanderer, expectant, prophetic of something greater than itself. The cave sanctuaries of Mithra rather than the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus were now the places of celestial assignation. The common man, the soldier, the trader,

came to find a brother in their divine inhabitant, the redeemer god, the heavenly comrade.

The pagan State religion had become the tolerant patroness of a brood of adopted children of the oriental cults. The result was an extraordinary extension both of mysticism and of humanitarianism, though the mysticism was generally far below the starry heights of Plotinus, while the humanitarianism could only languidly ignore but never seriously attempt to eradicate the bloodstained sports which were the school of cruelty, of hardness of heart, for the Roman world.

The State was no longer the hardy mother of a race of heroes. The taunt or wail of Nietzsche is that Christianity killed the virility of Rome, turning youths who could have become splendid athletes, soldiers, and statesmen into monks, self-centred in gloomy thoughts, instrumental, consciously or unconsciously, in that great conspiracy against life of which the Church must bear the main responsibility. This view is older than Nietzsche, it is latent in Gibbon's estimate of the same events, and it was expressed by Celsus as one of his main charges against the "Great Church."

For such as Celsus, Christianity was anti-civic, unpolitical; it made men useless dreamers; it took the red particles out of the blood of mankind. The Christians were, in the words which the ex-Kaiser applied so often to his own German Socialists, "fellows without a fatherland," anti-patriotic. To which Origen replies that they are *σύστημα πατρίδος*, an organism with a real *Patria*, a citizenship as wide as the Universe. "Say not now," writes Marcus Aurelius, "dear city of Cecrops, but say dear city

of God." Here the Emperor who persecuted the Christians was nearer to the Christian temper than he was to the realism of the pagan erastianism and nationalism of the date before the nations had been, as it were, melted together into the *Verschmelzung*, the racial indeterminateness, into which the civilized world was pooled.

Christianity entered that world as one among a tribe of eastern cults. It was a considerable time before it roused the attention, much less the conscious hostility, of the Roman State. When it did so, when the Government began to feel that, unlike the other mystery religions, the Catholic Church "meant business," it was quite as much the intolerance of the Church itself as the intolerance of the Empire which made the situation critical. The intransigent temper of the church towards the cult of the Emperor, a cult which to the average citizen was practically no more than a symbol of the omnicompetence of the State, the Church's *non-possumus* attitude towards the easy-going State religion and its protean auxiliaries or rivals, the non-official Mysteries—this, the more Judaic element in the Christian complex, was professedly repugnant to the Roman political mind. That mind, like that of our own Queen Elizabeth, was one that, while insisting on a certain degree of outward conformity, yet did so without the slightest tinge of zealotry (for Elizabeth herself was rather a Gallio than a fanatic), and with the inducement to conform that after all conformity was only external and, in the characteristically Machiavellian words of that acute stateswoman, "left opinion free." The Roman politician must have felt it surprising that Chris-

tianity, in a world of make-believe and compromise, should take paganism so seriously. Fierceness of temper, and rigour of outlook and of will, were characteristics in the early martyrdoms rather of the persecuted than of the persecutors. The latter, the magistrates and statesmen that is, not the mob, seem to have regarded the whole terrible business as a highly disagreeable necessity, and the Christian victims as foolish people who insisted on committing suicide because of unpractical ideas and unintelligible scruples. Still such scruples might mean real disloyalty, the sect of dreamers become an *imperium in imperio*, and so, as a wholesome deterrent, the law must have its course.

The root difficulty, the real cause of persecution, was the insistence by the church on its own self-government, not only in matters purely affecting religious ritual or speculation, but in many questions the settlement of which was a monopoly of the Roman Law, as in regard to marriage, for instance. This involved a practical refusal to recognize the *Plenitudo Potestatis* of the Emperor, who after all in his capacity of *Persona Publica* was but the State personified. The Church's attitude was based on the supposed right of the Christian society or association to independence in vitally important human relations involved in the life and work of the society. Already the conception of Liberty of Association, so hateful to all absolutisms and over-centralized powers, was felt by both the church and its critics to be a central point, which the Christians could never concede without disloyalty to Christ, since He must be master in His own house. But it was also an assumed right which the

state could never grant without ceasing to be omniscient. It was increasingly felt to be an intolerable challenge to the character of the Empire as the sole *Societas perfecta*, the solitary collectivist unity, mechanical and uniformist, rather than organic and multitudinous. The mediæval federalistic idea of the community as a *Societas societatum* was entirely foreign to the older Latin mind. The dome of the Renaissance basilica represents the Latin, the clustered towers and spires of the Gothic cathedral, the purely mediæval, ideal.

The dilemma between the claims of the Pagan State and those of the Christian Church has been often represented as one between the world-accepting temper, tolerant and facile in its attitude towards moral distinctions, and the world-rejecting one viewing the earthly life of the flesh and the senses and the pride of the intellect and of the will as at best unreal and evanescent and at worst the bait upon the hook of Satan. It is, however, an inadequate and superficial view which would represent the first Christians as anti-social and solely absorbed in the pursuit of individual salvation. The Church was originally Judaic, an offshoot of a Semitic community, though at an early period it had passed out of a Judaic into a Hellenist environment.

Now the root idea of Orphism, the later Hellenism generally, and Gnosticism in all their forms was that of matter as the congenial home of evil, and of salvation as the extrication of man's spirit from its physical entanglement in the alien material world. At the opposite pole altogether—the onward march of “a good time coming,” the days of Messiah, the Kingdom of God appearing on earth, are among

the most central thoughts of Old Testament prophecy, especially before Apocalyptic transferred the climax to another world. Judaism was essentially theo-centric, the later Hellenism psycho-centric. Hence the greater virility of Judaism at its best, its joy of battle, the *gaudium certaminis* of the war song of the Psalter—"Exurgat Deus," "Let God arise and let his enemies be scattered." The affinity of the temper and attitude of the prophets of the Old Testament is rather with the mood of ancient Persia than of India, with the Zoroastrian spirit of conflict rather than with the Buddhist one of world flight. Greek thought, in spite of the olympian sunshine which played on its heights and bathed its vales, had a deep under-current of feeling and ideas which hindered its being completely at ease in the material world. "I am a star like yourself," said the Orphic worshipper to the heavenly powers. In Hellenism, as in mediæval Christendom, man felt the influence of the "nostalgia of the infinite," the homesickness of the soul, *in via* here, *in patria* in the Beyond.

In spite of the serious preoccupation with spiritual things of the Hebrew prophets on the one hand, and of the artistic and athletic side of the Greek life on the other, the fact remains that there was an other-worldly strain in Hellenist idealism, and a political sense in the mind of Israel. A candid study of the history of religion runs counter to the conventional idea of the Greeks as happy children and of the Jews as occupied solely with matters of the soul. In the Old Testament literature, the ideal of good citizenship, of the

political side of human life, is present in a most stringent and pressing form. The prophets of Israel sublimate patriotism and citizenship. They do not eliminate them. On the other hand, if Plato is the builder of *The Republic*, he is also the prophet of immortality.

The living God, the energy of history, clothing Himself with time as with a garment, coming out of His place in eternity, is the central force of the religion of Israel.

The privilege and destiny of the immortal soul called to contemplate divine reality and realize kinship with it are the underlying interests of the later Hellenism.

In the development both of Hebrew and of Hellenic history, the civic virtues receded owing largely to inevitable circumstances. In Judaism, the future Kingdom of God became more and more apocalyptic and catastrophic, less on earth, more from the clouds. In Hellenism the life of the soul and the common rationality of humanity took the place of the city state, with its intensive political and social culture, and its sharply defined severance from the mass of outside barbarians. It is no longer the Greek citizen, but man as such, who is τὸ ζῶον πολιτικόν (the social animal). While by a parallel process in Judaism, developed into Christianity, the conception of the theocratic city and people is enlarged into that of a world-wide spiritual polity. The tent of Shem becomes a temple wide enough to embrace humanity.

The witness of the New Testament, though more profoundly spiritual and less apparently annexed to local and temporary conditions than that of the

Old Testament, is also one that makes for solidarity. New Testament religion is not solely that of lonely truth-seeking. If the Epistle to the Galatians in its witness for the spiritual claims of the Individual supplied the spark for the Reformation protest, the Epistle to the Ephesians represents Christ as the Recapitulation of Humanity, its *Ἀνακεφαλαίωσις*. It was as a society, essentially visible, organic rather than either mechanical or atomist, that at its beginning the religion of Christ startled, attracted, or terrified the world. So also the Christian view of man's nature involves the belief in the fact that the human race in its very roots is composed of socially coherent elements; that the individual did not make society, but that society helped to make the individual; that the latter is born into the former—so that there never was a time when a number of unattached individuals could say with any hope of success, "Go to, let us form society, let us make the State";—that the State, as far as the State is the natural outcome of the social instinct, is man enlarged, not man's manufacture or afterthought.

Here Aristotle, S. Paul, S. Thomas Aquinas, and Edmund Burke are at one. The atomist, individualist conception of so many of the writers of the *Aufklärung* and Revolution periods has nothing in common with that organic view of human society which lies at the basis of the noblest classical and mediæval Christian thought, and which is experiencing so powerful and many-sided a revival in the present day. Christians in the pre-Constantine period could not directly influence the State. They were outside it—a *tertium quid*. Yet the Church could, and in the main did,

uphold in its own life a witness to the true principles on which human society stands.

Two ideals form the norm, the underlying and implicit essence of the life of the Church. One is that of the family, the other that of the bodily organism. Christianity realized in itself its own existence as that of a Family and a Body—the *Familia Dei*, the *Corpus Christianum*. Its social character was at once *patriarchal* and *organic*. The first of these aspects is the more distinctly Judaic of the two. The wholesome and beautiful glimpses of Jewish family life during and after the Exile which meet us in the Book of Tobit, in the description of the wise wife and mother in the Proverbs, and in the keen-edged sayings about domestic life, its duties and difficulties, in Ecclesiasticus, are foretastes of the Christian home, and the Christian home is the germ, nucleus, and microcosm of the Church, the Family of God. “Receive, O Lord, we pray Thee, this oblation of our service and of Thy entire Family”—these words, for instance, of the canon of the Mass have in them the air of an immemorial antiquity. They carry us back to the days of the Patriarchs, to the time when Abraham and his clan came out of Ur of the Chaldees, and when the Church of God dwelt as yet within the tent of Shem. The social experiments involved in Christian citizenship, the attempts to apply the Christian spirit to the political conditions of to-day, are efforts which the primitive Christians would have hardly understood and could not possibly have anticipated. For most of them, except for a few larger minds, “dreaming of things to come” and seeing but incomplete glimpses of them, it was enough to know

that the Lord was coming to destroy the existing condition of society, which lay largely in the embrace of the Evil One. In a corrupt and hopeless world it was enough for the Church to exhibit in herself the life of the Family of God.

The other root ideal of the older Christianity is one which shews itself in its earliest manifestation within the Church as that of the *σῶμα Χριστοῦ*, "the Body of Christ" of S. Paul's epistles, particularly in the First Epistle to the Corinthians. But earlier than this, it has its roots outside the New Testament in the splendid conception of Humanity as one in origin and essence, as, alike in every individual and in the race, "possessed of reason and capable of virtue," a conception which marks the world view of Stoicism. The extreme asceticism of the fourth century partly counteracted the Stoic-Christian humanism. The separation between the Church and the World became, in the case of the more thoroughgoing Christians, absolute rather than relative. In the expressive terms of Troeltsch, the original *Überweltlichkeit*, the treading on heights above the world level, the indifference to the Average, became *Weltflucht* or world flight, *Weltverurtheilung* or world condemnation.

As the ascetic impulse swept through the Church it tended not only to cleanse the pollution of nature but to overwhelm nature itself. With Jesus, on the other hand, as has been truly said, the distinction is between the Present and the Future, rather than between the Church and the World.

Two divergent lines of thought and action as to the Christian attitude to the State came sharply to the front about the time of the conversion of Con-

stantine. In the New Testament itself both are to be found. On the one hand, Christ bids tribute to be given to Cæsar. S. Luke in his Gospel and in the Acts anticipates Dante in the *De Monarchia* in seeing the hand of God behind the Roman Empire. The peace-constraining force of Cæsar appears to brood over and around the manger of that Child who opened His eyes in the great Augustan days upon a world weary of war. In S. Luke's view the halcyon bird hovers over the waters, when Augustus becomes Emperor and Christ is born in Judæa. S. Paul, the master of S. Luke, takes pride in his Roman citizenship and appeals to its legal implications, while in a classic passage of the Epistle to the Romans (Chapter xiii.) he sees in the civil government the ministering servant of the unseen and eternal justice, *Lex animata*, *Justitia animata*, as mediæval phrases described the sovereign. "He beareth not the sword in vain." S. Paul's recognition of the secular ruler as having divine right, has, as history shews, been perverted to the defence of tyranny, yet it is a most necessary witness against the dualism to which, whether in the form of clericalism or of pietism, religious people are prone. In a true sense, God stands behind all public office, as its origin, upholder, and justification. The secular life is inherently sacred. This is the inner meaning, the implied postulate, of Dante's exaltation in his *De Monarchia* of the Empire, as holding its authority direct from God. No sphere of life that is necessary and legitimate can be lived outside the sanction of God. This idea was developed into that of a world-dominion of Christ, in which, in every nation, kings and legislators,

judges and tribunes of the people, as well as prophets and priests, are the ministers of His will.

The splendid idealism of mediæval thought expressed this in the great words with which in our Coronation Service the orb is placed within the hands of the sovereign: "Take this orb, and know that the whole world lies under the dominion of Christ."

The other and opposite influence to that which sees God's rule over all life, finds expression in the attitude of the Apocalypse towards Rome, the harlot queen of the world, and "the Beast" in whom is embodied the brutal *egoismus* of the Roman power at its worst, when Nero or Domitian sat in Cæsar's seat, and every whelp of Satan drank his fill of Christian blood.

The twofold attitude persevered, in peace the one, during martyrdom the other. When Constantine bowed before the cross his head rather than his heart, the crisis arrived. The world accepting and the world rejecting took their respective lines. The first allowed Christian ethical principles, especially those of brotherhood, to lose their edge and their radiance, to become blunt and dim, while the facile entry of half-converted or unconverted multitudes broke down the fences of the vineyard of the Lord and merged the world and the Church under a common standard of compromise. On the other hand, the stricter Christians tended to break off into rigorist heresies, or to fly to the peace and purity of the desert. The immense wave of asceticism that was to sweep through Christendom had begun to rise.

Both types of Christian were right and both were

wrong. World conformity cannot be the spirit of the followers of Him whom the world hated, nor can a self-regarding piety that means indifference to the interests of Humanity as a whole be the expression of His mind whose arms were outstretched on the cross that He might embrace mankind.

In considering the problem of the approach of the Christian Church and of the Empire to one another, as the era of antagonism came to an end, the distinctive attitude of S. Augustine to the relation of Christianity to the State becomes of supreme importance. Alike in his mind and in the circumstances of his life, Augustine stands at the watershed of two historical eras, i.e. the later pagan and the Western Catholic, a unique figure of immense influence and interest. It is because of the impress of his character and personality, in circumstances so favourable to their action on his time, that Augustine's attitude to the life of the civil society of his era is so instructive, even when it is problematical as well. He cannot be said to have been torn asunder in mind and spirit between two worlds, the one in the pangs of dissolution, the other in the throes of birth, the dying paganism and the young Christianity. It was the latter that, after the decisive moment when his conversion was accomplished, had undivided possession of his being. Yet his mind has sufficient capacity of appreciating the secular majesty and the significance for civilization of the Roman World State to make it impossible for him to see in the latter merely a crowning manifestation of Satanic power. Though Augustine, like Tertullian, sees in the pantheon of Rome no more than a rabble of devils, yet his attitude to the political

and social traditions of the Empire, and of the Republic before it, has not got the stern, pessimistic consistency with which the earlier writer, his fellow African, places in antagonism, as with a great gulf fixed between them, the religion of Christ and the civilization of antiquity. We can scarcely imagine Augustine, who owed so much to Platonism, echoing Tertullian's flash of narrow logic, no doubt directed against the Alexandrian theologians, "What has Jerusalem to do with Athens?" The subtle, delicate intelligence of Augustine could be swept along by waves of anti-pagan scorn—it was the mind of a poet and of a rhetorician rather than of a scientific critic—yet the majesty of Rome, and the significance of secular civilization and of all that Rome had meant for it and done for it, could not leave his soul untouched with regret, even with reverence, in regard to the mighty memories of the past. Augustine, like Dante, was a lover of Virgil. The shade of Virgil seems to follow us through parts of the *De Civitate Dei* and to suggest milder and juster thoughts about the *Imperium Romanum* than are usual in the more torrential and prophetic passages of the work. The reason for the crucial significance of the *De Civitate* is because its central ideas stand, as it were, at the cross-roads, as indeed the Christian Church and western civilization did at the time when this book was produced. To view it as the earliest instance in Church history of a treatise in scientific theology which gives an all-round survey of the nature and character of the Church regarded as the ideal and divine society, is to entirely misconceive the character of its composition and the circumstances amid

which it came into being. It was written at various intervals between A.D. 317 and 326, and in spite of its immense length and ill-arranged proportions it is, in the words of Boissier, as to its starting-point and indeed its vertebral idea, a *livre de circonstance*, an apologetic for Christianity against a particularly dangerous because plausible attack from an almost dying but by no means impotent foe. It is intended as an answer to the despairing cry of the adherents of the older gods that the taking of Rome by Alaric in 410 was a sign that the new religion had incurred for Rome and the Romans the anger of Heaven, that the Providence or Fate which had been the guardian of the City and the Genius of the Empire had pronounced against the Judaic-Oriental innovation. Much of the *De Civitate* is therefore rather destructive than constructive. Augustine devotes the earlier part of his book to repelling the view that the greatness of Rome, what had made her rule, in its brooding omnipotence, like the overarching sky, august even when shewing portents of change and disintegration, was bound up with the acceptance of her civic pantheon, the older inhabitants of which were jostled by a mob of new gods increasing in number daily. For Augustine, with all his classical culture, the Capitoline Jove is no symbol of the majesty of the empire's life, the divine consecration of its world-wide unity, but rather the chief of a diabolical hierarchy, of the band of evil spirits by which Rome had been perverted. Augustine never lets his readers forget that Christianity is the child of Jewish Prophecy, in his fierce scorn for the pagan rabblement of gods. The Roman Empire,

in so far as it is pagan, "bears a lie in its right hand." Its Palladium is an impotent idol. The intolerance of Semitic Monotheism, the Greek appreciation of beauty, the Roman regard for law, cross and recross one another in the strange complex of Augustine's "City of God," as in the mind of its author. For Augustine was no Tertullian looking forward, as in the *De Spectaculis*, to that Dies Iræ when the entire Roman civilization should descend wrapt in the avenging flame. Unlike the other great African, Augustine had no lack of respect for the majesty of Rome regarded as the world-power of history, though he did not, like Dante afterwards, idealize the story of the Latin race and regard its victories as the outcome of the divine ordeal of battle. The attitude of apocalyptic fury is not one which Augustine's many-sided nature could have long maintained in regard to Rome. He was a scholar, with the moods of an artist, with an exquisite sense of beauty and a deep feeling of imaginative appreciation for what is central and august in the human story, and he knew that for this Rome was but another name. Augustine's view, also, of external nature is sacramental rather than dualist. As a true Platonist beauty has for him a divine value. His political and æsthetic senses touch one another when in the *De Civitate* (XI. 18) he regards history as the Poem of God.

It was impossible from these various points of view for Augustine to ignore or deny the greatness, within its own range and compass, of the pre-Christian political and social world in the history of which all things tended towards Rome and flowed

out from her again, tintured by her spirit and mastered by her impress. Augustine's great treatise as it proceeds grows into a theodicy, a history of the world as the scene of God's unfolding Providence, as well as of the education of the human race. Like Milton, he seeks "to justify the ways of God to men," and like Schlegel to discern "the history of the world as the judgment of the world." He sees in the processes of time the methods of the divine Spirit, the *παιδαγωγός*, the tutor escort of the human race.

It was impossible for him, from these points of view, to ignore the significance of Rome. Yet on the whole the prophetic and apocalyptic elements, even the ascetic viewpoints, are stronger in his work than the æsthetic, the scholarly, and the political ones. He is the seer rather than the historian.

S. Augustine at times seems to see in the Roman Empire the providential scaffolding for the building of the universal Church. In other places he practically identifies it with the *Civitas Terrena*, the city of pride, which seeks its own glory, as the opposing city, the *peregrina civitas regis Christi*, the pilgrim city, seeks the glory of its king. At the same time, on the whole, Augustine has a sense that the history of Rome is more than the annals of a *magnum latrocinium*, though by his refusal to it of the essential attribute of Justice (which he explains as including not only religious but theological considerations, as right belief and worship, giving God, as well as man, His due) he leaves it as falling short of the character of an ideal commonwealth. Still he regards Rome's history as superior to that of Assyria or of Tyre. Rome, in the *Civitas Dei*,

seems to occupy, on the whole, a middle position, higher than Babylon, lower than Jerusalem, above the former through her reign of law, beneath the latter through her lack of holiness. But if she is not the crowned harlot of the Apocalypse, neither is she the divine, regal, and sacerdotal figure of Dante's *De Monarchia*, the sibyl bending over the manger of Bethlehem, the power, priest rather than executioner, which accomplishes the sacrifice of Calvary. There is nothing in the *De Civitate*, even in the parts of the latter most appreciative of the secular greatness of the Empire, in common with Dante's political mysticism, with his sense of the immanent deity guiding the development of Rome. For S. Augustine, the Empire and the Church are still distinct, though the age of the martyrdoms is past, and though a Theodosius may draw forth the great bishop's praises as the Church's ideal champion of Catholicism against heathenism and heresy.

Theodosius is the subject of what the Augustinian scholars of Germany call the *Fürstenspiegel* or mirror of princes, the famous picture of an ideal ruler, in the *De Civitate*. Yet he is not a *Persona Mixta*, a theocratic sovereign or Vicar of God, like Charlemagne afterwards. He is no Justinian, at once Pope and Cæsar of the Byzantine imperial world. For Augustine, the Church State is in the womb, no doubt, but it is not yet born.

The supposed identification by Augustine of the visible Church with the Kingdom of Christ, and his responsibility for the mediæval ideal of the Church State or *Respublica Christiana*, are based mainly on Chapter 9 of the XXth Book of the *De Civitate*. It may be largely the influence of Bryce's

“Holy Roman Empire” which, among English writers, has led to a fathering on Augustine of the great mediæval Christendom. The proof of this falls much short of the statements so often made from Bryce downwards. The Kingdom Church of *De Civitate*, XX. 9, is a pilgrim body pursuing a confused and dangerous course through the intricate landscape of the world. It is now in light, now in shadow, but not as yet in glory. It is only the kingdom in the sense in which the field with mingled wheat and tares of Christ’s parable is the kingdom, as indeed Christ Himself calls it (“gather out of his kingdom,” etc., S. Matt. xiii. 41). It is only the kingdom in the making.

This chapter of the *De Civitate* is the nearest to the mediæval conception, but it is still a very partial anticipation of it. In Augustine’s mind, when the Kingdom of Christ becomes tangible and concrete, it is so not in solid magnificence like that of a Free City of mediæval Europe with its richly articulated existence, but rather as “partly a pilgrim among the wicked, partly enthroned in eternity,”—*Inter impios peregrinatur, in stabilitate sedis æternæ*. With all his culture and æsthetic sensibilities his sense of the world as the *pulcherrimum carmen* of God, His fairest poem—with all his admiration for the public spirit of Republican Rome, and for the civilization of the *Pax Romana* of the Empire, the ascetic strain in Augustine is never far absent. It makes itself felt all through this work like the sound of autumn wind among the leaves, even though with a tonic touch that has in it the prophecy of spring. It connects itself with Augustine’s overmastering predestinarian convictions, his two-

fold sense of God's sovereignty and of man's corruption.

He sets the *Voluntas Dei* over against the *massa peccati*, which is our fallen nature, omnipotent creative Will and corrupt creaturely impotence. Such is his theological logic when unqualified by the poetry or philosophy of other parts of his many-sided nature.

Even this famous chapter, in which the visible Church emerges clearly for the first time in the book as Christ's kingdom on earth, is nearer in spirit to the monasticism of the fourth century than to the Catholicism of the age of Dante and Aquinas. Augustine's description of the two cities of God and of the World, is that of those, on the one hand, who live after the flesh (that is, after human nature in its condition of breaking away from God, the race of Cain) and of those on the other who live after the Spirit (that is, in adherence to God, the race of Seth). Behind the first human ancestor of the *Civitas Terrena* lies the pride of Lucifer, since pride is *omnium malorum caput atque origo*. In the quaint rendering of John Healey, the sixteenth-century translator of the *De Civitate*, "pride rules in the fleshless devil" and not matter but perversion of will causes sin. On the other hand, the *Civitas Dei* has its spring in the obedience of the angels, for Augustine tells us (*De Civitate*, XIV. 12) that obedience is the mother and guardian of all virtues, *Obedientia mater et custos omnium virtutum*.

The beginning of both kingdoms, of faith and of unfaith alike, is outside earth and before the birth of history. As they begin in the obedience

or disobedience of the angels, so they have their goal and culmination respectively in the eternal world. Here we see only a segment of their progress towards the respective ends which await them. The rebellion of man has its earthly origin in the murder of Abel, just as Rome's foundations were laid in a brother's blood. But long before Romulus, and even before Cain, the city of pride began when Satan, originally good, as the nature of all beings was at first, became corrupted by the perversion of his will. Two loves make these two cities and are their formative principles—the love of God on the one hand, the love of self on the other,—*Fecerunt civitates duas amores duo*.

The citizens of God's city live truly according to nature in its original character, for Augustine, predestinarian as he was, had learned to hate his early Manicheanism, the heretical and Oriental predestinarianism or fatalism, which taught that nature was not originally and organically good. Augustine, on one side of his mind and teaching, is the forefather of Calvinism, with its root dogma of total depravity, yet he can nobly say of the double character of the human race that it is *Genus tum discordiosum vitio, tam sociale natura*. Here we have man recognized as congenitally social, and that including all men, one human family of which even slaves form a part.

There is, however, in the *De Civitate* no attempt at a social synthesis such as that which the thinkers of the Middle Ages attempted to create, or rather imagined to exist in the Europe of their day. The unity of the City of God is not that of an externally solid, fortress-like construction. Its unity is that of

the common loyalty of a band of soldiers struggling through an enemy's country, "where ignorant armies clash by night." In this world the two cities are mixed together—*De duarum civitatum quas in hoc sæculo perplexas invicem permixtas*—(*De Civitate*, X. 32). The statement of Harnack that Augustine, in the *De Civitate*, is the precursor of the Hildebrandine Papacy has much less to be said for it (although it has a little) than that of Troeltsch, in the latter's splendid monograph on the same work, the view that Augustine's mind, here, as everywhere, moves within the atmosphere and *Weltanschauung* of the early Christian period, though in its later or Constantinian stage, and that to represent him as the herald of the great mediæval Church State is to ignore the main stream of his ideas. Augustine has no conviction of the renewal of its youth, in a new and Christian stage, by the old Imperialism, and if he looks forward to the triumph of Catholicism, it is to a triumph the main features of which will be in Heaven, the Beyond.

The critical point in regard to Augustine's estimate of the State generally, at least when regarded as outside of and apart from the profession of the orthodox faith, is to be found in the curious and no doubt deliberate alteration which he makes in his adoption, as expressing his own view, of Cicero's definition of the State. The latter runs as follows: *Coetus juris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus*. Augustine omits the crucial reference to justice and changes the definition to this form: *Coetus multitudine rationalis, rerum quas diligit concordi communione sociatus*. Nor does he leave us without his reason for the change, which is de-

liberate and meant to denote a reduced estimate of the ethical contents of all that the Pagan Great State stood for at its best and highest. This reason is crucial; we have alluded to it before. Since, Augustine writes, the idea of justice involves as its main constituent element that of giving to each his due, it must above all include this attitude in regard to God Himself. It must become righteousness in the full scriptural sense, and involve conscious and holy worship as what is justly demanded of His creatures by Him who calls Himself a "jealous God."

Now any State which, like the Pagan Empire with its Cæsar cult, is organized as a creature-worshipping association cannot have the attribute of justice, even if it have such philosophers as Seneca and such emperors as Marcus Aurelius.

Are we then to proceed to compare with the above the often-quoted sentence in another part of the *De Civitate*—*Iustitia remota, quid regna nisi magna latrocinia?* Are we to conclude that Augustine would have us view the pre-Christian Empire as a confederacy of brigands, a South European counterpart to the Northern Teutonic "Blond Beast" of Nietzsche's admiration? If so, Augustine suggests the attitude on the part of the Church which was after his time expressed in the famous letter of Hildebrand to Hermann of Metz, in which the great pope describes regal government as having its origin in pride, robbery, and murder. The logical consequence of Augustine's disallowance of the attribute of justice to the non-Christian State is that the profession of the orthodox creed and membership in the commonwealth, baptism and citizenship,

go together, united indissolubly in the life of the community and of every individual composing it. In this sense Augustine indirectly helped to found the unity of mediæval Christendom.

In this view foreshadowed incidentally by the great African, but never fully anticipated by him, and indeed a creation of a much later age than his, Church and State are but two sides of one thing, or, at most, are parallel, moving in complete harmony of aim and method to the point of practical identity.

These are the implications of the *Institutes* of Justinian, and of all mediæval law following them. Augustine's alteration of Cicero's definition of the State gave a real impetus to what afterwards became the mediæval view on this subject. He could as little have foreseen the mediæval development in which Church and State were incorporated in one sacred organism, as he could have known the tremendous consequences of his own justification of the use of political coercion in religious matters by the application of the text in the gospels, “compel them to come in,” to the suppression of the Donatists. Eucken sees Augustine as the responsible pioneer, many centuries before, of the proceedings of the Inquisition. Persecution, however, had other illustrious apologists long before Augustine. Plato recognized its legitimacy. It was, later on, an inevitable consequence of the blending of Church and State into one society. As to auto-da-fés and massacres of heretics, Augustine could not have anticipated consequences from which he would no doubt have recoiled with horror. As far as the *De Civitate* is concerned, that work must never be

regarded as of the same nature with the *Summa* of S. Thomas, or the *Institutes* of Calvin. It is in its discursiveness and its personal bearings of the order rather of the Pauline epistles, that is, of the less systematic of them. It has the harmony of expression of a rich and varied view of half-seen phenomena, rather than the clear consistency of a set of logical propositions, coherent and inter-dependent. The truth is that many very different views of the relation of Christianity to the State and to civilization generally might claim support, with considerable shew of justice, from the writings of Augustine. His mind lay as it were on the horizon between two worlds, the ancient and the mediæval. As compared with such a writer as Origen, Augustine is near to the Middle Ages; as compared even with Gregory the Great, his true spiritual and intellectual centre is in the ancient world.

In regard to the root principle of mediæval sociology, i.e. the existence and character of the *Christiana Respublica*, as one community binding together in organic unity the Holy Roman Empire and the Holy Catholic Church, and representing the ideal unity of all humanity, the *Universitas humani generis*, Augustine is unmediæval. This great idea is not among his thoughts, nor could it have been. Its attempted realization lay in the womb of the future. At the most, a sort of tentative prophecy of it emerges here and there. In the *De Civitate*, even in those places of the work where the Church is most concrete and visible and approaches nearest in Augustine's thought to identification with the Kingdom of Christ, she is conceived of as in

essence the body known in its fullness to God alone, the people of a pilgrim adventure, a *peregrinatio*, if an army yet one on the move and one only dimly discerned by the observer, a host indeed but mist-covered and with many stragglers.

In regard to the social and political aspects of Christianity, some see the *De Civitate* as the *Te Deum* of the Church over the prostrate pagans and heretics, while the Spanish Catholic Emperor Theodosius—one who might take his stand, were it not for some cruel actions, with S. Louis of France, as a standard bearer of whom Holy Church need not be ashamed—secures the City of God in the possession of harmony and peace. On this view, the military theocracy of the crusading times is present in germ and in unconscious prophecy in the *De Civitate*. Others, and with more reason, in spite of Augustine's ecclesiastical interpretation of the reign of the saints on earth in the visions of the Apocalypse, consider the strain in his spiritual nature which accentuates the mystery of the sovereignty of grace to be the keynote of this strange and rambling book, which grew with his mind for years together, and in which logical arrangement is the least apparent element. After all, Augustine's presentation of the Kingdom of Christ is practically and entirely non-political. Both the Catholic and the Calvinist can appeal with justice to Augustine; the former to his anti-Donatist, and the latter to his anti-Pelagian, phase; the former to his doctrine of the Church as essentially visible and world-wide; the latter to his belief in absolute, predestinating and irresistible grace.

But the socialist and the mediævalist must be

disappointed in him. He has less of the sense of the organic nature of Humanity as a whole than many other of the Fathers, and far less than such a writer as S. Thomas Aquinas, writing under the meridian of thirteenth-century Catholicism with its merging of Church and State into one ideal unity. Of all German interpreters of the *De Civitate*, the one for whose distinctive interpretation there is least to be said is Sommerlad, who sees in Augustine mainly the prophet of Christian socialism, the pioneer of social world renewal. With much more truth does Troeltsch represent the spirit of the great saint as on the one hand immersed in the sunset splendour of the dying Empire and civilization, but as on the other having no strong hope of a new dawn for that ancient world, seeing the sunrise as on the "delectable mountains" rather than on the Seven Hills, in the Beyond rather than in Europe renewed.

Augustine's intransigent attitude towards non-ecclesiastical civilization, an attitude which he shares with other North African Christian writers, though never to so extreme a form as that exhibited by Tertullian, arises largely from his viewing grace and fallen nature, that is our present human nature, as standing to each other not so much in the relation of higher to lower, of leaven to dough (as in the synoptic parable), as in that of antagonism and irreconcilable hostility. Though Augustine sees the root of evil in the Will rather than in the Nature of man; though he attacks Manicheanism; yet some leading phases of his thought are not without a Manichean tinge.

How much more modern in the best sense than the Augustinian diagnosis of experimental religion

is the Thomist view that grace supports and perfects nature as well as cleanses it. *Gratia naturam supponit*. S. Thomas here, as elsewhere, represents the golden mean, in which grace and nature mingle.

If this, the more really Catholic view, the view of the main body of the Church, learned and unlearned, in all ages, be the true one, it follows that Augustinianism of itself can never adequately account for the importance and significance of the social organism, the social character of life. *Humanitas*, wrote the Christian Father, Lactantius, who blended Stoicism with the Faith, is *societatis appetens*. *Deus nos animal vult esse sociale*.¹

Such humanism, congenial to many of the Fathers because of the Stoicism which they had imbibed, is hard to reconcile with Augustine's predestinarianism. Predestination cuts across the grand sense of human equality common both to Stoics and to Christians of the main and central type.

Calvinism, the heir of Augustine, both as mystic and as disciplinarian, has given to men's lives a deep conviction of personal vocation and responsibility. It has entered like a tonic of the spirit into the veins of man's nature, in the case of those to whom its iron setting of Christianity was congenial, and whom its message of the all-sovereignty of the Almighty Will stimulated rather than depressed. Yet it has never been in fact a democratic creed, for it has neither been humane on the one hand nor really vulgar on the other. Popular Protestantism of the Pleasant Sunday Afternoon

¹ *Lactantius Instit.*, V. 8, quoted by Troeltsch.

type has parted company with Calvin's scholarship and logic. When Wyclif honoured the peasant he did so not as a man made like all other men in the image of God but as a possibly predestinated person. Augustinianism at its best is the religion of distinction and intensity. It has little in common with the spirit of compromise, the desire to come to terms with what is good in the world. Hence the instinct of the great body of average and ordinary Christians, the "once born," whether Catholic or Protestant, has never felt at home under the absolute supremacy of Augustine. Still less has it been at ease under the tyranny of so many of Augustine's followers, who have possessed all his intransigence without his moral profundity, his delicacy of spirit, his sense of beauty, his tenderness of heart, his humanism, the last so strangely blended in him with the dualist strain which was an unconscious remainder from his Manichean days.

In spite, after all, of the undoubted greatness of Augustine, it is not to him that we must resort for the sacredness and ethical character of the *Universitas Mortalium*, and of its racial and institutional embodiments, and their idealist associations. For this we must go to John of Salisbury or to Burke or Comte, rather than to Augustine; we must be mediævalist or modern, or, better still, both together.

When we turn to the world politics of the Church, it is S. Gregory the Great rather than S. Augustine who is the real father of the Middle Ages, the precursor of the statesmen-popes in whose figures unity, the object and ideal of the intellect of a world distraught by passion, found not only its appropriate

symbol but its practical and executive instrument. The Papacy is born far more in the mind and actions of Gregory Magnus, a Roman of the Romans, a mind in which the antique Latin virtues seemed to live again, than in the pages of the *De Civitate*, and in the stormy North African temperament of Augustine. In the great treatise of the latter there are anticipatory flashes of the ideals of the World Church, but the dominant note is rather that of mysticism than of institutionalism. The truth is that, because of the spirituality of the nature and of the ideals of Augustine, the triumph of the Church under Constantine, with its completion under Theodosius, fills him, in spite of his description of the latter as the mirror and model of rulers, with no entire satisfaction. The greatest disappointments of idealists come always under the form of the victory of their ideals. The struggle begins again on a wider arena and against subtler foes.

In truth, the gaining of the Church's peace was but the prelude to a longer and interminable warfare, continued amid ever-changing phases. It was a climb down, as well as a lifting up. It was, in the eyes of most Christians, a necessary compromise, to the mind of some an unwise surrender, even of the nature of apostasy. "All this I will give thee, if thou wilt fall down and worship me," said the voice of the tempter. "My kingdom is not of this world," was the answer of Christ, at the climax of the struggle.

The choice lay between world acceptance and world refusal. Either course was beset with dangers. The former seemed to involve the lower-

ing of the ethical standard, the admitting that the ideals which Stoicism and Christianity had alike upheld were not attainable save in a very relative and limited form, that man's spirit cannot live on pure oxygen, but needs strong dilution of the heroic draught with the practicalities of the Average. The latter or uncompromising course was one which the Church did not take, but for which varying and divergent groups—monks, mystics, heretics, *illuminati*—have at one time or another stood out. It was the more prophetic, apocalyptic course, always spiritually revolutionary in its attitude to human values, and at times socially revolutionary as well. It led often to the call to prayer and thought, remote from vulgar successes. It also led at times of crisis to martyrdom “on the high places of the field,” but it was never quite “at ease in Zion.”

As the Church developed, the mystical type found its concrete expression in monasticism, which, however, under the influence of the genius of S. Benedict, came to claim and purify the earth by prayer and labour, making “Ora et Labora” its motto, rather than by merely copying Oriental world flight.

The other type—that of comprehension—is represented, when at its best, by the statesmanship of the Christian hierarchy, carrying forward the spirit of Rome among the new races, and blending Teutonism and the imperial traditions into a magnificent whole in the Empire of Charlemagne.

As the age of antagonism gave way to that of parallelism, in which Church and Empire exist and work side by side though intermingled as to common membership, so the parallelism or system of co-ordinate jurisdiction, called the Gelasian theory

from the letter in which Pope Gelasius expounds it to the Emperor Zeno, itself passed into that condition of identity of the two Powers in one organism which marks the Middle Ages proper.

In the time of Charlemagne and those of his successors who shared in his mind and outlook the new Imperialism, Gothic and Teutonic in spirit became incarnated, or rather perhaps clothed, in the traditional Latin structure of the earlier age. The way was prepared for the Christendom of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries by the fusing together of the hierarchic Churches of the German lands with the rule of the *Imperator Pacificus*, the Lord of the World. The Papacy at this time was weak and silent. The Churches of the Rhineland were powerful, and their hierarchy, resembling the prince-bishops of a later age, grouped themselves round and under the theocratic emperor, like jewels in the crown of Cæsar.

Between the sixth and the ninth centuries a change in the whole conception of the relation of religion to the State took place—more important than any other in the same region down to modern times. The Civil Power, as represented by what remained of the Roman Empire and after A.D. 800 by the attempted revival of that Empire in a Western form, became no longer parallel to the Church but blended with it.

The traditional civilization of the Mediterranean lands and the new energy surging through the North met and were poured into one another when in A.D. 800 the holder of the chair of Peter placed on the brow of a barbarian chieftain the diadem of the Cæsars. The cry of the Teutonic tribesmen,

Karolo Augusto a Deo coronato magno et pacifico Imperatori vita et victoria, welcomed the birth of the great attempt to actualize under the form of a cosmopolitan world-unity the Kingdom of Christ, in its external aspects, and to rebuild the shattered *Universitas humani generis* of the Empire on a Christian foundation, and with its most powerful resources supplied rather from the Teutonic than from the Mediterranean world. The mediæval Church-State was born, but before the child could reach its maturity the Dark Ages, not to be confused with the Middle Ages, were to intervene. Europe had to pass through its glacial era. The first anticipatory rays of the theocracy did not, however, dawn at Rome.

Though at a much earlier period it was born and well born, the Papacy relapsed into comparative obscurity, so far as the influence of most of its occupants were concerned, and even, in the tenth century, into ignominy, becoming the puppet of the Tusculan barons. It has been called the era of the pornocracy. The age of Hildebrand was not yet, though it was not far off. The first spring of the effort to realize the *Regnum Dei* was not to come from great reforming pontiffs, but from the lofty and versatile mind and will of Charlemagne, who was now *Imperator Orthodoxus et Pacificus, Dominus Mundi*.

After the death of the great emperor, darkness gradually closes in again upon the Church and the world of the west.

The second spring came in the tenth century, when Otto the Great revived alike the Empire and the Papacy, when he had secured a new career for

the first, taking hold of the latter and making it decent by force. He was the practical restorer within narrower limits than before of the Empire of Charlemagne. His grandson, Otto the Third, half Greek through his mother, the Byzantine princess Theophano, accentuated the mystical quasi-sacerdotal element in the Holy Empire as, jointly with the Papacy, symbolical of the Catholic world-unity of the Middle Ages, as far as it existed in reality and in fact. Otto the Third, like Frederic William the Fourth of Prussia in modern times, was a romanticist on the throne. But it was Charlemagne who had stood at the fountain-head of this development. As the Vicar of God, the peacemaker, the *Persona Mixta*, the priest-king of the new theocracy, Charlemagne, rather than the popes of his time, blends the Empire of Augustus and the Church of Peter into the unity that the Middle Ages knew as Christendom, in theory majestic even if in realization imperfect. In the art of the period Charlemagne and the Holy Roman Emperors after him wear the catholic dalmatic, as David did the ephod, while the emperor wields also the sceptre of the Cæsars. The Pagan conception of the *Divus Cæsar*, purged of idolatry, passed over into the Christian Imperialism. The emperor is not only the "standard-bearer of Holy Church," but is even representative of Christ Himself, Vicar of Christ for the temporal guidance of the Christian nations as the pope is Christ's Vicar in a more spiritual sense, for the shepherding of men's souls. Both are Christ's ministers, consecrated representatives of the unity of the Christian People and of Christ as its Head. Of this nature was the conception of

Christendom as held by such as Dante. The extreme papalists, however, regarded the imperial authority as only mediately from God but immediately from the pope. On the Hildebrandine view, at least in its less balanced form, the entire rule of kings and princes is but the *magnum latrocinium* of S. Augustine, a power arising from brute-force. But this is a violent utterance of the great pope, rather than his more settled view. Even the latter, however, would have left the emperor as a subordinate of the pope, though with legitimate authority in that lesser rôle. In the tenth century, however, before the Hildebrandine Reform, it was in the person of the Christian Cæsar that the mediæval idea, of which visible unity was the essential, took flesh, and the man who represented the long evolution of the world-power of Rome as embodied in the Empire stood beside the other man, who bore Peter's keys and cast forth Peter's net, and who stood for the parallel development, that of the Judæo-Christian revelation. The titanic struggle between these two powers, believed by Europe generally each to be necessary, each to be God-ordained, was the tragedy of the Middle Ages. The emperors at first sought to make the popes their chaplains, the popes, after the regeneration of the Papacy, sought to make the emperors their vassals. Neither succeeded, and what eventually happened was that the Holy Empire, after it developed the Spanish absolutism, vanished slowly but surely into the world of dreams, except so far as it eventually revived in a sort of antiquarian manner in the Austrian power. The popes, the other claimants of universal rule, transmitted in the Counter-Reformation an

authority solid and four-square, no fancy of heraldry but a substantial fact; yet still an authority from which about half of its original sphere of action had been removed, which largely lost the Baltic even if it retained the Mediterranean. The mediæval conception of a Christendom universal in idea and European in fact, in spite of the internecine wars between popes and emperors, asserted a general supremacy in life such as is now claimed and exercised by patriotic interests or oftener by commercial considerations. In spite, however, of this intangible supremacy, mediæval thought could not effectually reduce to the harmony of the divine plan the practical confusion of the world. The phenomenal order was more than a match for the ideal one. The bands of theories, never invincible, became more and more thin and ineffectual, before the pressure of insistent and advancing facts clamorous for recognition, or silently securing it.

CHAPTER III

THE CHURCH-STATE OF THE MIDDLE AGES

ALTHOUGH the two great institutions which towered in theory, and as to one of them largely in practical reality as well, over European thought and life in the Middle Ages—i.e. the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire—became, in the course of events, rivals in a war to the death, they were originally, and when at their best, expressions in different departments of life of the same idea, that of Headship as representing the unity of Christendom and mystically of the race. It is not the case that while the Papacy stood for an international theocracy, the Empire represented a purely secular and militarist force opposing its layman's realism to fine-spun theoretical claims of the ecclesiastical brain. The Empire, in its ideal, did not stand simply or even at all for feudalism. No doubt emperors tended to become practically heads of great feudal aristocracies, but this was not involved in the conception of the empire. Nor did the "People of Holy Church," many of whom were not even in priestly orders, merely represent clericalism in the narrower sense.

There is, of course, an element of truth in the description of the conflict of Titans that shook the Europe of the earlier Middle Ages, as one of clerical versus lay interests. But it is a modernization of a complex situation. The mediæval empire was not

a phenomenon of the type of any of the three great Powers, the Hohenzollern, Habsburg, or Romanoff, which have in recent years crumbled to dust. It had no connexion in its ideal with either militarist adventures or a mercantile and commercialist civilization. The language in which its representatives and upholders described it was one in which such words as "pax" and "tranquillitas"—words common in Dante and Marsilio alike, and of which we hear the echoes all through the Middle Ages—were the key-notes, at times triumphant, oftener pathetic, as the great conception involved appears to advance or to recede.

The affinities of the ideal of the Empire were not with the Imperialism of Assyria in the ancient world or of Prussia in the modern one—a system typified by the beak and talons of the eagle. The Holy Roman Empire, in its theory, however warlike it was by fits and starts, as when it became a German power raiding Italy, was an institution which represented the unity of the *genus humanum*—the halcyon bird might have been its symbol rather than the bird of prey.

In theory the wings of the dove rather than the claws of the vulture were associated with the imperial ideal. Though both Empire and Papacy were again and again the centres of disunion to Germany and Italy respectively, yet this was the direct opposite of the ideal embodied in the case of each. Each represented, the one from the more secular, and the other from the more spiritual side, the harmony, which seemed to the best mediæval minds necessarily symbolized and rendered practical by the unity of one office held by one personality. The

object of the unity in each case was to indicate to man the best method of reaching both naturally and supernaturally the true ends of his being. It was the expression of an effort made as by rough child-like types of humanity to actualize the innate and ideal wholeness of life, the *incolumitas vitæ*, to use a favourite phrase of a great mediævalist, John of Salisbury.

This conception of the wholeness of the life of Christendom, the unity of its end giving harmony to the action of its articulate parts, was, even if only realized in a most partial and fragmentary manner, a noble ideal. If over all these was "the shadow of Peter passing by," this was partly indeed, as it must be candidly admitted—human nature, even Catholic human nature, being what it is—due to elements of the sacerdotal will to power, and of the spiritual indolence and largely vicarious nature of the religion of the laity.

Yet it was not wholly so. No great institution has its roots purely in selfishness and fraud. It is not possible for the human mind for any length of time to feed on absolute lies. Forgery and priestcraft no more explain the rise of the Papacy than brutality and the appeal to force that of the Empire.

The False Decretals, found useful by Rome though not originated by her, were the evidence of a tendency as much as the instruments of a design, a representation of the circumstances of an actual evolution or revolution as if they were identical with the static condition of an imaginary past.

The ecclesiastical statesmen who shaped the policy of the Roman See in the direction of the centralization of Christendom, were, no doubt, not always

strictly scrupulous in their methods. In the age in which they lived it was natural and almost inevitable to meet brute force by subtilty—the “wisdom of the serpent” which Christ commended, too easily becoming in practice the cunning of the snake—nor had the curialists what Chaucer calls “a spiced conscience” where the interests of the Church were concerned. They used the vast experience of the great institution, the fortunes of which they guided, in ways not always the most ingenuous. Yet the Papacy was not purely the outcome of the unscrupulous mentality of a clerical caste. This, which is generally the superficial and onesided judgment of the Whig school of historians, whether Protestant or Rationalist, is an entirely inadequate explanation of a complex situation, in which all the threads of European political history, as well as the interests and passions of contemporary religion, both theological and popular, were involved. At several critical situations the Popedom itself, sometimes, as in the tenth century, acquiescent in moral degradation, or at least unconscious or forgetful, as it might seem, of its immense potentialities of authority and influence, had greatness thrust upon it by the imperative need, real or imaginary, of the European *communitas communitatum* for a centre of unity, a visible symbol and directive force of the underlying element of that era of confusion, the peace “at the heart of endless agitation.” Men found, or thought they found, in that apostolic see which Christendom had ever acknowledged as first in honour, a city appearing above the welter of violence, Peter’s rock in the barbaric flood. The necessities of history seemed to call for the Papal

Supremacy, just as similar necessities at a later date, a time of analysis rather than of synthesis, called for critical examination of the validity and utility of its claims. The Papacy, in its ideal and in its best days, partially, yet also within limits really, the arbiter, the determining factor making for cohesion amid the clash of divergent forces—forces as yet unguided by national laws and untamed by strong monarchies—tended to a reversal of its function by becoming the storm-centre of Europe. It is as a betrayer of its own distinctive position by becoming the mischief-maker instead of the peacemaker of Christendom, that the Avignon Papacy is assailed by the most trenchant and dangerous of all its mediæval critics, Marsilio of Padua. The latter enters into the lists as the champion of Peace. His weapon is his book, *Defensor Pacis*, its very title conveying a satire, its influence cosmopolitan among thinkers, like that of another and more witty piece of anti-papal criticism of a later date, the burlesque drama, *Julius Exclusus*, which almost certainly emanated from the pen of Erasmus. Marsilio is *toujours audace* against his papal enemies in that nest of quarrelsome intrigue, as it seemed to him, and to his great contemporary Ockham, the luxurious city on the Rhone, the second Rome, with all Rome's vices but without her majesty of tradition.

In the days, however, when it was at its zenith, the Papacy took all Christian Europe (except the Byzantine Church and Empire), and that as representative of Humanity itself, under its ultimate spiritual control as shepherd and judge. The entirety of mortal existence, as far as that existence had passed into the baptismal covenant, the political,

industrial, and economic elements of social life came directly or indirectly within the scope of the definition of matters affecting or affected by morality and religion. As such they were swept into the meshes of the canon law. Christian discipline, even if more clericalist and meticulous than the men of the present day would tolerate, maintained some sort of hold, though often conspicuously evaded or defied, over the anarchy of human wills. The ethics that were enforced may have been sometimes overstrained, or fanciful, or misused in their application, yet at any rate they witnessed to a nobler ideal of life than that of a scramble for gain or power, or for the gratification of appetite, unrebuked and uncontrolled by any exercise of the common conscience and of the general will.

The regulation of every department of life by the canon law expressing the *communis sensus* of European Christendom was no doubt in one sense the outcome of a premature attempt at synthesis, in another the continuation of the primitive Christian discipline under changed conditions. It at least involved the noble conception of human life as an organic and harmonious structure, rather than as a condition of things which might be described as an anarchy, without plan or vision, allowing limitless opportunities for financial adventure.

The elements of the mediæval synthesis came together only gradually. Some of them had to struggle for admission and recognition, as for instance the form of Aristotelianism which afterwards dominated all. But the ideal of and aspiration for harmony and unity laid hold of them and made them organs of its great design. To the social

and religious synthesis, the Bible contributed, from the Old Testament, the conception of the sacredness of kingship, yet of the king as *persona publica* or *justitia animata*, not as an irresponsible tyrant.

The main contribution from the New Testament, and that a most dominant and central one, was the Pauline conception of the *Corpus Christianum*, the Body which is baptized Humanity in actuality, and all Humanity in potentiality and idea. Christ is grandly described by S. Thomas Aquinas as *Humani generis caput*. The conviction which underlies this is that human life is that of an articulated organism, and that while the individual has aboriginal and inalienable rights (for this is also a root idea of mediæval thought), yet that the latter can only rise to distinctness through accepting the principle of solidarity and conforming to the law of service.

This conception of the Body, at times presented in an almost crude anthropomorphic or biological manner, follows right along the whole line of mediæval thought in social questions. It is found alike in writers the most papalist as John of Salisbury at one end, and in writers the most regalist or (if we may anticipate the use of the term) erastian, as Marsilio of Padua at the other.

It is magnificently used, as Gierke points out, at the time of the Conciliar Movement by Cusanus (Cardinal du Cues) in his *Concordantia Catholica* to illustrate the ideal of a Catholicism of Church and civilization which should save unity by recognizing the functional character of the various groups in the community.

There are three conceptions of human nature and of its history which the student of the social philosophy of the past finds crossing and re-crossing one another, as it were, in the more fully developed mediæval thought in regard to social ethics, the thought of the Thomist period, the thirteenth century. This is especially the case after the translation into Latin by William de Moerbeek in 1260 of the *Politics* of Aristotle, which rapidly became the text-book and even sacred authority in regard to the nature and government of human society. "The Philosopher," as Aristotle was reverently called, and S. Thomas, as the commentator on his work, became the standard teachers on this, as on other subjects.

(1) The first of the separate elements referred to is the belief in the *Lex Naturæ*, or ideal state of mankind, derived from Stoic teaching, evident in the writings of Tertullian, the North African Puritan, and the father of Latin Theology, whose grand phrase *Anima naturaliter Christiana* has a Stoic flavour, so far at least as it implies an original and continuous kinship of the soul with the divine virtue and goodness. Tertullian, with all his severity, is not the father of Calvinism, as S. Augustine undoubtedly is. This Stoic element continually meets us again, both in the writings of the Fathers, and later in the Canon Law, and in the *Sententiæ* which it absorbs and includes, from the time in the seventh century in which the *Etymologies* or encyclopædia of S. Isidore of Seville were largely incorporated into the *Decretum* of Gratian. This belief is one which represents the original existence of mankind as being a condition of absolute equality

and freedom. In S. Isidore's definition of this ideal state, while monogamous marriage is represented as its rule of sexual relationship, yet property, slavery, and coercive jurisdiction and penalties are described as unknown.

On this theory, the things described had no place in original mankind. S. Isidore represents this natural condition as arising from instinct or impulse divinely implanted, not from any exercise of the human will; *Instinctu naturæ non institutione*. He knows nothing of that social contract which follows us all along the history of political and economic thought. In the words of Troeltsch, this is *Liebeskommunismus* or the state of *Naturgesetz*—the Law of Nature as distinct from the *Relativgesetz* which represented natural law as accommodated to practical human conditions in a fallen world. The Christian teaching of the story of the Fall comes in as the dividing line between the world of the *Jus Naturæ*, the absolute paradisaical state "the state of man's innocency," and the present fallen world of *Jus Gentium*, or relative moral law, at once a punishment and a salutary discipline, *Pœna et remedium peccati*.

S. Thomas defines the Law of Nature in a sentence which has the grand ring about it of the later Stoicism, at once mystical, ethical, and humane—*Participatio legis æternæ in rationali creatura lex naturalis dicitur*.

That is, that the immanent and all present Reason, which penetrates the universe, rises in man to a height and climax in which it becomes the conscious law of liberty and truth. Here Platonist, Stoical, and Christian ideas meet in a splendid unity.

The Stoic golden age, the Hebrew Garden of Eden, may be unprovable, but the belief in the Law of Nature, that is in the absolute claims of justice and its universal and legitimate extension, can only pass away when man's brain ceases to think and his heart to feel. This belief, or rather instinct, has accompanied human history under Christianity right down from the Stoics, the Fathers, and the Catholic canonists, to the Franciscan Fraticelli, the Anabaptists of the sixteenth century, the Levellers of the English Commonwealth, the French Revolution leaders, and the Socialists of to-day of all types—a varied crowd of transmitters or distorters.

It cannot be proved by science, nor has it ever been embodied in history, yet it seems in one form or another to have become practically incorporate at once with man's noblest instincts and with his wildest dreams.

(2) Modifying this conception of the *Jus Naturæ* which involves an original or ideal condition of freedom, equality, and brotherhood of mankind, came the view of the powers of man as growing out of his original nature and as determined in each case by their appropriate end. This is the teleological conception—the Aristotelian view of the State as Man writ large.

It was S. Thomas especially who grafted on to the Stoic principle of *Lex Naturæ* the Aristotelian ones of realism, empiricism, development, and teleology. What is lost here perhaps in ethical austerity is gained in greater fidelity to observed fact. The Law of Nature according to this view is observed, and obeyed, while the human will has a creative

share in shaping the growth which the human mind studies and yet of which it is itself a part.

On the first view crudely expressed, the Law of Nature is a code which is discovered and rules are based on it. On the second, it is the inner law of an unfolding organism which is observed, and the reason and value of which are to be found not in its obscure beginning but in the richness of the end to which it moves.

(3) In the Thomist synthesis, which embodies the widest, deepest, and most characteristic efforts of mediæval thought, that side of the theology of the Western Church which was tintured profoundly by the impress of S. Augustine's mind and experience is a powerful factor but by no means an exclusive one.

The ascetic strain in Augustine is not allowed to dominate the Christian view of society and of social morality as presented in the Thomist philosophy of life, though its keen influence pervades it, sharpening its ethical angles. Yet it does not devitalize the other elements. There is in mediævalism of the Thomist type an attempt at a synthesis of Nature and Super-Nature, very different from the severely logical ascetic view often exclusively associated with the theology of the Middle Ages.

This synthesis is a distinct advance upon S. Augustine. The Political State is treated as the outcome of the immanent Reason. In the words of Baron von Hügel, "The State becomes the complex of that essentially good thing, Nature; the Church the complex of that different, higher good,

Super-Nature; roughly speaking, where the State leaves off, the Church begins."

Here we have a view more complete and balanced than the Augustinian one, whether as seen in Augustine's own writings or as exaggerated and isolated in Luther's flaming reproduction of it.

We must also note in the Thomist theology the high position given to the Platonic virtues, as, the four cardinal ones—prudence, justice, temperance, fortitude—and among them justice as their queen.

Justice, in mediæval thought, is the foundation of all the virtues and that which is the principle of proportion among them, making each faculty into a member of an harmonious hierarchy of being.

The sanity and solidness of the four great pre-Christian virtues marked them as Christian by anticipation, and justified the wisdom of the Church in claiming them for Christ. "Can any man forbid water, that these should not be baptized?" Of the Platonic four, justice became the keystone of the virtues. The very word "Justice" (*Justitia*) was as much the watchword or slogan of the mediæval thinkers as that of "Liberty" was of the period of the French Revolution. The prose of Dante's *De Monarchia* blossoms into poetry as he thinks of justice and of the ideal of her practical embodiment in the Holy Empire. "Neither Hesperus nor Lucifer is so fair." "She is like Phœbe gazing at her brother from the purple of the morning calm," (*de purpureo matutinæ serenitatis*).¹ At the turning-point of the Middle Ages Dante sees in justice the august and primal form of divinity, and exalts the Empire because it is a sort of political

¹ *De Monarchia*, I. xi. 35.

sacrament, a concrete and efficacious symbol, of this basal virtue, the foundation of all the others.

In the earlier mediæval period, John of Salisbury, in his *Policraticus* or Statesman's Book, lately recovered from undeserved neglect, exalts justice as the *regina virtutum*, the queen of the virtues. In one passage, an instance of genuine majesty of diction, John almost touches the level, in meaning at least, of the often-quoted line in the *Œdipus Rex* in which Sophocles claims for the moral law a sharing in the eternity of Deity: μέγας ἐν τούτοις Θεός οὐδε γηράσκει.¹ (In these God is great, nor does He grow old.)

Such are the ἀγραπτα κάσφαλῇ θεῶν νόμιμα² (the unwritten, enduring laws of the gods), which bind the heart and will of Antigone, so that she chooses death rather than disobedience to them. Late on in the Christian centuries Wordsworth gives utterance, in the immortal language of the *Ode to Duty*, to the same sense of the universal supremacy and divine origin of the moral law.

"Thou dost preserve the Stars from wrong;
And the most ancient Heavens,
Through Thee, are fresh and strong."

Of such laws, writes John of Salisbury, *Sunt præcepta perpetuam habentia necessitatem apud omnes gentes legitima. Ante legem, sub lege, sub gratia*—that is, before the Jewish Law was given, under that law, and under the Christian dispensation of grace. *Omnes Lex una constringit*. This unwritten law is the *Inventio et donum Dei*. He

¹ *Œdipus Rex*, 845, Sophocles. Ed. Wunder.

² *Antigone*, 452, Sophocles. Ed. Wunder.

goes on to define this law as identical with that which John Stuart Mill afterwards called "the Golden Rule of Jesus of Nazareth," i.e. *Do unto others as ye would they should do unto you*, quoting this saying not only in Christ's words, but also in the earlier negative form (*Do not*, etc.) from the Book of Tobit.

We may note that John of Salisbury does not introduce into his description of Justice the necessity of holding the orthodox Faith, a factor insisted on by S. Augustine as a fundamental element in this great virtue. John is a thoroughly loyal and believing churchman, but his definition of justice is of it as moral and social and not necessarily theological in character. He places this magnificent virtue, alike to Platonist and to mediæval scholar the central jewel in the ethical diadem, in an atmosphere that is much more that of the Stoics and of Galilee than is the case in S. Augustine's treatment of the same subject. The good qualities and noble deeds of the wise and heroic among the ancient Greeks and Romans are not dismissed by John as *splendida vitia*. In this and in other ways he is more lay and modern in mind than was S. Augustine, or indeed than his own most typical ecclesiastical contemporaries. He believes in the necessity of grace, but he has also a strong healthy sense of the reality of natural virtue. He is a synergist—a believer in the God-endowed power of the human will to co-operate with God. Had Calvin come across his book, he would have dismissed it as semi-Pelagian, at the least. It takes for granted, all through, the conception of the dignity of man, though it teaches that each individual has his own distinct vocation, varying in im-

portance for society. John infers that human existence as a whole has a dignity and a meaning to which the life of each contributes. Before his entrance by Baptism into the Church, man, even when considered as fallen, is not merely a mass of corruption, but a creature wonderfully made, both as individual and as social organism. He retains the splendid traits which witness to his kinship with the Deity. The spirit of man as such trails behind it "clouds of glory," even though it wanders under storm-swept skies. John's description is one under which could be included those splendid dispositions and deeds of virtue exhibited in the lives of pagans, both before and outside Christianity, which S. Augustine's more exacting formula would exclude. John of Salisbury's description of justice as the product of the Divine law and as the out flowing of the immanent reason, his sense of its sovereignty and universal validity, as of a virtue comprising all other virtues, may be paralleled by the similar utterance of a great modern statesman. William Ewart Gladstone, in speaking against the China War of 1857, used the following words: "The higher ground of natural justice, that justice which binds man to man; which is older than Christianity, because it was in the world before Christianity; which is broader than Christianity, because it extends to the world beyond Christianity; and which underlies Christianity, for Christianity itself appeals to it."

John of Salisbury's *Statesman's Book* is in reality a sort of miscellany of scattered thoughts of every kind centring round questions of government,

law, and of the nature of society regarded as brought under the reign of Christ.

Irregular as it is in arrangement, its central portion is of the nature of a treatise on the Christian commonwealth, regarded as the expression of eternal law. The interests of the book touch Stoicism on the one hand and modern sociology on the other. The part of it which is a treatise on government and law is of the same order as the thought on these subjects of Cicero or of Seneca in the later pagan era, and of Richard Hooker in that of the Renaissance and Reformation period. John of Salisbury, papalist as he may be, is a Christian of the type of Hooker and of Butler. There is not in his nature the torrential force, the afflatus, that is in that of Augustine and of Luther. Consecrated rationality rather than mystical depth is the main characteristic of his mind. The wide sane view of life is his rather than the intuitions of spiritual genius. He is wise rather than ardent. If he exalts the position of the priesthood, yet it is because its ideal function is that of the spiritual organ of a community in which there is no sharp cleavage between the ecclesiastical and the secular.

Of all in the earlier Middle Ages who were of the Hildebrandine rather than of the cæsarist and regalist schools of political thinkers (for he was an able upholder of the hierarchic party), John of Salisbury is probably the most reasonable and the most modern minded. He is at once man of religion and man of the world. His political sense is as acute as that of Machiavelli or of Hobbes, yet, unlike them, his view of the State is ethical through and

through. He is surprisingly free from that unbending sacerdotalist spirit which made Hildebrand see in the secular power mainly the instincts of wolves ravaging the heritage of the Lord. In John of Salisbury's view Church and State work together as twin parts of one consecrated organism, and although the priestly part is the nearer to the divine cause and original, yet its control of the rest is of the nature of moral guidance rather than of coercive power. As might have been expected, this secretary and confidant of Thomas à Becket, and personal friend of Pope Adrian IV (the only Englishman who sat on Peter's throne), who himself died as Bishop of Chartres in 1180, is frankly and honestly on the side of holy church in the great struggles between the lay and the ecclesiastical powers, both in England and abroad. Yet John of Salisbury is no embittered fanatic. He is a man who would have been remarkable in any age. He may rank with those other great Englishmen of history and literature who have united versatility to force.

Man of affairs, statesman, political thinker, scholar with real depth and range of knowledge of the classical literature of Rome as well as of the "Lion Latin" of the Vulgate, uncompromising churchman, yet with a mind interested in all the things of humanity which came within its range, and knitting together ecclesiastical with secular affairs, John of Salisbury well deserves the interest and attention which his teaching and influence are now receiving.

It is strange to find in the centre of the party opposed to King Henry II and in the entourage of

him who was afterwards known as S. Thomas of Canterbury a man of a mind as modern and humanist as that of John of Salisbury. Yet after all the great archbishop himself had had as background to his primacy and martyrdom an earlier life of law, of politics, and of the business of the commonalty rather than one of the grey routine of the cloister.

Political sense, classical culture, and Christian ethics each contribute to the conception of organized society which John of Salisbury presents to us. In his teaching the Platonic sense of justice as the supreme political virtue blends with the Christian condemnation of avarice as the cause of the corroding of states, and pride as that of the downfall of kingdoms. The conception of the commonwealth in the *Policraticus* is, in the words of his German critic, Gennrich, that of a living organism of justice: *ein lebendiger Organismus der Gerechtigkeit*. It is certain that John of Salisbury, whose reading was omnivorous, had studied the *Timæus* of Plato. It is doubtful if he knew anything about the *Republic*. But the blending of Platonic with Christian elements in his ideal constitution is unmistakable. He is as Platonic as S. Thomas is Aristotelian.

Certain favourite mediæval conceptions rule his view of life and of society. Foremost among them is that of the foreordained harmony between the life of the commonwealth of man and that of the individual alike in his spiritual and in his physical structure. The macrocosm of society is only man's individual nature enlarged. In the latter—the microcosm—is seen the prophecy of his social life.

At the basis and root of human society as its generative principles, its *Lebenskraft*, lie Justice and Reason, for man shares in the immanent Reason of which God is the spring, and without which human life would be an incoherent chaos. The social principle is not an afterthought. It has a divine root, it is an instinct not an acquisition.

This common sharing of individuals in the immanence of the universal Reason leads to that idea which rules all the mediæval conceptions of society, i.e. that of the universal unity of the human race, a unity which transcends all social divisions, however real in their own measure and degrees. The lesser unity of the individual is regarded by John as in its organic character the representation of the various functions of man regarded as a social being. This is the anthropomorphic or biological analogy which goes back to S. Paul and even earlier, and which recurs continually in mediæval thought. It rules all that part of the *Policraticus* which John claims to have adapted from a lost treatise of Plutarch, the *Institutio Trajani*.

The body of the Commonwealth, according to the *Policraticus*, must be animated by a soul. The clergy constitute this soul. They are supreme, like the philosopher-rulers of Plato's *Republic*. Yet their supremacy is, like that of the soul, not to be exercised in a directly coercive manner. Spiritually, they rule directly. In other matters their oversight accomplishes its aim through the action of the Prince or civil ruler.

If the clergy are the soul of the body, the Prince or ruler—the king in fact—is its head. The relationship of the three great social organs is

analogous to those of similar classes in Plato's *Republic*. The groups are: (1) priesthood; (2) civil, judicial, and military rulers and administrators, with merchant help; and (3) agricultural workers and artisans, etc. The correspondence roughly of these to the philosopher guardians, the warriors, and the workers respectively of Plato's ideal commonwealth has been remarked by many critics of the *Policraticus*. They are, says Gennrich, the *Lehrstand*, *Wehrstand*, and *Nährstand* of the community. That is, as in Plato, the intellectual and spiritual guides, the fighting defenders, the providers of physical support.

The office of Prince or king is one of sacred dignity. The divine right of kings or of "the Prince," to use the regulation phrase, is a prominent article in the system of the *Policraticus*, as in mediævalism generally. Yet this is very different from the hereditary "Right divine," with the corollary of "Non-resistance" of the Stuart and High Anglican theory or of the Gallican one of the reign of Louis XIV. There is no necessary and inalienable right of succession of the nearest of kin. The *Policraticus* is vague on this subject. In theory, kingship is elective. Here the great body of mediæval authorities is agreed.

The idea of contract is to some extent implied, especially by the papalist school, who were more politically liberal than the regalist or cæsarist party, yet it is not logically developed as subsequently by the school of Locke. There is no place whatever for political absolutism. It is barred out in advance by the distinction between the king and the tyrant. It was said by Lord Acton that "Not the devil,

but S. Thomas Aquinas, was the first Whig," because the political principles of the great schoolman, expounded in the *De Regimine Principum* (which he began and Ptolemy of Lucca completed), and based on Aristotle's *Politics*, are unfavourable to irresponsible rule and are largely similar to those of the English Revolution of 1688. In regard to political history, it is a remarkable fact that the more legal and constitutional section of the Puritan party in the Stuart period was unconsciously mediævalist, while the High Churchmen of the same time in their advocacy of absolute monarchy and passive obedience were under the influence not of Catholic, but of Renaissance principles.

John of Salisbury not only justifies, as does S. Thomas, the refusal of allegiance to a king whose manner of rule is an offence against justice, but he also plainly teaches the legitimacy of the killing of a ruler who has become a tyrant, and that by a private person, if the community cannot act, and if such ruler be incorrigible. He appeals to Old Testament precedent in regard to this startling view, which was also enunciated by other mediævalists, chiefly ecclesiastical writers, as conspicuously at an earlier time, by the Hildebrandine Manegold of Lautenbach. John of Salisbury disapproves of the use of poison in tyrannicide. His instincts as a gentleman and a sportsman were no doubt offended at the thought of it. Besides which, it complicates an execution with an unconscious suicide. The justification of the assassination of a tyrant—that is of one who rules by arbitrary self-will and not as *famulus justitiæ*, or servant of justice—whose rule is that of *voluntas* and not of *lex*, irre-

sponsible Will being the essential element of tyranny, as constitutional rule, guided by Law and guarding Law, is that of kingship, comes upon us in the pages of John of Salisbury with an unexpected shock. The justification is made by reason, since the tyrant is a public enemy and the slaying is an act of irregular justice, and also by appeal to the Old Testament, to the wild retribution inflicted by Ehud, Jael, and Judith. Yet so out of keeping is the section of the *Policraticus* justifying tyrannicide with John of Salisbury's general view, which is one that we would now call liberal conservative as far as we can compare mediæval to modern political philosophy, that it strikes the reader as a sort of unexpected boulder or foam centre in the clear and even flow of argument and illustration. It seems as if this section would be more in place in a treatise by the Calvinist Beza or the Jesuit Mariana, written during those centuries, the sixteenth and seventeenth, when theological animosities and the struggle for existence of ecclesiastical bodies had given to politics an extra venom. It is possible, as has been lately suggested, that this advocacy of the legitimacy of assassination, by John of Salisbury which is so hard to equalize with his general temper and teaching, in regard both to their law-abiding and to their Christian aspects, is to be explained by the fact that there was at that period no legal or constitutional machinery for the deposition of an unworthy king. Even later, when such depositions took place by law, they bore the form of accepted resignations.

The king is not, in the *Policraticus*, a lonely figure supreme over a prostrate crowd. On the contrary,

the heart represents the senate or council without which the Prince will not be wise to act, yet this appears rather as a consultative than as a representative body.

The genesis of representation was somewhat later than the time of John, who died in 1180. In his book, the senate is hardly representative. It was not until the thirteenth century, and then partly in connexion with the constitutions of the Orders of Friars, especially of the Dominicans, that it rose into prominence. By the time of the Conciliar Movement it had become so powerful that it essayed at Constance to remake the entire organism of Christendom on constitutional principles, in accordance with the splendid dreams of Gerson and Cusanus, and even to lay hands upon the very citadel of autocracy, the *plenitudo potestatis* of the Papacy itself.

The effort of the Conciliar Movement was for mediæval Europe and the mediæval Church a sunset glow rather than a new dawn, but it involved the principle of the entire body of the church being, through its organs and representatives, the ultimate earthly authority. The Christian idea of the Spirit-filled Body had long been obscured. The Conciliar Movement, in spite of the noble idealists who were its inspiration, was too secular and political to be able to secure permanently the place in the church of the representative principle. Yet an example was set which, in political matters, such a country as Holland and later on as England were subsequently to follow. Always in lasting political developments religion has an influence and a connection, indirect often, yet none the less real.

Neither early mediæval thought as represented by John of Salisbury nor even later thought as voiced by Cusanus and the Fathers of Constance has any full recognition of what we now call democracy. In the *Policraticus* the place of the feet is taken by the people who work with their hands. They have no share in the work of the head or of the heart—the king and his senate. It is implied that while the members of the labouring communalty are to be protected and to be treated justly, they are not qualified for the office of rule, and are best off when they are in the position of subjects who are governed well and who have not to take part in the arduous public service the rendering of which is the prerogative of those who fill the place of Plato's guardians and soldiers, as distinct from the mercantile class and from the hand workers, whether farming peasantry or town artisans. The truth is that mediæval civilization was practically democratic in the modern sense only or mainly in regard to the question of entrance into the ranks of the clergy, holy orders or minor orders, "the People of Holy Church."

But the tonsured form an immense confederation recruited from every class of the community and from every nation of Europe, as far as nations then existed. They included large numbers of persons who were "clerks" but not in the priesthood. This was the class which made the university cities notorious for riot, but which also for hours together drank in the disquisitions of the schoolmen and the teaching of "the Philosopher," Aristotle, the oracle of the Middle Ages. The "holy-water clerk" who was often a peasant, and the "little clergion" or

acolyte boy, like Hugh of Lincoln in Chaucer's "Prioress's Tale," were "in the clergy." They were among the "People of Holy Church." The latter took them under her ample mantle and gave them a share in her immunities and privileges. The Church jealously guarded, as against any attempted inhibition by feudalist aristocracy, her right to ordain the common man and to advance him to the highest position in her hierarchy.

The ladder of the Church was one up which a carpenter's son, as was the great Hildebrand (Gregory VII), or a beggar boy, adopted and educated by the friars (Alexander V, Peter Philargi), might climb to the attainment of the Papacy itself. The ploughboy who, as an acolyte, swung the censer at Mass on Sundays, was a member of an international and consecrated fellowship, the home of which was as wide as Europe or even as the world itself. The universal habit of pilgrimage tended to get people from time to time out of the groove in which feudalism and the static group-spirit generally would have fixed them. The epithet "the glacial era" sometimes applied to the Middle Ages is only appropriate if applied to certain phases of their life, in which the static element was supreme, such as feudalism. Even monasticism was often represented by monks who were continually on the move and in touch with the world.

The kind of life represented by the Free Cities, the universities, and outside all, the ever-shifting and not over-reputable crowd, the description of whom fills the pages of Jusserand's *English Wayfaring Life in the Middle Ages*, was of a type anything but glacial. It was often many-coloured

and certainly quick-witted as far as the universities were concerned. Whatever was the case with feudalism and its serfs, *adscripti glebæ*, grey monotony was not the characteristic of these crowded centres of life.

Rather their appropriate note or atmosphere is similar to the *mise en scène* of Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet*—"these hot days is the mad blood stirring." The methods of study were weak no doubt in the use of the appeal to experience. The mediæval scholar was taught to tread the high *a priori* road, confident in the sure guidance of the syllogism and of his master Aristotle to preserve him from losing his foothold amid the dangerous mists.

The logical not the empirical was his training-ground. The appeal to observation and experience in all departments was yet to yield its well-nigh inexhaustible fruit. Roger Bacon was among the anticipations of the modern world which appear, sometimes in startling manner, in the very midst of mediævalism.

Ockham, scientific rather than theological in mind, is in the general succession of the school of Bacon, that is as to mental temper as distinct from subject-matter of study. He is a disciple of the scientist friar, so far as that solitary pioneer had any school of disciples. Ockham's philosophical outlook, school-man as he is, is ultimately opposed to that of Aquinas, the "Angel of the Schools." In the inner trend of their minds respectively, they are on opposite sides of the water-shed which divides Mediæval from post-Renascence thought, and that in spite of Ockham's crabbed intellectual methods, and the range and depth of S. Thomas' philosophy and

the sanity of its relationship to life. There are weighty signs, however, of the restoration of Aquinas to his lofty honour as a thinker—in this von Hügel is a leader—and of the increasing consciousness of something lacking in the Individualism which became the heir to the Nominalism of Ockham.

As to the honour due to manual labour, the failure of John of Salisbury to acknowledge this, was, as might have been expected, due not to the influence of Christian theology or even of the ecclesiastical atmosphere, but to the following of Aristotle and of the Hellenic way of looking at civilized existence. According to this those engaged in physical labour, being largely slaves, were viewed mainly as existing in order to the affording of adequate leisure for culture and the higher citizenship to the pure-blooded and free-born Greek. Even beyond the ranks of actual slavery, the slave taint touched all manual toil, before the coming of the Carpenter made sacred the hands of labour as well as the brow of thought. The practice, however, of the Church of the Middle Ages, in regard to Holy Orders, was much more democratic than the theory of those mediæval writers who were unable to rise above the Greek lowness of estimate of the dignity of hand-work, as we have seen in the case of John of Salisbury. Feudalism was the least democratic either in theory or practice of all the forces which made up the irregularly compounded complex of mediæval life. In serfdom the static principle which largely neutralized the mediæval conception of the organic character of human society and was the barrier to any kind of progressive ferment had its

least admirable embodiment. Yet even in regard to the nobler type of aristocratic ideals of this period, which guarded the essential truth of the importance of Distinction as opposed to the standard of the Average, there was wanting that element expressed by Burns as "a man's a man for a' that." This latter conception, however, the heritage of Stoicism blended with New Testament ethics, underlay much of mediæval life. The feeling, even when not directly applied to economic conditions, that Christ's Religion was meant to be the poor man's charter, became a chief contributory cause of all those restless movements which, whether Catholic or heretical, mystical or socialistic, Franciscan or Waldensian, were continually at work in Europe from the thirteenth century onward. The study of these has led Troeltsch to describe the later Middle Ages as the period of the rise of *Laienchristentum*, the common man's Christianity.

If democracy, in the modern sense, was foreign to mediæval thought and largely also to its practice, still more was commercialism. In the *Policraticus*, the pseudo-Plutarch, in his describing for the instruction of his pupil the Emperor Trajan the true constitution of a commonwealth, represents the parts of the social organism which have to do directly with money as corresponding to the abdominal region in the case of those supplying or regulating the financial needs of the State. The mass of lesser agriculturalists and hand-workers are represented by the feet. The corporate body of the commonwealth is therefore like a centipede moving by the aid of a swarm of lesser organs. Greek thought discouraged the pursuit of wealth on any large scale.

The economic circumstances of the Hellenic city-states as well as the natural bent of the Greek mind towards simplicity and restraint as essential principles of art and life rendered natural the advice of Aristotle to social reformers (*Politics*, II. 7) to train the nobler sort of natures not to desire more property and to prevent the baser natures from getting more. The authority of Aristotle, par excellence the *sacer vates* of the later Middle Ages, was great, but an even greater authority had spoken to similar effect. The Synoptic Gospels are penetrated by distrust of the acquisitive tendency, and while Christ, like Aristotle, puts forth no programme of communism and recognizes the natural character of the property-owning instinct, when it is also an instinct for rightful property using, He solemnly warns His followers against the dangers to the soul of the desire for accumulation, and calls on some at least to surrender possessions altogether, in heroic freedom of service.

Hence if, on the one hand, the attempted rule of society by manual workers alone and in their exclusive interests—the revenge for a former state of things in which labour was consistently exploited—can claim no precedent in mediæval thought; still more unmediæval because un-Aristotelian and un-evangelic is the conception of society as existing, not that as many men and women as possible may “live and live well,” but to facilitate the gaining of enormous fortunes by individuals or groups of individuals, who regard the function of the State as simply that of making a ring for the free operations of high finance. No doubt the Bolshevik utopia would have appeared to the best mediæval

minds as a *bouleversement* of the natural and therefore divine order, by levelling down to one flat and commonplace surface the multiform variety of life, its distinction of function.

But still more repellent would unrestrained commercialism have seemed. The treating the money-acquiring and money-increasing desires as the main arteries of healthy society, the regarding material acquisitions as practically a mark of the divine favour, all this is the absolute antithesis to that sacramental view of poverty and that distrust of wealth which, though too often contradicted by the flaunting of the direct opposite at the very centre of the life of the Church and of Christian civilization, in theory at least distinguished the Franciscan age.

But in the later Middle Ages, currents and cross-currents mingled with one another. Life, like Joseph's coat, was of many colours, regal, aristocratic, military, ecclesiastical (this phase that of a world in itself), democratic in patches though of a more static type of democracy than at present. In two respects it differed much from this time: (1) Religion, and that the Catholic Christian Religion, was all dominant, even if not all penetrative subjectively. It flowed around and through and into every phase of life. (2) The divisions of European society were, as has been often pointed out, horizontal rather than vertical. Nations in the sense of entities with separate and supreme sovereignties were as yet unknown, or were only in process of emerging from the partially differentiated mass of Christendom in which their future forces lay concealed.

This may be illustrated by the social *Weltanschauung* of the mind of S. Thomas.

The background of that mind is not the baronial castle, although S. Thomas was born as a member of the feudal nobility, but rather the Italian Free City.

Sir Walter Scott's novels do not give a fully historical environment of mediæval thought.

It is in the turbulent streets of Paris, thronged by the fighting or jesting crowds of the students of all classes and types of her cosmopolitan university, that we see the characteristic spirit of the later Middle Ages in one of its most living aspects. Aquinas, Ockham, Marsilio, were all at one time or another among its teachers or scholars. So also at a later period were Rabelais, Calvin, and Ignatius Loyola—all three with minds that were alive, but minds in nought else alike.

It is the spirit of universities and of Free Cities, not of feudalism and of the existence spent in or about castles, which seems to pervade a glorious building like the parish church of S. Sebald of Nuremberg, with the rich intricacy of its shrines of saints, and chapels of trade and merchant guilds, with their familiarity and splendour mixed together; the Church hospitable to the busy world, the world in return learning the gracious manners of the Church; adaptability of a good kind prevailing on both sides.

The truth is that if all through the Middle Ages we meet the ghost of the Roman Empire, to use the famous metaphor of Hobbes, we also feel in their later period, from the fourteenth century downwards, the pre-natal life of the modern world. It

was the period of a civilization distinctive in itself, yet also organically connected with two other civilizations, the one its parent, the other its child, even if a self-assertive and independent one.

Mediæval life was often characterized by almost inconceivable violence and cruelty. It is perhaps characteristic of that age that the latter vice was not included among the seven root sins. The purely mediæval period in certain of its phases was marked by a monotony which makes the Renaissance appear by contrast as the thaw after a deep and long frost. This is, however, far from being true of the period as a whole. It is certainly not true of some of its most characteristic features and living centres, and was only so whenever the static element became under certain conditions, through the combined influence of caste and asceticism, absolutely prohibitive of the dynamic impulses. No doubt the period was neither the fool's paradise of romanticist sentimentalism and of the Neo-Catholic reaction, nor the nightmare of Protestant prejudice, with sinister forms moving in the pre-Reformation gloom.

Whatever its faults, it had not anticipated the later transformation of Christianity, the romance of the ages, into a system mainly of taboos and respectability. Its virtues and its vices were alike extreme. Yet the immobility of life in many large tracts in those times, and all that was involved in the semi-slavery of serfdom, must make us pause when our imagination fills in the outline of the "Merry England" of our forefathers by the figures of happy peasants dancing round maypoles, acting in mystery plays, and finding a double home in the church and in the tavern. Dr. Coulton has cleared

away much of the golden haze of these picturesque idealizations. He would be a brave man or a very foolish one who would question the accuracy of such an historian's statements of fact. Yet in regard to another direction, that of collective thought, ideals, and traditional attitude towards life, Gierke's name is as weighty as that of the writer alluded to, and the great German writer has proved beyond dispute the lofty rationality and saneness of mediæval political and social theories and the impossibility of regarding the shapers of the nobler features of the civilization of the period in question in any other capacity than as, in their own day and measure, supreme benefactors of mankind. That melancholy and restlessness developed as that age drew to its close is, however, undoubtedly certain. There is no echo to the larklike note of S. Francis.

The deep discontent of the later Middle Ages finds expression in that sigh for peace in the world and, in the Church, for the holy simplicity and poverty of Christ, which strikes on our ears at every turn. The Fraticelli, or extreme and logically consistent Franciscans, swarmed everywhere, bringing with them the spirit of immediacy in approach to God; of literalness in the following of Christ; of fraternal realization of the equality demanded by Christian love, of the Law of Nature, that is God's law of original equality and sharing, rather than the Law of Nations, that is man's law of relativity and status. They tried to regain the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount, and, at the same time, to go behind that of the Donation of Constantine. Aristotle's authority is questioned. The larger humanity of the Stoics is invoked, or even Plato's dream

of community of goods. Appeal was made from Aristotle's philosophic Justice to the humanitarian Justice of the Stoic School. *Piers Plowman* (Langland) says of the friars in regard to the Peasants' Revolt:

"They prechen men of Plato, and proven it by Seneca
That all things under heaven ought to be in commune."

Above all things the poverty of Jesus, reincarnated as it were in Francis, seemed to the latter's more ardent followers to regard with reproachful eye the luxury of Avignon and of Rome.

In the cruder aspects of this ferment Dante had no share. The asceticism which characterized it was often too wild, unspiritual, and inhuman to have attracted him. His protest against what was represented by the Avignon Papacy was heroic rather than fretful, and it embodied itself in literature in the *De Monarchia*, his great plea for the inherent sacredness of secular life, for the civil commonwealth as no mere offshoot of an imperial church but as having, from and under God, vitality and authority of its own.

In the often-quoted words of Lord Bryce, the *De Monarchia* is at one and the same time "an epilogue and a prophecy." It is unconsciously the swan song of the Holy Roman Empire, but still more it is the herald's trumpet blast for the entrance on the European stage of the modern State.

The type of civilization in which we live to-day in Western Europe emerges in idea and principle among the conceptions of the *De Monarchia*, *Imperium non dependet ab ecclesia*. In these words

of Dante's treatise is involved the determination of modern humanity to realize, in itself and in its members, the adult citizen life, while gratefully acknowledging the training in principles of Christian politics given by the Church during the tentative and experimental period of the youth of European civilization. The commonwealth is in Dante's words, *A Deo immediate non ab alio Dei ministro seu vicario*. Here is a principle equally opposed on the one hand to the full-blown theory of mediæval ultramontanism and to all modern dilutions of it—a theory which, we may note, has never been formally disavowed although through force of circumstances it has been discarded—and on the other to the practical negation of God erected into a system of politics, to the tyranny of the omniscient and unethical State. It is equally removed from the temper of Boniface VIII's bull *Unam sanctam* on the one hand, and from that of Machiavelli's *Il Principe* on the other. The greatness and distinction of Dante as a political thinker lie in the fact that he belongs to two worlds, the past and the future. He is thoroughly a man of the thirteenth century, the epic poet of Catholicism, as Milton is of Puritanism, yet his soul dreams of things to come and his view of life and of society is underneath its mediæval vesture even startlingly modern.

John of Salisbury is a large-minded mediævalist, Marsilio of Padua is a democratic thinker born before his time, but Dante "looks both before and after." His trumpet-note is one at once of farewell and of prophecy. The significance of the *De Monarchia* does not lie in its celebration of the

Empire as destined to be as old as humanity itself. Henry of Luxemburg was not a very adequate Messiah or second Cyrus. The opposing powers, the Empire and the Papacy, had each of them seen their best days. The time of Hildebrand, the time of Barbarossa, those eras of Titans, had passed away for ever. The modern nations were beginning to move in the womb of Europe. More than that, France and England were born and well born. The real and abiding significance of Dante's political attitude lies not in his Imperialism. The *De Monarchia* is of more value than if it were a Ghibelline pamphlet, however inspired. It has a permanent European and human significance. Its atmosphere is that in which the Modern State emerges. The following are the most significant conclusions, direct or indirect, of Dante's philosophy of politics. The World-State or Community is a sacred organism. Its origin is directly from God. It represents the human race which is "the son of Heaven" (*humanum genus filius est cæli*). It is the "Great State," to use the very modern phrase of Mr. H. G. Wells. It needs no papal bull or priestly consecration to make it a divine thing. The Empire, the heir of Augustus, of Constantine, of Charlemagne, is one and unique. It is not merely the German Power with claims on Italy. It is the sacramentum of mankind, the mystical representative of the human race, the embodiment of justice, and of peace the necessary companion of justice. The social organism, the *gens humanum*, which the Empire represents, is divine by its own inherent nature, by the indwelling of the immanent reason of which it is the organic expression.

Nature as well as Super-Nature is divine. The rationality of God is the creative and formative principle of the life of the human commonwealth. The State is, in its ideal, reason externalized. Of course Dante does not deny the origin and spiritual authority of the Church and even of the Papacy, though placing popes in hell. The Church, in his view, as in that of his master, Aquinas, is the divinely appointed guide of man in regard to the things of eternity, as the Empire or Civil Power is in regard to the things of time. In the harmonious co-operation of each lies the ideal perfection of mankind here below. Each is of God, each has its own limits of jurisdiction, world-wide in both cases, but differing as to the nature and objects of the rule exercised and as to the parts of human nature over which either power has control. Dante's theory as to the relations of Church and State to one another is practically that of parallelism, and would logically work into something like Mazzini's "Free Church in a Free State" idea, though the distinction with Dante, as with all mediæval thinkers, is rather that of two powers or sets of organs in one body than of two distinct and separate associations. Dante's view is no exception to the universally held mediæval conception of the identification of Church and State as one thing, yet his work is a prelude, unconsciously so no doubt, to the rise of the Modern State. Its arguments are of the past. Its conclusion is of the present.

Both Dante and Aquinas contributed unknowingly to the gradual disintegration of the great mediæval synthesis or attempted synthesis: Dante by his disentangling in idea the State from the

tendrils of Church control; Aquinas by his grafting into Catholic philosophy the *Politics* of Aristotle. The latter had as its background the political life of the Greek city, congenial in its autonomy to the Renaissance conception of the sovereign State and (unlike the humanitarian world-view of Stoicism), not really easy to adjust in range and outlook to the usual atmosphere and action of the Catholic mind, with the latter's internationality of interest. But Dante's idealisation of the Holy Roman Empire is no anticipation of the pre-war militarist conception in Germany, Austria, and Russia, or even of the collective opportunity for financial enterprise on a vast scale which that much-abused word "Empire" is in danger of suggesting to the modern mind, especially to the Anglo-Saxon one. In Dante the word has no connexion either with the idea of fighting in the interests of a national fatherland, or of extending trade with the colonies and dependencies of the home country. Peace is the atmosphere of the theocratic mediæval Empire as of the Empire of the Antonines, the broad spacious age of the second century A.D. The one Cæsar is not primarily War Lord, but rather the *Advocatus* or champion of Peace. He is *Dominus Mundi* not through any bloodstained supremacy, like that gained by Napoleon, but as the elected representative of Catholic Christendom and so implicitly of the human race. He is the embodiment in the natural order (as the Pope in the supernatural one) of that divine Law by which the world is held together—the Law which is not the outcome of human wills, but which Aristotle, the guide, blended with Augustine, of mediæval

thought, knows as "Reason without passion" *ἀνευ ὁρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἐστίν*).¹

Yet the peace which Dante praises is of a higher type than any merely secular repose. He describes it as "universal peace—the best of all those things which are ordained for our blessedness." This is not far removed from the great thought of the *Divina Commedia*: "In His Will is our Peace." Dante's aspiration for peace is not for his own soul primarily, but for the world. Wholeness and fullness are the marks of his ideals. For him, in the *De Monarchia*, the universe itself is the footprint of the divine goodness—*Vestigium divinæ bonitatis*. The course of history before Christ is viewed by Dante in the second Book of the *De Monarchia* as the arena for the olympic games in which nations are the wrestlers. In this ordeal of battle Rome has borne off the prize, the empire of the world, *Cunctis athletizantibus prævaluit*.² So to the New Testament the poet makes a strange appeal, characteristically mediævalist rather than modern. Christ was born at Bethlehem because Cæsar Augustus had ordered all to be taxed at the native place of each respectively, and the fact of the place of the nativity was an acknowledgment of the validity of the command by the infant King who obeyed it, in the person of His mother. In Dante's view of the nativity, the eagles of empire seem to protect the cradle of the child. Like S. Luke, he sees in Rome the genius of universal peace. The great name of Augustus Cæsar seems blended with the

¹ Aristotle, *Politics*, III. xvi. 5.

² *De Monarchia*, II. ix. 1, 2.

pax hominibus bonæ voluntatis of the Christmas song.

Strangest argument of all, in order that the sacrifice of Calvary should be efficacious, it was necessary that Christ should have been condemned to death by the only power, the Roman Empire, that had legitimate authority as the representative of God. "He suffered under Pontius Pilate." "Thou couldest have no power at all against Me, except it were given thee from above."

The authority of Cæsar is, as it were, unconsciously the priest by whom the sacrifice is offered. Dante views the Catholic Church and the Christendom which it stands for as the resultant of two lines of development, each of them guided by a providential hand, the histories of Israel and of Rome; both the records of chosen peoples; both studded with miracles, and forming romances of adventure and escape; the history of each in itself a providential wonder, the wonder of preservation in the one case and of world-empire in the other, each marked off by God's hand from the rest of mankind.

Dante's sense of the solidarity of man makes him more akin to our own time than he is to sixteenth-century thought. His social and political ideas are at once more antique and more modern than those of his famous contemporary, Marsilio of Padua, the stormy petrel who anticipated the Reformation convulsion. Marsilio, the author of the *Defensor Pacis*, Dante's contemporary, was imperialist, but unlike Dante, who had no quarrel with the Pope as shepherd of souls, an opponent not only of the temporal power of the Papacy but of its spiritual supremacy as well.

The ideas of the *De Monarchia* are in one respect those of a past never fully realized, the past of a romantic dream, and yet, on the other hand, of a future which lay beyond the range of Marsilio's acute rationalizing mind. Marsilio anticipates the spirit of the Renaissance, in regard to the self-contained unity of the laicized State, and even further the spirit of Rousseau in regard to popular sovereignty. Dante looks back no doubt on the surface to the age of Barbarossa, but the true inwardness of the *De Monarchia* lies in its modernness of idea, and in the aspiration of which it is the expression. Its spirit is that which is moving in the minds of the best men and women of to-day, and which is the necessary support and stimulus for such work as that on which the League of Nations is embarking. Aristotelian in philosophy as Dante, like Aquinas, is, his world-outlook, his universalism, is unlike the limited completion of the Greek City-State. The range of Dante's thought, like the over-arching sky, is not suggestive of the hellenic balance and proportion.

At the beginning of the thirteenth century in the pages of Marsilio's *Defensor* we see in something more than germ, indeed in very distinct outline, the Modern State of to-day, secular, lay, tolerant, self-contained. There is an absence, however, in Marsilio's treatise of the spirit of the seer. There is no vision of the unity of mankind expressing itself in a *societas societatum*, or federation of peoples and groups knit together in a common fellowship. This conception is embodied for Aquinas in the headship of the Pope, with the Emperor as chief temporal officer, and for Dante in a dual

primacy, that of the Pope in the spiritual and of the Emperor in the temporal sphere. The necessity in regard to either department of life for a visible representative, for what the mediæval thinkers called a *persona publica*, is now no longer the obvious axiom that it appeared to the men of that time. So far, the *De Monarchia* is obsolete as to its arguments and assumptions, and antiquarian as to its interests. But unity, as distinct from uniformity, in regard to international life and relations, a unity to which each nation has the power of making a distinctive contribution, is an ideal achievement of the future of which the spirit of the *De Monarchia* is an appropriate and even inspiring prelude. The aspiration, at once austere and exhilarating, which breathes through it distinguishes Dante, in spite of all his capacity for anger, as among the great peace lovers of history. His place in this respect is with Cusanus and Erasmus.

All three invoked the spirit of "pure and peaceable wisdom" amid the "strife of tongues," and invoked it in vain. Dante's champion was but a pasteboard hero; the Conciliar Movement, which Cusanus first blessed and then deserted, dwindled away into futility. Amid the angry clamour of the sixteenth century, the roar of the loosened water-floods of religious revolution, the voice of Erasmus is heard in vain, exchanging the note of mockery of folly for that of pleading for peace.

Not till quite modern times does the conception of the possibility of the building by common international understanding for Europe and for the world—of the City of Reconciliation, "Word over

all, beautiful as the skies"—rise above the intellectual and spiritual horizon of the lives of the peoples. Amid the Napoleonic thunders is heard the "still small voice" of Kant.

The hopes, often faint enough in the light of past experience, which are called forth by the inception of the League of Nations, may have wider and more entrancing issues than even those of political peace. At some fierce crisis when racial patriotism deposes reason, the mind of an immediate realism, supreme within its own range, the range of the obvious and of the unspiritual, may silence the expression of every other influence. But when the strife of tongues has died away and sanity returns, it is voices such as that of Dante, the prophet of the nobler Catholicism, of the common reason, of the unity of the race, and of the kingship of Christ, which are heard across the centuries. They are voices of the eternal world, which cannot be silenced by the changes of time.

CHAPTER IV

TRANSITION TO THE MODERN STATE

THE fourteenth and fifteenth centuries saw the beginning and the development in its earlier stages of the process of the laicizing of public life, and of the parting from one another, sometimes gradually and imperceptibly, sometimes violently, of theology and politics. It was only a few years from the close of the great Catholic century, the thirteenth, that of Innocent III and of S. Francis, when the brutal outrages inflicted on Pope Boniface VIII at Anagni (1303) and his consequent death marked the fall of the mediæval Papacy and the entry on the scene of a new fact, the national and sovereign State. The French King, Philip, supported by the powerful lawyers of the regalist school, anticipated to a certain extent, though not to that of an absolute breach of communion, the subsequent action of our own Henry VIII.

The humiliated Papacy was carried off to Avignon. The thunders of Boniface VIII, in which the claims of the Roman theocracy reached their climax, touching a limit from which there has been in later and modern times a tacit recession as to temporal assumptions, were exchanged for the pliant voices of his immediate successors which echoed the wishes of the king of France, whose chaplain and vassal the Papacy had for a time practically become. A few years after

the Roman claim had suffered this crushing blow appeared Marsilio's *Defensor*, a sort of premature bolt from the blue without immediate result, striking at the very foundations of the papal power, and at the whole conception of absolute and irresponsible authority which it represented. In the pages of Marsilio, the Modern State makes a precocious entry. In this treatise, originally a *livre de circonstance*, the lay view of life broke into the ecclesiastical atmosphere, like a dangerous missile hurled at a cathedral roof, a prelude of storms to come.

Yet in Marsilio, Church and State still remain one, though the civil functionaries are at the top and the clergy at the bottom. The political State is, as in Platonic and Aristotelian thought, a sort of self-going concern, an embodiment of that immanent Reason which gives to each his place and his work in the social scheme. Marsilio's commonwealth is unecclesiastical, no doubt, but it is not unethical. He stands midway between two great Italian writers in politics, Dante and Machiavelli; more of the purely secular statesman than the former, less of the God-ignoring diplomatist than the latter.

All through the later mediæval period, fundamentally an age of transition, a condition of civilization accompanied by splendid theories and aspirations having as their watchwords Unity and Peace, and blending the ethics of the Philosophy of the Porch—the Stoic humaneness and cosmopolitanism—with the distinctive Christian faith and teaching, was on its trial. This was so unconsciously to itself and to those at its head who, at least by

their conduct (though not by their words), practically invited the challenge of it as the legitimate representation of the life of Christian society. But the contrast between the ideal and the actual became less and less possible of evasion. The rawness of the flesh, the gaping wounds—the resultants of life's injustice and cruelty—could not be concealed beneath an overlying surface of sentiments, idealism, and dogma. Least of all was this possible in that age of violence when barbarism of nature was less diluted than in later and more sophisticated periods. To add to the misery of the times, there was also increasing difficulty in the economic sphere.

In spite of a network of dispensations and exceptions, the canon law was unable effectually to cover the intricacies of the unexpected developments of social life and history. An unavowed realism which had little respect for the *imponderabilia* of religion, nor fear of the divine nemesis, nor regard for what Machiavelli, alluding to Savonarola, calls "unarmed prophets," became the real working religion of the Europe of the Renaissance. The political influence of Aristotle was the bridge between the older Christendom, largely static, with its loosely knit and loosely articulated system, overarched by the omnipresent Catholicism, and the Modern State with its autonomous character and its religious neutrality. At one end was the universal Church-State, in which baptism and citizenship were coterminous terms. At the other extreme, Machiavelli's non-ethical State, with its instinct of self-preservation and of extension and its will to power, its law of nature not that of immanent reason, but of natural appetite; its redeeming point

being, however, the ardent and disinterested patriotism which was the real religion of its author.

Marsilio's *Defensor* is unmediævalist, though coming at the climax of the Middle Ages, but it is also un-Machiavellian. Its political and social background is that of the Greek City-State blended with that of the Italian Free City. Its temper is Aristotelian rather than either Catholic or Machiavellian. Its ruling principle is the practical reason rather than faith on the one hand or will on the other. It is one of the last of those compositions which shew all through the Middle Ages from John of Salisbury to Cues the absorption of Greek political ideals and their grafting into the stem of Christian sociology by the mediæval mind.

But the Platonist-Aristotelian-Catholic synthesis began to tear and gape at every fold. It could not fit the growing and changing European mind and civilization. The realist said in effect, We must reconcile ourselves to facts. In this world, as the German Neumann tells us in his criticism of the Christian social ethic, "Man cannot live on pure oxygen." Such writers indeed as Aquinas had recognized this difficulty and tried to provide for it. Hence their keeping extreme and logical Augustinianism mentally at arm's-length; hence also the Catholic theory of the double standard; hence casuistry, a necessity in some form or other in a moral world which is dynamic as well as static, relative as well as absolute, in regard to its character and obligations.

After the sixteenth-century revolution and the subsequent reaction, the Church of the Counter-Reformation became at once purer and narrower, more

disciplined and more tied up, more directly efficient and more regimented, as was possible owing to its narrower territorial range, and increased concentration on directly spiritual and ecclesiastical interests, than could have been the case with the more widely extended and less compact organizations of mediæval Christendom. Above all, the potent influence of the Jesuits made for "tidying up" the previous condition with its comparatively easy-going character.

In spite of such outbursts against heresy as the Albigensian crusade, it was not until the Latin Communion was in process of losing almost half of Europe that martial law was proclaimed. In such countries as Spain uniformity was secured by measures of drastic coercion. Where Rome was not supreme, her position was that of an assailed fortress, or even of a proscribed conspiracy, her interests naturally becoming concentrated partly on self-defence, partly on the training of individuals in her own distinctive spirit.

The tendency of post-Reformation Roman Catholicism has necessarily been more or less to practically abandon the attempt to supply on any large commanding scale guidance for social life *as a whole*, international, national, civic, economic, as well as domestic and personal. The last two phases, the life of the family and of the individual, became, and rightly so, the main spheres for the application of Christian ethics. The sphere of Christian sociology as a whole was neglected.

Until the general revival among all Christians of the social conscience, to which, in the Roman Church, Leo XIII's teaching and influence power-

fully contributed, the latter communion, while practically abandoning such claims as that of the right of deposition of sovereigns, had also ceased to give guidance as to questions such as war, and the condition of the poor, except so far as the latter was regarded as an opportunity for charity and for merit for the devout, rather than as an offence against justice, as the great mediævalists would at least in theory, and often in practice too, have viewed it.

It is true that the treatises on international law, at once profound and practical, ethical and political, by Suarez and other Spanish Jesuits, written after the rise of the Counter-Reformation, laid the foundation on which Hugo Grotius built. But there was no comprehensive Catholic sociology in active operation, though much vigorous revival of devotion.

While the post-Reformation Roman Communion became necessarily less fully European than had been the older Western Catholicism, yet we must not in a one-sided manner idealize mediæval Christianity, because of its comparatively larger scope and interest than that of the Counter-Reformation Church. The working out of the idea of the *Regnum Christi* during the centuries in which the Western Church and the revived Empire came to be regarded as one mystical organism ended in demonstrating the imperfection of the synthesis involved, its limitations, its incoherencies, above all, its carrying with it the result of religious persecution, of coercion of conscience, on a scale which strikes the modern mind with horror. In the gradual reaction the State went one way and the

Church another. Sometimes the former succeeded in almost entirely absorbing the latter. Where the Christian spirit has been vital since the Reformation, it has been occupied either in securing for the Church the spiritual necessities of its own existence, or in training Christian souls for the immortality for which this world was conceived as only the threshold. The tide is now turning in the direction of an increasing value for social unity and an increasing desire to see that unity embodied or represented in a new fellowship of the peoples, a federation of civilized and, as religious minds would add, of Christianized mankind. Both the Catholic and the socialistic trends in modern life and thought are leading to the birth of sympathy with times ignored or misrepresented in the immediate past. But if we would truly learn the lesson of the Middle Ages, we must arrive at a clear perception of the causes which led inevitably to the break-up of the world of Aquinas and Dante, by forces to which both these great thinkers themselves unconsciously contributed.

It is one of the marks of the peculiar many-sidedness of the thought of Troeltsch, that German genius so lately taken from us, great alike, in spite of characteristic defects, in profound knowledge, in noble instincts, and in penetrating insight, that while in his treatment of the Catholic past in his *Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen*, his approach to the subject is very different from that of such admirers of that period as Chateaubriand on the one hand or Comte on the other, he has for its central ideals a genuine and even glowing admiration. Thomism, he tells us, is no ascetic world-

flight. The element of pessimism, which the mind of Augustine, only with the aid of heroic faith, kept at bay, is in the Thomist view thrown into the background. In the foreground is the incorporation of nature and of grace, in organic life and upward development. There is indeed asceticism in regard to the dangerous frailty and unreliability of unaided nature. Aquinas, like Browning, otherwise the prince of optimists, knows "the corruption of man's heart." The Thomist view, recognizing as within the sphere of Christ's kingship and therefore of Christianity all the powers of civilization as then developed, embracing life as a whole, yet at the same time self-judging, vigilant, and restrained, is like Poetry in Matthew Arnold's description of it,

"Radiant, adorned; a hidden ground
Of thought and of austerity within."

In one sense the mediæval spirit continues the asceticism of the fifth century. S. Jerome is its progenitor. In another it seeks to interpenetrate in a consecrated unity the genius alike of the Church and of the world, the latter becoming the *regnum Christi*, the orb beneath the cross.

In Thomism the central characteristic is not asceticism by itself, but the union of asceticism as the heroic self-discipline of faith with life in the world. In the words of Troeltsch it is "Die Vereinigung von Askese und Weltleben." He adds truly that both these aspects, that which sees the world strenuously as a scene of pilgrimage and that which sees it thankfully as the king's palace and the father's house, have their roots in the Gospels.

This was expressed in the double view of the Christian life given in a great saying, *Exsul peregrinatur ad Dominum, civis gaudet et regnat cum Domino*. The Christian is conceived of as at once pilgrim and guest, on the road and in the palace. We are on the trek on the one hand, with as little baggage as possible, and, on the other, fellow-citizen of the city into which the kings of the earth bring their honour and glory. The latter truth involves that conception of humanity as a living unity under the kingship of Christ which is expressed in a great sentence of the *Summa*, startlingly like the view which modern theology has learnt from Maurice and his school, *Genus Humanum consideratur quasi unum corpus cujus caput est ipse Christus*.¹

Here the *Summa* re-echoes S. Paul in the Epistle to the Ephesians, in a phrase parallel to many in Dante's treatment of the unity of mankind, and very different from what the usual view of the dualist character of mediæval thought would have led us to expect.

The aridness and the meticulous unpracticality in which Scholasticism ended ought not to blind us to the perception of the lasting influence and the depth and range of thought of the greater of the writers of this school in the days when it was still in touch with life. The critical temper of Colet and of Erasmus made them unfair to Aquinas, since they identified him with attempts to define what lies beyond definition and beneath the sounding line of reason. But the critical temper itself had its

¹ *Summa*, III. 8. Troeltsch notes the Thomist view of Christ's headship of the human race.

genesis in modern times among the Schoolmen whom it disparaged.

The revived interest in the English William of Ockham has rediscovered for us the figure of this, the great critic of the later Middle Ages—the agent of disintegration, the herald of change. If the mind of the Angelic Doctor, Aquinas, is of the synthetic and architectonic order, seeking to discover the principles of harmony by which all life, individual, social, and religious, are held together, that of Ockham, the Invincible Doctor, is of the type which takes things to pieces and disjoints the limbs which need resetting.

A man of cities (as was also S. Thomas), a vital influence in the Universities of Oxford and of Paris, Ockham was then for four years prisoner in the papal palace of Avignon, making a romantic flight to Aigues-Mortes, the galley in which he escaped chased in vain down the Rhone by one of the cardinals, charged to bring him back to captivity in the papal fortress. He gained just in time the pinnacle sent by the Emperor to secure the safe conveyance of the friend of Cæsar and the object of the anger of Peter. Henceforth, in Italy and in Munich, Ockham was germinal by his writings of the principle of the laic State, to become ultimately the modern or secular State. The de-papalized condition of modern civilization and the unclericalized civil organism of law and justice are to be found in seed and root rather than in full growth, in the principles which underlie the thought of Ockham and sometimes emerge from his tough dialectic and obscure language with startling and clear-cut distinctness, the Protestant and

the Rationalist, and not merely the Liberal Catholic, leaping up, as it were, for an instant and then sinking again into the background of mediæval scholastic argument.

Those implications of Ockham's political thought which involve the birth and beginnings of the idea of the modern State were camouflaged in the minds of their often unconscious agents and disseminators by their connection with the semi-theocratic imperialism of the Holy Roman Empire, the interest of which was the ostensible object of Ockham's anti-papalism and of his bringing the laity to the front in the Church as well as in the State. The trend of his thought was not realized at first, probably not even by himself, as ultimately disintegrative of the pure mediæval system.

As the adviser of the Emperor, in the latter's struggle with the Papacy—ending his days at Munich in 1347, unmastered to the last—Ockham is in form mediæval, but in germinal thought often modern and indeed startlingly so.

Ockham anticipates in many important respects the main features of the modern State. He rejects the *plenitudo potestatis* theory of the papal power. He teaches that authority in every department of life must be the guide and not the despotic governor of human intelligence.

Von Hügel writes of what he calls Ockham's "agnostic Nominalism" as a philosophical clearing of the way for Luther.¹ Certainly as an expounder of the Nominalist philosophy Ockham has little respect for the *communis sensus*. One evident reason, one sound proof from Scripture weighs

¹ Von Hügel's *The German Soul*, pp. 166 and 220.

more with him, he tells us—*quam assertio totius universitatis mortalium*.¹ He would have agreed with Matthew Arnold that *Securus delirat orbis terrarum* would be generally a truer statement of the value of universal, but unexamined, judgments than S. Augustine's *Securus judicat orbis terrarum*, that saying which for Newman was like the sound of a bell inviting his soul to take the path to Rome.

In Ockham's *De Imperatorum et Pontificum Potestate*, a treatise lately made accessible to ordinary readers by its editor, Mr. C. K. Brampton, he opposes the papal autocracy not by the weapons of far-fetched scriptural allusions, but by going to the foundation notions of authority, law, and liberty. He insists that all authority, the papal included, must be *Non dominativus, sed ministrativus*.²

His language about the Papacy is extraordinarily daring. It got its edge from his experiences at Avignon. In the opinion, however, of the recent editor of the *De Imperatorum*, its author was not an anti-papalist on principle, as Marsilio certainly was. The object and justification of government, he tells us, is leadership, not lordship. *Principatus dominativus* is the rule exercised over slaves. It is non-Christian, inhuman, and in the highest degree irrational. *Principatus ministrativus* is that of a wise teacher, leading children entrusted to him to the full freedom and responsibility of manhood. He contrasts the *servitus* which characterizes the system of the *Eccllesia Avinionica* (the Avignon Curia) and, he says, terrorizes thought lest it should

¹ Ockham's *De Imperatorum et Pontificum Potestate* (Brampton's edition), Pref., 30.

² *De Imp.*, VI. 20.

discuss the limits of the Papal power, with that *libertas evangelicæ legis*—the freedom of the Gospel Law—which invalidates all claims to rule that are not justified by the capacity to liberate and to serve.¹

Ockham, like Marsilio, sees in the Church not the clergy only, even including the minor orders, but the entire community of baptized and faithful people. He insists on the necessity of representative assemblies in order to ascertain the mind of the Church, which was not the mind of the ecclesiastical lawyers and financiers round Pope John XXII at Avignon, but of the whole Church, including the laity, and even women—for, to judge by some allusions, Ockham would not bar the admission of these latter to church assemblies. In regard to the representative principle he is the father of ideas which afterwards shaped the Conciliar Movement. When Pope John XXIII fled by stealth from Constance in disguise on a sorry nag, terrified by the approach of his deposition by the council, the incident involved the revenge taken by the spirit of Ockham for the latter's flight from the fortress-prison of Avignon and for his fear of recapture by the Pope's predecessor John XXII, as his boat sped along the Rhone.

The principle of representation and the right of deposition had been commonplaces of mediæval politics in such countries as France and England long before, developing the practical consequences of the principles involved in Ockham's audacity of criticism, the University of Paris took the lead, under Gerson and D'Ailly, the intellectual heads

¹ *De Imp.*, passim.

of the *Studium*, or body of the scholars of Europe, in applying them to the Church itself. Political ideas of constitutional responsibility of rulers and of the inherent right to justice on the part of the ruled, in fact of government as a school of citizenship, had for long moved, sometimes dominantly, sometimes dimly, in the background of the nobler and wiser thought of the age. But the Papacy, even when proclaiming their validity in the secular sphere, had kept them at arms' length from all contact with, or application to, the system of the Church.

These principles failed to justify themselves by practical success in regard to the renovation of Western Christendom. The Council of Basle, less hierarchic and more democratic than that of Constance, was out-manceuvred by the reviving Papacy as represented by the astute Venetian Pope, Eugenius IV (Gabriel Condolmieri). Indeed, both the reforming council and its extraordinary anti-pope—Felix V, Duke Amadeus of Savoy, an ex-military commander turned hermit, a widower with a family of sons who served as acolytes at his coronation—became somewhat discredited and discreditable. But the principles of constitutional liberty, the attempt to realize which died in the Church as the Basle assembly shrank into insignificance, awoke again with thrilling effect in the political sphere, though here also inspired by religion, in the War of Liberation of The Netherlands, and they were practically identical with those of the 1688 Revolution in England. The Whigs, the heirs of the Puritans, not only appealed to the underlying principles, at once liberal and mediæval, of the English Common Law, but they also used, though no doubt largely

unconsciously, the very formulæ of the conciliar constitutionalists in Church politics, applying the principles involved to the secular situation of their own time. They thus justified in theory their sending adrift the Divine Right Monarchy of High-Church tradition, now in the person of James II false to that tradition, and in any case as a system the growth of the Renaissance rather than of the Middle Ages.

The analogy between the ideas behind the Council of Constance and those behind the English Revolution of 1688 can be more clearly seen when the moderate and constitutional, as distinct from radical, character of the changes aimed at in each case is realized. Gerson was to Hus or afterwards Luther as the men of the England of 1688 to those of the France of 1789. Constance did not go all the lengths which the principles of Ockham, its indirect originator, would have justified.

It was a movement in which the aristocracy of intellect in the organism of the European Church-State, the leaders of the University of Paris, the *Studium*, allying themselves with the Teutonic spirit, and putting into the foreground the non-Italian hierarchy and even the Emperor Sigismund himself, took advantage of the impasse in the history of the Papacy to make an effort to reconstruct and so to save the unity of the disintegrating *Respublica Christiana*, never actually effectually united save in theory and ideal.

The position of the conciliar party was similar to that of the barons at the Magna Charta crisis, but its best parallel is to be found, as we have found it already, in the action of the Whig thinkers and

nobles of 1688 in our own country. In each case an aristocracy sought to transform absolutism into constitutional rule. Neither movement was really democratic, except in a distant, indirect, and ultimate sense. 1688 was a success as to its immediate objects. The Whigs triumphed and government by oligarchy ensued.

This was not the case with Gerson and his school. The Paris professors were beaten, as to their ultimate aims, by the Roman diplomatists, Christendom north of the Alps by Italy. The re-galvanizing of the Holy Roman Empire as a sort of shield behind which Church reform could advance, proved a failure. Sigismund might summon the council, but he was but a poor reproduction of Constantine. Public spirit was also lacking to most of the bishops, and Christian democracy, except in the dream of Marsilio or the visions of the Fraticelli, was as yet unborn. Constitutional reform and the preservation of a united Christendom as its consequence lost its chances, at the cost of the subsequent Teutonic revolution in religion. But Gallicanism, and in a measure Anglicanism—the latter more so to-day than during the Reformation itself—are, in history, heirs of the conciliar spirit.

The way in which the history of the Council of Constance is stained by the crime of the violation of the safe-conduct of Hus and his subsequent burning illustrates the fact that no one is so angry with the revolutionary radical as the evolutionary reformer, into whose movement the former cuts at an inconvenient angle, trying to turn it in his own direction. Gerson's attitude to Hus is paralleled by that of Sir Thomas More to Tyndale, of Erasmus

to Luther, and of Edmund Burke to Tom Paine. The Wyclifite principles which Hus transmitted in their Bohemian form represented a view of the Church of Christ as no longer a visible institution but as the *numerus predestinatorum*. Cusanus (Cardinal de Cues), the genius of the conciliar party, at its rise, whose *Concordantia Catholica* was the last and most comprehensive presentation of the federalist conception of mediæval Christendom, and who as a precursor of the New Learning, with a mind of modern type and of scientific capacity and range, is at one with Wyclif in recognition of the corrupt condition of the Latin Church and of the Christian civilization of the time. Into the latter the mild wisdom of de Cues sought to breathe new life and inspiration. But the author of the *De Concordantia* differs from the great puritan schoolman in his refusal to surrender the objectivity of the Church, and either to merge it in the State altogether, or to replace it by the severe Predestinarianism which Wyclif derived from a severe Augustinianism, without Augustine's enthusiastic adherence to the visible Catholic body.

Three main streams, social and spiritual, in Christianity, the Latin Catholic, the Puritan, and the National Church types, have their representatives among the schoolmen of the pre-Reformation period. The more spiritual and intellectual presentation of Roman Catholicism is being sustained by the renewed study of S. Thomas Aquinas. The strongly individualist and subjective type of religion, with insistence on Scripture without Church authority as the only binding standard of belief, a type which finds its repre-

sentatives in this country chiefly among the Free Churches, has its true mediæval representative in the mind and teaching of Wyclif, the *Doctor Evangelicus* as his disciples called him. For Wyclif, as his learned biographer Dr. Workman has shewn conclusively, was nearer to the Puritan than to the Anglican theology and ethics, and that in spite of the fact that he died while hearing Mass in his own church at Lutterworth.

If he was the Morning Star of the Reformation, it was of its Calvinist portion. His demand was for a Church so spiritual that it would have been, if formed on his lines, reduced almost to the stark aspect of an abstract idea, removed from contact with, much less identification or blending with, human life as a whole; uprooted from history; suspicious of art and by reason of its consisting of the elect alone necessarily out of sympathy with the modern democratic spirit for which predestinarianism has never been intelligible or congenial.

This severe, unworldly scholar, at once courageous and unsympathetic, is the John the Baptist, the forerunner and pioneer, of the later Christian Stoicism of Geneva and of Holland. But he was almost as much remote from the National Church idea with its breadth, its compromises, and, in the words of Burke, its "lifting of its mitred head in courts and parliament," as he was fiercely antagonistic to the imperial centralization of the Roman Curia.

In Wyclif, Nonconformity can claim its share in the theology of the schoolmen. Anglicanism has its affinities, as pointed out before, rather with Ockham, who made no attack upon the sacramental system

and sought not to exterminate the liturgical spirit, but to save it from perversion into a magical routine by developing alongside it and as at once balancing and interpreting it the appeal to Reason and to Scripture, while insisting on the reality of lay membership in the Church and, in a quite prophetic manner, anticipating the development of representation as expressive of the mind and experience of the entire organism. For the ordinary mediæval Catholic, the clergy tended to be a vicarious caste, or actually became so. For Wyclif, they ceased to be of any significance except as expounders of the Bible. For Ockham, they were the organs of the Body of Christ, *the Cætus Fidelium*, having a real authority, but that one of consecrated service. If Calvin's ideas are on the line of Wyclif's, those of Colet and Erasmus are on the line of Ockham's. Marsilio of Padua stands in a striking way alone, although he shares with Dante hostility to the temporal power of the Papacy and its claim to be the over-lord of Christian Europe, and with Ockham belief in the necessity of the consent and experience of the entire community, expressed or understood, as, under God, the ultimate and final seat of ecumenical authority.

But while Ockham has what may be called a lay mind, with a strongly scientific bent, he is mainly connected with the reconstruction of Christendom on its more definitely religious side, becoming therefore a chief source of the great conciliar experiment. Marsilio, while recognizing religion and that necessarily in its Catholic form, looks at ecclesiastical questions from the modern secular point of view. In his *Defensor*,

the clergy are one of the six essential divisions of the social body, i.e. the men of the law (of all types), soldiers, priests, agricultural workers, artisans, merchants and traders; yet they are reduced to the position of officials of State, whose function is no doubt the teaching of Christianity, but mainly with a view to citizenship, rather than as ambassadors from the spiritual world. Marsilio is an erastian before his time, and, like Erastus afterwards, he deprives the clergy of the power of effective and authoritative spiritual jurisdiction. He interprets the Power of the Keys (and that by a wrong exegesis) as the office, not of stewards over the household, but only of porters or even turnkeys. As in the case of Erastus (or Lüber) after the Reformation, he was no doubt seeking to save society from the confusion of excommunication with the deprivation of civil rights and even, in extreme cases, with the death penalty, which followed it as a consequence when the Church had become a kingdom of this world, and when the two spheres—civil and spiritual—were confused. Penal discipline was characteristic both of Rome and of Geneva, rather than of Anglicanism and of Lutheranism. Each of the latter, however, coerced conscience through royal supremacy.

The political Aristotelianism of Marsilio and his view of Church and State as one thing are his unmodern and mediævalist features. He is in fact in these respects a sort of inverted and laicized mediævalist, but still a mediævalist. But the entire spirit of his treatise, its inner trend, its atmosphere, is extraordinarily modern. This is the case both in regard to his common sense, his tolerance, his

desire to keep the clergy in their place, and his avoidance of high-flown idealism in political matters. His audacity in regard to his criticism of the Papacy, and, unlike Dante in this, his absolute rejection of the Papal Monarchy in spiritual matters, retaining only the possibility of keeping the pope as a chief executive officer in Church administration—all this shews, as in the case of Ockham, who, as a friar, is less theologically rebellious, to what lengths of anti-papalism and even anti-clericalism a mediæval Catholic could go, provided that his negative or hostile criticism did not touch the Mass and the ordinary sacramental life. The Mass was the burning question in more senses than one. Wyclif passed this boundary; hence the startling significance and the subsequent revolutionary potentiality involved in his lonely courage. Marsilio, like so many other anti-Vaticanists of the Latin races, took questions of worship for granted, but resented keenly the intrusion of ecclesiastical interests into matters of citizenship and good government. He has no fanaticism, but his acute political instinct is without prophetic afflatus. As compared with two other Italian patriots who have made a lasting mark on the history, not only of their own country but of Europe, his realism is not so earthly as that of Machiavelli, his idealism falls short of Mazzini's lofty spirituality. He is neither exclusively patriotic like the former thinker nor broadly humanitarian like the latter one. Passion is not evident in his treatise to the same degree as in either of the above, in the hearts of both of whom love for Italy burned. His strongest feeling is for that peace of ordered

government which the Holy Roman Empire professed to stand for. *Tranquillitas*, or the harmony of a just civilization, is his ideal, as with Dante. But he is less theological than Dante, and in spite of his surface imperialism the root conception of his treatise is plainly what Dr. Stieglitz, one of the ablest German interpreters of his political philosophy, calls that of *Volks-Souveränität*, the ultimate Monarchy of the entire People—what Marsilio calls the *Pars Principans*, or *Humanus Legislator superiore carens*. This principle, however, in which he anticipates Rousseau, with whom he has many affinities, is saved by his distinction between the Legislature and the Executive from being pure Jacobinism. He is at once as conservative as Aristotle and as democratic as the thinkers of the French Revolution. His conception of Law, that question which lay at the heart of all mediæval thought, is at the opposite pole from that of S. Augustine, while S. Thomas lies between. Augustine treats only of divine laws, Aquinas both of laws divine and laws human, Marsilio of human laws alone.

Whether Marsilio was, as Stieglitz considers him to have been, *ein scharfsinniger Skeptiker* or not, he is certainly not among those statesmen or writers who, in the words of Emerson, “have hitched their waggon to a star.” He is one of those politicians who have earned for themselves the undying hatred of the Vatican. He and his collaborator, John of Jandun, are denounced by the papalist writers of their time as *serpentinei gemini* (twin serpents). On the other hand, his book was, in spite of its democratic flavour, a favourite with King

Henry VIII, no doubt because its arguments assailed a common enemy.

The question of the relation of nature and grace to one another, which is continually recurring in mediæval thought, has reached a point in Marsilio at which grace, as distinct from moral virtue, is entirely in the background or ignored. In the Thomist Catholicism, as the Church is the home of grace, and grace is superior to nature, the State must therefore be subordinate to the Church, and act as its ministering agent. In Dante, however, the Thomist notion of subordination is absent, and co-ordination of the secular and ecclesiastical powers of the one organism has taken its place.

In Ockham, the great Nominalist, the two powers, the Church Power and the Civil Power, are separated, as are Reason and Faith in his philosophy.

Of the above, each successive thinker is less theocratic in his political theories than those before him, while in Marsilio we are on the terra firma of the modern world.

In studying the development of which Marsilio gives us the foretaste, we have to pass through periods of political philosophy, beginning with the Renaissance, during which, in spite of the revived Augustinianism of the Reformation and the fanaticism which inflamed political strife and added religious venom to racial antagonism, public life, as the theological storms subside, becomes less and less implicated with religious controversy. The political leaders, however, still use the old religious watchwords, though no longer sincerely interested in the controversies which these imply. The politicians and diplomatists are hardly as candid about

this underlying change of attitude as indirectly and by implication is Machiavelli, who, at any rate, does not add hypocrisy to his other faults.

If, on the one hand, the noble vision of Cusanus sheds a sunset glory over the expiring Middle Ages, Machiavelli's *Prince*, on the other, with Cæsar Borgia as its hero, becomes practically the new political gospel, the ruler's vade mecum, practically, but not avowedly, for even Frederic the Great, of Prussia, writes an "Anti-Machiavel." The political spirit which recognizes the reality of the moral law and the ideal of fellowship among the nations did not, however, become extinct, though for a time discredited or only gaining some faint homage of the lips. The fact of membership in the social body, as involving duties and responsibilities—a fact which seemed to have been lost in secular and sensuous reaction—reasserts its power in the minds of such international thinkers, good Europeans, and good members of the human commonwealth, as Grotius and Leibniz. Both of these also had the Erasmian mind as to religion as well as to public life generally. Leibniz anticipated the Malines Conversations by his reunion correspondence with Bossuet, though his attitude as to the reconciliation of the Churches was that of a statesman rather than of a theologian. When the Renaissance age had passed away, even in politics—the natural home of an unethical and so-called realism—the idea of what ought to be asserts itself as against acquiescence in what is. The solid firmament in which the stars of duty and of the law of justice are shining is found, in spite of its mystery, to be no fabric of

a dream, but to over-arch humanity as the spiritual background of all the latter's richness and complexity; to draw out by its influence the unity, the purpose, the immanent yet elusive rationality of the life of man.

The bringing the world of politics under the influence of *Menschheitsbildung* (rather than of that *Machtsbildung*, which has exacted such a toll of blood), of a civilization the keynote of which is Humanity, rather than of one of which it is Power, demands an idealism that is at once lofty and practical as being the science of that building of the city of God of which the lives of men and of nations are the stones. The right orientation of mind which such a task requires is one of the most insistent, as it is certainly one of the most exacting, problems of the age on which we have entered, when, after an unmoral realism has become visibly bankrupt, the mental interests are trivial because the need of vision has been ignored. "The hungry sheep look up and are not fed," or, what is still more serious, the sheep are not conscious of hunger, although at the same time leanness has entered into their souls.

CHAPTER V

MYSTICAL AND SOCIAL SECTS—GENEVA'S PROPHET AND PHILOSOPHER

THE fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were, like the present day, times of restlessness and of the potentiality of far-reaching change. The *Societas Societatum*, the irregular many-celled structure of mediæval society, vaulted over by the Roman ideal (an ideal often contradicted by the facts) of the ultimate and encircling, but often nominal, unity embodied in the *Persona Publica* of the Pope or of the Emperor, or of both, gave visible and increasing signs of disintegration.

The re-shaping of the politics of Christendom is to be noted during this ambiguous time, not only in the treatises and pamphlets which present to us the influence of the new ideas as they begin to appear, or which strive to renovate and justify the conditions that are on the point of change, but also and more significantly in the general shifting of the entire mental atmosphere. Unconscious influences begin to gradually thaw and dissolve the apparently static conditions which seemed, even to the acutest mediæval minds, to be as lasting as Christianity itself.

To the half-revolutionary, half-mystical instincts, rather than consciousness, of many minds in this period of mediæval decline, the Aristotelian schema of human society, its characteristics of growth and

relativity, had not the attraction that it had for schoolmen and devisers of imaginary commonwealths. It was to the Stoic Law of Nature, which was also, as they envisaged it, the sphere of the reign of the Spirit, that those who believed themselves to be in a special sense the children of that Spirit referred as their ideal standard. From the instinctive thoughts of the more or less underground world of the Middle Ages, penetrated with suspicious and heretical influences as, to the more static folk in Church and State, it seemed to be, came all sorts of presages of change. There was in the air, in such circles, a sort of unformulated socialism of conviction and feeling. This was connected in one direction with the Stoic theory of the equality of original conditions, which the Church had incorporated in her political philosophy. In the other it had its support in the temper of the Sermon on the Mount, the Galilean spirit, which was as congenial to the Franciscan mind as it was foreign to that of the Protestant Reformers with their devotion to the Epistle to the Romans and to the Augustinian Predestinarianism.

It could not have been said even of the most spiritual of the Calvinists that, in the words of Keble, on them

"Had smiled,
In dreams the Mother and the Child."

There has never been devotion to the sacred Infancy among those who have felt their souls to be storm-proof, based on the rock of the absolute decrees, while the multitude of mankind are sinking outside the mercy of God. This temper has no doubt an

iron strength of its own. But the Franciscan spirit, which, in comparison with it, seems to be childlike, dances hand in hand with the angels round the holy manger. Calvinism "has put away childish things." The Franciscans are content to "become like little children." The spirit of Francis is at home with the homeliness of God. Naturally, the Christmas carol is Franciscan in origin and unpuritan in character. One of the earliest of these love-songs to the Christ-child, written by Jacopone, the minstrel of the movement, has all the charm which drew children, and the common people, and vagabonds, to follow S. Francis and his friends, and led the birds of the air to flock around them.

"The little angels join their hands
And dance in holy ring.
Love-songs they're whispering
The little angel bands.

Good men and bad they call and greet:—
High Glory doffs its crown,
And has come down,
Low lies there at your feet.

The earth and all the skiey space
Break into flowery smiles.
So draws and so beguiles
The sweetness of His face."¹

This Franciscan note is renewed in Botticelli's *nativity*.

S. Francis was no politician. But he was a master of that democracy of spirit which is the thing that matters. The mediæval mystic was often close to the mediæval communist, that is in mind, wherever actual community of goods was not possible. Franciscanism tended to develop, on its ex-

¹ Translated in *Sons of Francis*, by Anne Macdonnell, p. 371.

treme left and in souls less ethereal in spirit and less tender in heart than that of S. Francis, a temper in which the Magnificat acquires something of the character of the Marseillaise, the marching song of the army of the disinherited.

The desire for simplicity and directness in religion, in approach to God and in communion with Christ, did not in the social and political sphere always lead to a sense of common obligations and of fraternal fellowship, but, in the case of critical and revolutionary minds, to social bitterness, to a desire to pull down rather than to convert. Hence the tendency to rediscover and restore the original and natural Rights of Man, of the common man, those aboriginal rights which mediæval jurists and canonists proclaimed so clearly as God's first endowment on His human creatures, but which they went on to dilute and to compromise till, as it seemed to hungry bodies and discontented souls, the primeval values were sophisticated away. The orthodox teachers appeared to take away from the people with one hand what they had given them with the other.

The more unregulated mysticism tends to call in question the hierarchic politics of the typical mediæval type with their principle of status. It tends to be apocalyptic, catastrophic, revolutionary. The world-order appears to shake and quiver, as the dispensation of the Spirit draws near. The atmosphere is electric. Anything may be expected to happen. The underground thrill of discontent which went through the later mediæval world had as its accompanying dream, fanatical or pathetic, the making life not less but more moral, with the equality of man

and the spirit of sharing reasserted as the original law, the law of poverty and fraternity, that is, of simplicity and love, as against artificiality and hate. When Luther kindled into flame the religious revolt of Germany, the uprising of the peasants was one of the most immediate consequences. Yet the spirit underlying the German Peasants' War was rather that of the later thought of the mediæval common man and of the partly socialist and partly mystical mediæval sects than it was of the principles of the Protestant Reformation. The horrible methods by which both the Peasants' War and the Anabaptist Movement were stamped out were fully approved of by the orthodox Reformers. Luther's appeal was to the Epistle to the Romans, Calvin's theocracy at Geneva was built on the Old Testament. The direct appeal to the Spirit, and the belief in the Spirit as the living and interior Word of God, not mediated exclusively through rite, or priest, or book,—whether this conviction or experience had its outcome in revolutionary and explosive ardours as if attempting to remould the world, or in reflective calm, the nurse of Christ-like deeds—was characteristic in either case rather of the mystics of the later Middle Ages or of the sixteenth-century sect type (the precursors through the Mennonites of the Society of Friends) than it was of the Reformation proper.

With the cry of those belated mystics, the original Anabaptists, of "Back to the Kingdom of Christ, to the Sermon on the Mount," none of the great sixteenth-century Reformers, with the possible exception of Zwingli, had the slightest sympathy. Despite Calvin's public spirit and noble disin-

terestedness, his politics were those of an aristocracy of the godly elect, the "ephors," rather than of a commonwealth in which the suffering commonalty of Europe were called to share. The Anabaptists were, in one sense, the relics, and in another the advance guard, of a view of the State which either estimates it as, in its present condition, hopelessly evil or at least as a matter of no concern to the followers of Christ, or which seeks to take hold of it and "shape it wholly to the heart's desire" until the kingdoms of this world become in reality and not merely in name, in direct actuality and not merely through compromise and relativity, "the kingdoms of our Lord and of His Christ."

Luther, Melanchthon, and Calvin, and the writers of the XXXIX Articles as well, discerned by instinct, rather than as the consequence of argument, that the Anabaptists were in a different camp from themselves, and that the stock of ideas of these sectaries was fundamentally opposed to that of the more respectable and orthodox Reformation. In the words of Troeltsch, the keynote of the mediæval sects who were the precursors of Anabaptism was *Die Gleichheit des Kommunismus*, that of the Protestant Reformation *Die Freiheit des Individualismus*, that is, Equality in the former case versus Liberty in the latter. Hence the unrelenting spirit with which Calvin urged the magistrates to cut out the plague spot of Anabaptism, or even the cry of the comparatively mild Melanchthon, "As they immerse, so let them be immersed," as he gave his voice for drowning as the appropriate punishment for these Bolshevists of the Reformation. This is what might have been expected.

Every new movement, as it becomes, comparatively, accepted and respectable, seeks to clear itself from suspected contact with disreputable allies.

The truth is that the ideas of the Anabaptists were of a different order from the ultra-Augustinian theology and the respectable economics of the Reformation leaders. Their adversaries said that they were Pelagian in their entire denial of original sin. Their denunciations of wealth, though they resemble those of Latimer, are based on absolutely communist theories which Latimer did not share. Their view of the Civil State in any Christian country, Catholic or Protestant, regarded it as belonging practically to the devil's order of existence—the order of killing, imprisoning, imposing oaths, and in fact of doing everything contrary to the commands of the *Bergpredigt*, the Sermon on the Hill, the new law of brotherhood and love. "Love and do as you like," said S. Augustine. "All things are allowed," writes a Russian teacher of ethical nihilism. Extremes meet. They certainly did in the much misunderstood Anabaptist movement.

The chief link between the Anabaptists of the earlier sixteenth century and the spirit of such mediæval mystics as the followers of Joachim of Flora, the famous hermit of Calabria, who prophesied a new dispensation of the Spirit, lies in the fact that, both alike, heretic or Catholic, refused to regard external religious authority, whether of the Bible or of the Church, as having said the last word, in such a sense that the Spirit was henceforth dumb. "God had fresh truth to break out of His Word." The Spirit was causing

the truths of the Faith to shine with new splendour, reflected in the receptive soul of the mystic. There were Catholic prophets, as Savonarola, Catholic prophetesses, as Catherine of Siena and Bridget of Sweden.

This claim to immediacy in hearing the Spirit's voice was often disquieting to the authorities of the Church. Mr. G. B. Shaw, in his treatment of the martyrdom of S. Joan, while giving to this exaggerated stress, has yet rightly sensed it. The Fraticelli, the left wing of the Catholic mystics, were regarded as on the verge of heresy, if not over the border, by the wealthy and irritated Curia of Avignon, which began to take action. They retorted by denouncing Rome as the new Babylon, but because of her worldliness, not, like the Reformers of a later time, because of errors in matters of the Faith. Tendencies, however, are often more significant than expressed principles. The tendencies of the extreme wing of the Franciscan Movement form a bridge between the ideas of the orthodox mystics and those of the revolutionary Anabaptists. In the political direction, the more communistic of the latter school came to regard the reign of human law as either operating on some lower plane to that of Christianity (a view involved in the idea of the distinctness as well as union of Nature and Supernature in the world of grace, and one quite consistent with the orthodox faith) or as being the outcome of the activities of the Evil One. At this latter extreme mysticism became Manicheanism as with the Albigenses. Its sunshine changed to sunless severity. It either became a thing of physical violence like the religion of the

Jewish Zealots or of the Bohemian Taborites; or else it retired within the limits of some peaceful garden plot of prayer and study, which was the case in the Low Countries with the Brothers of the Common Life, neither monks nor ordinary laymen, in the world and yet not of the world.

The more socialistic sects of the Middle Ages hated war, as much as did Erasmus afterwards, in whose Colloquies the representatives of the soldier type have a touch about them almost of the ruffian and but little of chivalry. For the apocalyptic sects, the soldier was of the army of the world; he had on him the brand of Cain. His slaughter weapon and the cross could have nothing in common. We here arrive at the antipodes of the military Catholicism which dates from the Emperor Theodosius, at once Spanish warrior, Roman Cæsar, and champion of orthodoxy. These sects also believed in the equality of all men, or at least of all believers. They regarded money with fear and suspicion as the devil's bait. They viewed "Holy Poverty" (which the Church in theory regarded as a quasi-sacramental state) as the condition of freedom for all Christians, and not for the Mendicant Orders alone. They treated the attempt to live without property, and that for purely lay people, as a practical possibility, in accordance with the *Lex Naturæ*.

The gracious dream, as of one from the minds of inspired children, became, too often, a frenzied fancy in its later developments. Yet at the beginning of the movement of mediæval mysticism the indifference to money had the genuine note of the Galilean mission. S. Edmund Rich, afterwards

Archbishop of Canterbury, a figure splendidly typical of what is best in mediæval Christianity, as teacher at Oxford, with the words "Dust to dust," throws his fee upon the window ledge, from which it was afterwards stolen. His prayers, his books, his friends, were the true and only wealth of this young saint and scholar. Yet in spite of this attractive side to the great European movement of which S. Francis and his followers formed the apex, but which was much wider than the membership of the Franciscan Order, there is a certain kinship between Joachim of Flora the Calabrian hermit and prophet, amid the Italian flowers and under the Italian sky, at the one end, and the hunted and tortured Anabaptists of Holland, Switzerland, and Germany at the other.

All alike refuse to acquiesce in a tamed and domesticated Christianity, a "muffled Christianity," to quote Mr. H. G. Wells's description of Anglicanism, as the latter presents itself to him. In their dread of wealth the sects shared the spirit of the Catholic Church, as represented by her greatest teachers and by her most characteristic institutions, even while they denounced her rulers for inconsistency. But they had no two standards as she had, and her comprehension of the Grande Chartreuse at one end of her system and of the Papal Court of Avignon at the other offended their austere and simple-minded logic.

It is a far cry from Jacapone da Todi, once leader of gay youth, as Francis himself had been, now, with a full-blooded experience behind him, the wandering Franciscan minstrel of Umbria, to the spirit of the wild, half-Manichean sects with their com-

munistic equalitarianism. The praise of poverty may connote a fanatical distrust of the fullness of life. Poverty itself, as G. B. Shaw reminds us, may starve man's life and character as well as simplify them. It may be no doubt a "full great sacrament," but it requires, like all sacraments, for its efficacious reception, a good disposition, which all do not or cannot bring to it. Refusal of what wealth connotes, large responsibilities and opportunities, may mean the resolution of that essentially virile thing, Christianity, into the trance of Buddhism. It may involve the temper of the slothful servant in the parable, and incur the condemnation of those who make what Dante calls "the great refusal."

Yet, under more favourable circumstances, it may become the instrument of true interior liberty, as setting the soul of man free from slavery to the acquisitive will. Jacopone's is this freedom, as of the birds of the air, the Galilean freedom. To the Mercantilism coming to the front in the sixteenth century—its eager thirst for gain, no longer apologetically seeking satisfaction with the aid of dispensations and casuistry, but justifying itself, open and unashamed—there could be nought but fanaticism or folly in Jacopone's praise of the lady Poverty:

"Poverty, thou Wisdom deep,
Holding all possession cheap,
Thy Will that thou fast bound dost keep
Springs up in Liberty.

"Poverty, great Wisdom's height,
Each day more clearly shews thy might.
And here below thou walk'st in sight
Of the high life to be." ¹

¹ Translated in *Sons of Francis*, by Anne Macdonnell, p. 363.

When we come to deal with the Reformation itself in its social aspects, as distinct from the "mixed multitude" who went out with it from the older Christendom, we encounter the dominating character and influence of Luther.

In spite of Luther's genuine greatness, and the acute significance of his protest against intolerable abuses, the inorganic nature of his conception of the religion of Christ, combined with his rooted distrust of the capacity of the common people in regard to political action, succeeded in making his influence in the political sphere one against liberal development in the State, as far at least as the German lands of the North were concerned.

With Calvin and with Loyola, religion is an institution and a propaganda, though of course also much more.

With Luther religion loses all Church-generating power. It tends to withdraw within the inner consciousness of the justified believer, while shedding upon the family life (as evidenced in the German Reformer's *Table Talk*) a homely and genial benediction.

Luther was naturally anti-ascetic. His coarse gibes at celibacy compensated across the centuries for S. Jerome's equally coarse disparagement of the married state. Yet in spite of almost incredible grossness of language, as evidenced in certain of his sermons, the Reformer of Wittenberg had, in his own rough way, a deep sense of married life as a sacred vocation, a sphere in which the highest virtue could be attained, and the noblest types of Christianity exhibited.

Luther exalts citizenship as a counterpoise to asceticism, but he has no constructive sociology. The State he views as "the true monastery," but he does not regard it in as humane a manner as he does the Family. He views it mainly as wearing the aspect of policy and force. It is as the "Minister of God," "not bearing the sword in vain," of whom S. Paul writes in Romans xiii., that Luther envisages the State. As in the parallel case of Wyclif's theory of Grace, the echo of Luther's trumpet note calling the individual soul to freedom was the rebellion of the peasants. Under somewhat similar circumstances, Wyclif had practically assured John of Gaunt and the English nobles that his master theory of "Dominion founded on Grace" was only meant to strike at Church lands and endowments, that it was only socialistic as against the hierarchy, and was arbitrarily barred from giving any sanction to the English Jacquerie, to the political and social ferment stirred up by such men as Wat Tyler and John Ball. Wyclif, with a sort of dry scholastic humour, held that the baronage must not be interfered with because "in this world God must obey the Devil," or really because he knew that it was quite enough to excite one revolution, the ecclesiastical one, at a time, and that, like Luther afterwards, and indeed Cranmer also, he needed the help of secular power and property against the agelong and still energetic *plenitudo potestatis* of the Roman Curia, now thoroughly roused and awake to its danger, especially after the ending of the papal schism had given Rome time and opportunity to turn attention to what was happening in England.

Hence, had the peasant leaders of Wyclif's time looked to the parson of Lutterworth for support, beyond the theories of his tracts, they would have looked in vain. Wyclif's attitude was as safe in regard to the feudal aristocracy and lords of the manor as it was marked by audacious courage with regard to the Church.

In this he resembles Luther, whose gospel of freedom had little to do with political or social liberty. The great German Reformer, with all his unique spiritual force, made little or no addition to Christian sociology. His subjectivism in religion and his political indifference or pessimism contributed to this result.

Unlike Luther's mentality, the intellectual and spiritual temper of Calvin, without being in the least democratic in the modern sense of the word, was to prove itself, in the long run, a potent force for the development of free institutions and for the breaking of the yoke of tyranny. It must be added, however, that it was often with the intention, and, when successful, the result of substituting a spiritual tyranny of its own.

In the Geneva of to-day, in a quiet meadow-land, stands in stoic majesty a statue of Calvin, among those of other Protestant Reformers. A clear stream, intended to be typical to the eye of the water of life cleansed from defiling obstructions, flows through a rocky channel at their feet. Among the gay crowds in another part of the city, on the island at the point where the Rhone leaves the lake, is the statue of Rousseau, Geneva's other citizen of world-wide fame. Both of these men were mighty to destroy—though only Calvin to construct. The

discipline of his intellect and character, the iron of his will, raise the influence of Calvin to a region more hygienic for mankind, even allowing for the bleakness of his creed and discipline, than the heated world of Rousseau's sentimental naturalism. It may be maintained with much justice that, in spite of the extent to which the rigid and narrow logic of Calvinism has chilled the sunshine of heaven and the laughter of earth, wherever the theology and discipline associated with it were able to drive and dominate that delicate and illogical thing called "human nature"—much more lasting mischief has been wrought and unhappiness caused (in spite of some good as, for instance, its protest against class-rule and mercenary standards of worth) by Rousseau's spirit of humanitarian philanthropy than by Calvin's iron creed. Both these world-moving Genevans were men of practical genius and of commanding influence, in spite of the admixture of pedantic and fanatical elements in the nature of each, of a want of wisdom more conspicuous in that of the later writer and of charity in that of the earlier one. But Calvin's mind was ruled by the astringent Hebrew factor, the essential regard for personal conduct, without which genius itself, unguided and undisciplined, can neither guide nor discipline, but with unlit lamp and ungirt loins leads mankind into the morass or down the abyss. Yet Rousseau was no mere creature of slipshod emotions. He had a complex personality, in which the characteristic Genevan strain, with its rigorous and doctrinaire tendency, was never wholly absent.

There is a Spartan element in the *Contrat Social* as well as in Calvin's *Institutes*. The despotic

powers of the community of Rousseau's ideal society include that of the infliction of death for the denial of Deism, the creed of natural religion.

Rousseau's principles of statesmanship have been styled "inverted Hobbism." In his optimism about human nature he is the direct opposite of Hobbes, who was under no illusions as to the "noble savage," and who would have viewed with scorn or amusement Rousseau's statement that though the people can be deceived, they can never be corrupted.

Rousseau's theory of *original* equality is as old as the Middle Ages and before them the Alexandrian Fathers and the Stoics. But his intolerance of intermediate social forms, having independent life, is pagan, Roman, and Hobbist.

Yet in several respects Rousseau's theories have a certain affinity with the mind of Calvin. After all, in post-Reformation times Geneva, not Paris, was the mother of the absolute equilitarian rights of the individual, the latter no longer conceived of as predestinate, but as the child of nature.

On one side of Rousseau's dual personality was his character as that of a man whose temperament was swept by emotions and drenched in sentiment. Personally unrestrained in the direction of lubricity, the foundling hospital received the products of his amours. But there was another Rousseau—the prophet of the Revolution which he did not live to see, but which by voice and pen and by ceremonial translation of his relics acclaimed him as its true author, the Moses who had led the enslaved people out of Egypt. There is genuine and not merely artificial emotion breathing through the *Contrat Social*, but the prevalent factor in that world-

shaking book is a dry and trenchant logic, apparently unanswerable, as long as its *a priori* abstract premises and unproved and unhistoric assumptions as to the genesis of human society pass without question.

In the service of these abstractions Rousseau is a fervent priest, the *vates* of the new evangel of the *Être Suprême* in religion and of the *general Will* in political science. When occupied with this liturgy, he has all the Genevan rigour. Here he is not merely philosopher of civic science and of secular morals, but an hierophant of a religion. He speaks with the fervour and authority though without the personal distinction and consistency of his great Genevan predecessor.

Like Calvin also, Rousseau is scornfully intolerant to teaching antipathetic to his own, though, unlike him, without the power of putting his principles into practice.

Rousseau's attitude to Christianity was that of contempt. His political sense, fed by such reading as that of Plutarch's *Lives*, and following, as he believed, the great examples of classical antiquity, found no point of connexion with a system which was, in his opinion, as expressed in the remarkable chapter on "Civil Religion" in the *Contrat Social*, "an entirely spiritual religion connected solely with heavenly things." "The Christian's religion," he goes on to say, "is not of this world." "In it the essential thing is to reach Paradise." His standpoint that of Deism and of the ethical attitude of Marcus Aurelius (one of his greatest heroes), Rousseau must be reckoned among the eminent or notorious anti-Christians of literature.

One sentence of the Rousseau Koran, in the chapter on "Civil Religion," has the sound of an echo of Machiavelli or of an anticipation of Nietzsche—"When the cross had driven out the eagle all the Roman valour disappeared."

His attitude to the Church, or Christian community in any form, is that of Hobbes', whose expression of fundamental and absolute erastianism Rousseau underlines with almost fanatical agreement. The State, both these thinkers hold, must be omniscient and reign alone without a rival. Not only is any attempt at ecclesiastical supremacy to be fought, but even any claim, however modest, to the most spiritual kind of "parallelism," involving any independent life whatever in the Christian Society as such. Under no circumstances should a corporation led or driven by priests or preachers be allowed to have an existence distinct and underived from the absolute monarch (the Sovereign People, the inverted equivalent of Hobbes' despotic *Leviathan*).

In Rousseau's opinion the earlier philosopher Hobbes is the only one who has seen the evil and its remedy, and who has dared to propose a reunion of the heads of the eagle and the complete restoration of political unity. Rousseau takes rank with the anti-clericalist company through the centuries, conspicuous among whom are Machiavelli and J. A. Froude. His two antagonisms in matters of religion, *i.e.* towards institutional Christianity and towards avowed Atheism, have, as he tells us, as their cause no theological reason but the civic condemnation of anti-social principles and tendencies. Calvin justified persecution because of the honour of God

and of danger to the soul, Rousseau because of injury to the well-being of the State.

The latter, in his belief, was in danger alike from the superstitious other-worldliness of Christianity, at least when organized under a priesthood, and from the atheistic rejection of belief in a benevolent creator and constitutional ruler of the world and of mankind. When, in the course of the French Revolution, priests were persecuted, and "the tongues torn out of the Church bells," on the one hand, and, on the other, the Hébertist leaders of Atheism were guillotined, appeal could not be made, in the name of tolerance, to the mind and teaching of Rousseau, sentimentalist as he was.

Indeed, it may be truly said that not only fear, the mother of cruelty, but perverted sentiment as well, was one of the most potent of the sinister causes that generated the Reign of Terror. Utopia had to be secured from its enemies, even by a sword dripping with blood. In the name of Humanity, Robespierre incarnated all that was most doctrinaire and inhuman in the gospel of his adored master, Rousseau. But in a wider and less pedantic sense the driving forces of Rousseau's life and soul were in the air during that time of terror, and the mentality of the dead sophist or philosopher was more powerful in that hour for destruction than it could ever have been in his lifetime. Men saw red in the light of the emotion and reasoning, blended as in one devouring flame, of a writer whose ideas, at first the playthings of literary salons, became ultimately the expression of the explosive forces which were to wreck or to remake a world.

Calvinism has been called the Christian Stoicism.

It is this, but it is even more the resurrection of the Old Testament spirit, for good and in some respects for harm, within the New Testament Church. The Calvinist pattern of the Christian State was derived from that of the Mosaic Law.

While Anglicanism attempted to continue in a national form the mediæval unity of Church and State as one organism, a unity which is the underlying principle of Hooker's massive exposition, as against both Rome and Geneva, of the *raison d'être* of the Elizabethan settlement of religion, the Calvinist Churches, especially the Kirk of Scotland, held the strongest theories of ecclesiastical independence. Indeed, the attitude to the State of these Churches was not only one of spiritual autonomy but of absolute supremacy, involving fundamental intolerance and the principle of persecution. The Ministers of Religion, in Cartwright's representation of the Two Kingdom theory, are the *interpreters* of God's Will, the civil magistrates the *executors* of it. This may be compared with the office of the secular ruler, *quasi carnifex*, in regard to heresy, in the mediæval view. Both are in the same high level of Church supremacy. For the Calvinist there is no regalism in religious matters. There are two kingdoms—Christ's and the State's, and the latter is inferior to the former. *Duplex in homine regimen* is Calvin's terse expression of this in the *Institutes*.¹ Cartwright makes the Church the greater, because its end has to do with eternity, that of the State with time. This is essentially Thomist. The Scotch Kirk of that time

¹ Calvin's *Institutes*, IV. xx. 1, quoted by Dr. Pearson in his recent work on *Church and State in Cartwright's Writings*.

was no whit milder in temper than had been the Hildebrandine system. Even the right of deposition of kings by the Kirk as God's prophet was tacitly and sometimes openly held. This spirit was, however, distinguished from the corresponding ultramontane one, at the other pole of the ecclesiastical firmament, by two characteristics, both of them to the advantage of the Genevan Churches. First, these absolute claims bidding the secular State realize its secondary position and not dare to regulate the message from the prophets of the Lord were saved from being an intolerable clericalism by the co-option of the laity in the Assemblies and in the official work and discipline of the Church. The Anglican Church lost the minor orders, while the Presbyterian one gained the lay elders. Hence the Kirk struck sturdy roots into Scotland's national life and character. If, like the Scotch thistle, it was wanting, as a critic of religions has said, in the more delicate graces of the rose of Sharon, it was at any rate no artificial growth.

The second point by which Calvinism was saved, in spite of its tendency under the plea of discipline to meddle unnecessarily with innocent, or at least neutral details of human life, was the fact that by its doctrine of Vocation, or divine calling, as underlying every honest secular pursuit and all good citizenship and statesmanship, such departments of existence as politics and commerce were raised to a higher order, and the just merchant and the wise statesman were as much, in their own way, the instruments of God's Will as the preacher or the missionary was in his. The Christian Commonwealth stood side by side with Christ's Kirk. In-

deed the latter was the directing soul of the former. Both represented a people in covenant with the Lord.

Calvinism, as Moses to the Israelites, gave to the life of The Netherlands that stringency, that power of resistance, as of iron drops in the blood, without which the struggle with Spain would never have exhibited such an heroic character, or been carried to so glorious an issue. With fortitude and energy more demonic (in the classical sense of the word) than human, the spirit of Holland was, in the long run, a lasting match for the giant bulk of Spain. The spinal column in the resisting organism was furnished by Calvin's faith and Calvin's temper.

While the leaders of Calvinism made little allowance for literature and art, being only humanists in the sense of being often scholars, the Calvinist genius developed in Holland a spirit without which the achievements of a Rembrandt might have been impossible. The influence of Calvin did for The Netherlands what even Erasmus, the glory of Holland, could not have effected. The large reasonableness and sanity, even the moral fervour of the great humanist, would not have been enough to nerve his country for the death-struggle. There are times when a certain stringency and limitation are more necessary than alertness of mind and range of interests. Among the breakers, the helm must be held firmly. It is no time to steer one's boat broad-side on.

In the attempt made with much success by the early Puritans and the Elizabethan politicians and merchant adventurers to turn the English mentality (in Mr. Chesterton's language) from that of "a

Christian nation into that of a chosen people," from that of a member of Christendom into that of the Israel of modern days, with wealth and prosperity, as in the story of the patriarchs, the marks of God's favour, we see a prominent result of the swing of the spiritual pendulum, released from the mediæval restraints, in the direction of a sort of Protestant and patriotic Hebraism, noble though hard in many of its higher manifestations, provincial and uncivilized in its lower ones.

In one of his latest writings, Troeltsch called attention to the process of what he describes as the "de-orientalizing of Christianity," the stripping it, the more westward it goes, of its original mysticism and the clothing it with cheerful practicality, with the spirit of efficiency and successful methods. The comparison of Russian with United States Christianity illustrates this.

The unconscious process which Troeltsch describes as above, and of which, despite his German Protestantism, he shews the weakness as well as the merits, is one which may only too easily involve the elimination of the more heroic elements of our religion. The yoking of the spirit of Christianity mainly to the interests of the Family or of the Nation, forgetting that its Founder calls Himself the Son of Humanity, may mean that the domestic and patriotic virtues take the place of others of a more world-wide range. We may so muffle the Religion of Christ in the folds of the Union Jack that the Cross itself ceases to be more than an asset of the British Empire.

Protestantism, in its best days the powerful critic of a corrupt institutionalism, has developed a number

of modern institutionalisms of its own, in which the unity and fellowship of the "Great Church" of primitive Christianity, and the fullness and majesty of the ideal of the *Respublica Christiana* of a later time, have no representation. Now the local has a claim and a real one, but only as a part of the universal. The "Beloved Community," as visible and united, finds no real place in Protestantism as such. But the remedy is not to be found in idealizing the Mediæval Church. Protestantism, the former witness for the prosecution of Catholicism, is now itself on its defence, and is increasingly embarrassed under the process. But it will never be supplanted by any attempt to galvanize the past. Due progress cannot be made by going backward, unless in order that the backward motion may assist the onward view. The spirit of the Gospels and of the Gospel itself is wider and deeper than that of either the Reformation or the Counter-Reformation. It is both heroic and homely. To it we must be always returning.

The cry of "back to the source" involves, however, the crucial problem of development. Nothing can stand still, and it is possible to waste our time hunting after an original primitive purity when we are called upon to enjoy a fruitful and developed richness of life. The history of Christianity is often appealed to as a witness that this, the greatest of creeds, is no exception to the rule, the truth of which the course of the great world-religions has often illustrated, that the stream is purer when nearer to its source.

No doubt this is true as far as the partly subterranean community of the primitive pre-Constan-

tinian (or rather pre-Decian) Church with its internal atmosphere of love and fellowship is concerned, the common Christian life which has about it such an attraction of graciousness and purity in the pages of Pater's *Marius the Epicurean*, and of Cardinal Newman's *Callista*.

We may fully admit that this life, communal in spirit, of the earlier Church is nearer to Christ's mind of love and sacrifice, that it has more of the Galilean flavour about it, than is the case in regard to the splendid attempt at synthesis made by the mediæval thinkers and statesmen. That synthesis, in idea at least, blended in one, as in Dante's *De Monarchia*, the spirit of the catacombs and the spirit of the Palatine, of the martyrs and of the Cæsars, of S. Luke's Bethlehem song and of Virgil's Fourth Eclogue. Whatever view we take of this fusion, the imperial swing in the gait of Western Christendom after the period of Constantine and Theodosius is not solely, or even largely, due to the paganizing of Christianity. If, on the one hand, something has been lost in freshness of vision and purity of aim, yet, on the other, as the world poured into the Church (the nets breaking as Greek intellectualism and Roman statesmanship accommodated Christianity to themselves, rather than themselves to Christianity), the entrance of the new forces brought with it elements of enrichment as well as dangers of impurity.

It brought with it ultimately, in the case pre-eminently of such a thinker as S. Thomas, a recognition of the merits of the masculine virtues of pagan antiquity, the civic virtues, with all their

strength and solidarity, their balance and their sanity, as in the later Stoicism, in theory at least, bringing all humanity under control of one supreme law of right, the unseen reality.

The effects of this synthesis did not obliterate the original root connection of the Catholic Church as the New Israel with the Judaism from which it sprang. The Semitic strain coursed strong and deep through the veins and arteries of the Christianity of the Mediterranean and later of the Gothic type. The union of Platonic and Aristotelian social philosophy and later of the Stoic universalism with the temper of the prophets of Israel made possible the growth of the principles of political idealism, ethical in essence, claiming world-wide validity, the application of the *Lex Naturæ* yet tempered and modified by the inevitable realism of experience in the actual imperfect world.

The massive ideals of prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude, put in the background in primitive Christianity by the greater attraction of those tenderer virtues which are dearest to the Christian heart, returned to share with their newly elevated sisters of faith, hope, and charity the organic and hierarchic disposition of the lives of men. Inevitably, and not merely by a process of corruption, Christianity became political. Its very virtues developed political tendencies, as the thoughts of Paul and Augustine were fused with those of Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno. The Church and the *Civitas Dei*, the city of God seen in the Apocalypse as descending out of heaven to men, and the "dear city of God," the brotherhood of mankind, which Marcus Aurelius dreamt of as transcending in its

loved splendour the city-state of ancient Hellas—these two, the former revealed in vision, the latter arrived at by thought—almost melted into one. Yet this was never with so complete an absorption that the identity of each respectively did not remain at basis and in idea distinct, even if this distinction, blurred by the closeness of the union or confusion, became rather a potentiality than a fact. When afterwards the growth of nations and of nationalist and individualist types of life disintegrated the Catholic Aristotelian synthesis, both as a European thought-system and as in a lesser degree and only in a partial and fragmentary manner a civilization represented by a connexion of loosely compacted social groups under papal and imperial headship, the change, when it came, was not always of a clear-cut character. Generally it was, at one and the same time, a loss and a gain.

As the severed Churches emerged from the Reformation, though they learnt on both sides to suspect reason, now that reason was beginning to break loose, yet the influences of classical philosophy still pervaded Christian thought. The Spanish Jesuit Suarez; the Anglican Hooker; the Puritan Cartwright—all of them distinguished theologians, were all alike Aristotelians, and conceived of and envisaged society on Aristotelian as well as scriptural lines. On the other side, that of the classical new birth, the Renaissance was far from being in all respects a purely pagan revival, an unbridled outbreak of the *libido sentiendi* and of the *libido dominandi*, of the sensual impulses, or of the will to power, of the natural man. There was a Christian Renaissance which almost went under, between the

impact of the twin fanaticisms, the perversions of forces arising from the same Christian womb, and the cynical practical materialism in the moral bankruptcy of which the Italian phase of the revival tended more and more to exhaust itself.

This saner and more central Renaissance awoke again, especially in Holland, where the spirit which Rembrandt represented in art and Grotius in international politics finally mastered that fierce zeal of Calvinism which, without consciously intending it, advanced the liberties of the future, but would have starved its artistic development.

The truth is that Humanism and Christianity have too much in common to be ever at any time absolutely severed, except at those unfortunate periods when either art has become sensual or religion has committed spiritual suicide by self-starvation, cutting itself off from those factors, other than itself, which supply appropriate nutriment to its spiritual forces.

Humanism, which is another word for civilization, has always had, when sane, central, and comprehensive, deep-rooted affinities with the Christian Religion, and that in spite of the fact that inevitable capacities for misunderstanding and hostility exist in the case of those two greatest forces of life. It is not always easy to reconcile the breadth of the one with the passion of the other, nor does the man of art or the man of religion appreciate, as a rule, the other's capacities and point of view.

Human nature being what it is, it is hard for either to admit the fundamental and essential character of the other's gifts. Religion or art alike

have a tendency in each case to relegate the other to the sphere of outlying superfluity.

In regard to the whole subject of the relation of religion to the other forces of human life, to the fact that it is to inspire and guide, but not to ignore and to destroy, not to make a spiritual solitude and call it peace, we may quote the wise words of one of the very wisest modern helpers of the soul, Friedrich von Hügel, in his "Letters to a Niece": "I want you, just because you long for religion, to cultivate more carefully and lovingly also the interests and the activities that are not directly religious."

CHAPTER VI

GENESIS OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION—PROBLEM OF CHURCH AND STATE

IT was the tenacious will to live and to expand, the will not only for liberty but potentially at least or even consciously for supremacy, on the part of convinced religious minorities which, in one country of Europe after another, threatened the order and legality of the Renaissance nationalisms. The autocratic interpretation of the maxim *Quod principi placuit habet legis vigorem*—a maxim which in its original mediæval setting was capable of a constitutional reference, or of the authority of the Prince as *legibus solutus* and as being the fount of the laws, having them in his own breast, *quasi scrinio*, as if his will was their origin rather than his mind their guardian—was challenged, and in the long run successfully, first in Holland and afterwards in Scotland and England, by the spirit of Calvinism and its child the Puritan Revolution. The Calvinistic ferment, the real driving force of the Reformation, was always attended by incalculable consequences, whenever it forced its way into the sphere of purely political interests.

The same might be said of the Counter-Reformation. The spirit alike of Geneva and of Rome was at once too logical and too passionate to allow it to mingle with the compromising considerations of the *Politique* party. There was a Semitic strain in the outlook on the world in the case of the Churches

alike of Calvin and of Loyola, a theocratic and intolerant temper, which such social philosophers as Bodin, or statesmen as Sully, or critics as Montaigne would have found it impossible to assimilate and reduce to any logical coherence with the tentative political supremacy of the modern State which was emerging as the child of the Renaissance, along that line of development of the latter which was least deflected by religious strife.

It is hard to imagine a common factor which should include the *ethos* of the prophet Elijah with that of Gallio, "who cared for none of these things." The sympathy of the modern lay mind with the temper of Bacon or of Montaigne, as compared with that of Beza or of Ignatius Loyola, ought not to make us forget that, by a curious but intelligible paradox, it was the apostles of intolerance who, by their determination to secure for their respective creeds space in which to grow and to dominate without State interference, became the instruments of political liberty, and ultimately often, in spite of themselves, of religious liberty as well.

Every Calvinist who felt as he took part in the Wars of Religion that he was a sword in God's hand, every Jesuit who faced the rope and the quartering block sooner than acknowledge the Elizabethan Settlement of Religion as having spiritual validity, were contending, whether they intended it or not, against the pagan theory of the omnipotent State. They were enemies of the human Leviathan, the idol of Hobbes, the King-Priest in whose being, as in that of the Divus Cæsar, religion is absorbed as a subservient element, devoid of independent life or even of organic distinctness.

The keen edge of religious conviction cut through the meshes of statecraft. Where the Renaissance State was not strong enough and not self-centred enough to expel the virus of the opposition to the national system of religion, Catholic or Protestant, the result was that the force of conviction broke down the autocracy of the State. As we have noted, it is a remarkable fact that the more sternly logical and intolerant Churches became, by their fixed determination to exist and to extend, the involuntary instruments of a liberty for the political side of which, as far as it tended to the breaking down of privilege, they had no very great sympathy, and for the ultimate though indirect result of which in the establishment of complete religious toleration they could have had nothing but abhorrence.

For Calvinists and Jesuits alike made no concealment of the fact that supremacy, not toleration, was, in the case of each, their real goal. This is as true of the out-and-out adherents of the Genevan Reformation as it is of Pope Pius V. "Heretics ought to be put to death now," said Cartwright, the champion of Presbyterian Puritanism in the Elizabethan Church; "If this be bloody and extreme, I am content to be so counted with the Holy Ghost."

The Calvinists and the Jesuits alike produced powerful and able pleas against despotism, as in the case of the *Vindiciæ contra Tyrannos* of the Huguenot Duplessis Mornay, or of the *De Rege* of the great Spanish Jesuit Mariana, with its exposition of mediæval constitutionalism, including the right of deposition, and with even its revival of Manegold's and John of Salisbury's defence of the personal removal of the tyrant from existence. Yet

neither Calvinists nor Jesuits would have had the faintest tolerance for theological error, or have included liberty of worship among the principles of a rightly ordered State.

Calvin was exceptionally venomous towards the noble Castellio for the latter's condemnation of cruelty exercised in the cause of religion, "the tenet of blood" as Roger Williams, the Castellio of New England, in his hatred of persecution, called coercion for theological error, to the horror of his fellow-Puritans.

The cause of spiritual and intellectual liberty had no foster-fathers among the Protestant Reformers, whenever that cause involved toleration to those who went further than themselves. Its pioneers were to be found in certain mystics and rational thinkers on the outside edges of the Reformation orthodoxy. These were more or less suspect to its authorized exponents. In them the spirit of Erasmus revived, Erasmus who tells us that he could even make a friend of a Jew, provided the latter did not speak disrespectfully of the Saviour.

Castellio was almost the earliest of this, in their own time, little-known and little-honoured group. As *Martin Bellius* he opposed the mystical Christianity of Love to Calvin's Christianity of Law. Next to him in this succession was Theodore Coornhert (d. 1590), secretary to the Estates of Holland and writer of the first manifestoes issued by William of Orange.¹ Coornhert was not only a noble patriot, a worthy son of the Dutch Republic,

¹ For Castellio and Coornhert see Edward Hulme's *The Renaissance, the Protestant Revolution, and the Catholic Reformation*, pp. 361-3.

that mother of modern European liberties, but he also faced the fury of the Calvinists in his advocacy of complete religious toleration, even for Roman Catholics, and that although he was in communion with Geneva and had been the only person excluded from the amnesty signed by the Roman Catholic commander Requesens.

Coornhert had discovered and read the *Treatise on Heretics* by Castellio, who had died at Basle some years before, starving and forgotten, a victim of Calvinist malignity. The spiritual appeal of Castellio for love as against hate in regard to the treatment of religious dissidents had in the hands of Coornhert become a rational passion, and it is largely due to the influence of the latter that Holland became the home not only of political liberty but of religious liberty as well, and learned that the iron force of the logical French mind of Calvin needed to be tempered by the forgotten humanity and sense of justice of the wider mind of the Dutch Erasmus, Calvin's mental antipodes.

Since the Reformation three psychological types have contributed towards the gradual abandonment by the State of coercion in matters of religious belief and worship, and ultimately towards the disentanglement of citizenship from theological tests. The first of these is composed of the mystically tolerant who feared the extinguishing in any man of any spark of the divine light, however dimmed by error. The second were the rationally tolerant, to whom the infliction of civil penalties for speculative opinions and for practices in regard to worship based on such opinions appeared to be not so much wilfully cruel as intellectually stupid, as if one

should try to fight a ghost with a sword. The third were those whose policy of tolerance was in truth essentially policy rather than principle, statesmanship choosing the lesser of two evils, rather than a rejection of coercion for opinion and modes of worship as the opposite both of the spirit of justice and of the revelation of love.

To this third class—the political—belonged the *Politiques*. In the later sixteenth and in the seventeenth centuries the Gallio-like temper which throws the dust of a tolerance which is comparative indifference upon the angry insects of religious controversy seemed to statesmen of the class called in France the *Politiques* to be the course most conducive to the peace of the commonwealth.

Incipient and generally unconscious rationalism combined with a passion for the well-being of the State to develop a type of statesman and political thinker who refused to imperil the social equilibrium by unbalanced appeals to the principles of the Jewish theocracy. The famous political thinker, Jean Bodin, contemporary of the actors in the French Wars of Religion, who died in 1596, was a striking representative of this type, a type in which expediency or prudence becomes the chief political virtue. Here lurks an ambiguity. If we stress this quality of prudence as the *articulus stantis vel cadentis* of statesmanship, we may, as we interpret it, either make our political science as unethical as the principles of Machiavelli and Hobbes, or as rationally moral as those of Edmund Burke, for whom prudence was only another word for that instinctive wisdom which recognizes the complexity of human life and antagonizes all attempts to re-

duce its tangled situations under obedience to some abstract theory.

Bodin, as is evidenced by the six books of his *Republique*, has the modern mind which meets us in the pages alike of *The Prince* and of *The Leviathan*, and yet his realism is no synonym for unethical brutality. It is one which gives the highest place, and that with no mere lip homage, to reason and to the moral law. He is, however, ethical rather than theological. Bodin is naturally and in theory thoroughly tolerant, like Montaigne, his literary contemporary with whom he has much in common.

On the one hand, his Platonism, an element as characteristic of the mental forces which moulded the Renaissance mind as the influence of Aristotle is of those of the mediæval scholastic period, links Bodin with the political thinkers of his own and of an earlier time, when Greek thought and Christian teaching alike secured at least a theoretical supremacy in human life for the ethical and rational elements, in a word, for idealism.

On the other hand, his political norm is that of the sovereign State in a family of nations rather than, as in mediæval theorists, the brotherhood of Christian humanity in an international federalism of social organisms or groups.

Although Bodin recognizes the naturalness of the growth of such groups, he refuses to give them natural rights, and so, unlike Althusius, the real father of modern associational and socially pluralist conceptions of the State as a *societas societatum* or society of societies, he upholds the omnicompetence of the sovereign State.

This fact places Bodin in that line of succession

which, starting from Marsilio (as to what is distinctive in the latter, his practical secularism, as distinguished from the Aristotelian, ethical, and Christian elements of the *Defensor*), has the positions of Machiavelli's *Prince* and Hobbes's *Leviathan* as its most distinctive points of development. In this gallery of realists, Bodin has a distinguished place, though his realism acknowledges the authority of higher elements. In his *a posteriori* methods and his dislike of treading the high *a priori* road, he has again a relationship to Machiavelli, at whose view of life he professed to shudder.

Law, for Bodin, is the creation of the sovereign State, and the latter is in its best condition when embodied in a practically absolute monarch.

The king is not Law personified, as the mediæval view envisaged him, *Lex animata*, or the representative agent of Law, not its fount.

For the Middle Ages, Law is supreme as representing divine justice. For Bodin, on the contrary, Law expresses the will and sovereignty of the State. Law is the State's command. In mediæval times it was conceived as the State's parent and originator, the State subordinate to human law, and the latter the *sacramentum* of that eternal law by which all things consist. Bodin also anticipates by his value for observation and experience and his sense of the importance of the study of history the minds of Montesquieu and of Burke. He is as immune to fanaticism as is Bacon. In this he is nearer to the latter than to Burke. As to the crucial question of religious toleration, Bodin was a supreme instance of the *Politique* type. Such men

were often personally attached to the Church of their country and had no desire to encourage sectarian revolt. Yet in matters political they put the well-being of the State above theological considerations. Unlike Jehonadab the son of Rechab, they would not go with the persecutor to see his zeal for the Lord. They tended to view organized religion as in its best state when its teeth are drawn. They considered it as something which is a good servant but a bad master. The erastian temper in its lay commonsense was the groundwork of their practical philosophy of Church and State, though often only unconsciously so. As Laodiceans they were abhorrent both to Rome and to Geneva, to the Church of Loyola and to the Church of Knox. They appeared to the zealots, the passionately religious on all sides, as being culpably "at ease in Zion," prepared to live and let live in regard to matters where toleration meant disloyalty to truth absolutely revealed. If fanaticism was the danger of the temper of their opponents, sober worldliness was the snare of the *Politique* or erastian mind. Of course it is only by an anticipatory anachronism that this school can be described as erastian. After all, erastianism in the general sense, the temper of the average lay politician towards the uncompromising attitude of religious idealists, is probably as old as religion itself. This temper was naturally detestable alike to Geneva, which was for Pope S. Pius V "a nest of devils and apostates," and to Rome which was for Geneva "the mother of harlots."

Modern liberalism may discern in the temper of the *Politiques* a practical anticipation of an agree-

ment with its own spirit. But none the less, unexpected as it may seem, it was not the broad-minded political thinkers, with their charts for steering the ship of State into calm waters and away from the crash of dogmatic icebergs, who secured our modern liberties. The Baconian mind with its comparative religious tolerance had its affinity with enlightened despotism, with the ideals of Strafford rather than with those of Milton. But it was really the intolerant who ultimately made complete toleration inevitable and final. The paradox, which is as unexpected as it is historically certain, is that it was the more bigoted and intransigent in matters of religion who by their refusals to obey the rulers of their respective countries made impossible the enforcing of uniformity, even amid comparatively wide limits, by the action of the omniscient State.

In Holland the struggle for political freedom came, under the influence of Calvinism, to have the fierce tension of a war-embrace. It was inspired and sustained by a theological determinism which made each elect man or nation no casual product of the play of circumstances, but the expression and the instrument of an irresistible and infinite Will. Each man chosen by God was as a sword the hilt of which was in the unseen. Each stroke went home because there was no intellectual hesitancy in the brain of the smiter. More than once in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, while secular philosophy proved itself either the support of absolutism or at least failed to be its solvent, religious zeal secured political liberty in the first place and afterwards, as an indirect consequence, a toleration all

round entirely foreign to its own spirit, but rendered inevitable in the long run by the awakening by theological strife of the spirit of revolt in matters of belief and of the mind.

The passionate idealism of Calvinism, whatever its limitations, its blindness, and its cruelty, had nothing of the numbness of atheistic fatalism. It did not leave the soul of the common man cold, but made it glow with ardour at once restrained and invincible. The cry that "the Religion" was in danger, the sort of temper that makes Milton's sonnet on the Vaudois so austere alive, was, to the Puritan or the Huguenot, as the trumpets inviting to battle, while the republican philosophy of the *Contre-Un* of Montaigne's friend, La Boétie, had no consequences outside the world of books.

No doubt politics and religion have often made "a fractious mixture," yet if religion has proved itself the virus or venom of a political situation, on the other hand, at certain great turning-points of history, it has been the tonic force which has made possible the success of the refusal to conform to wrong, and without which the struggle for liberty would have lost its staying power and its nerve. All great idealism can have this effect, but religion pre-eminently.

With its Judaic background and inspiration, the Calvinism of the Reformation period, and the older Puritanism, its Anglo-Saxon descendant, were to the sentimentalism of present-day Protestantism as the virile angels of the Old Testament to their idealess representatives on a modern Christmas-card. Unlike Lutheranism and Anglicanism, Calvinism was essentially a propaganda. If it had

affinities with the self-mastery and the *innerweltliche Askese* of Stoicism, it also shared in the driving-power of Judaism, the people of Will.

Though in the earlier stages of its history it found in France its main supporters not in the people but in the feudal and aristocratic classes, in the Teutonic countries generally it became allied with the commercial and merchant interests; and also, particularly in the Low Countries, in Scotland, and among the English Puritans, its peculiar type of religion became in many places that of town craftsmen and small traders, as well as of the country yeomanry.

Oliver Wendell Holmes, representing the optimistic liberal reaction in the North American Boston world of his time against the Puritan predestinarian tradition which dated from the theocracy of the Pilgrim Fathers, writes, in his *Philosopher at the Breakfast Table*, that Calvinism was nullified by two forces, "the blood in men's veins and the milk in women's breasts." But, at any rate in its best days, when it was the creed of the council chamber and of the battlefield, and not only of the prayer meeting, it had, like every live movement on the march amid the main issues of its time, red blood in its veins. It was no mere creature of the sacristy, or even of the study. Its militant and aggressive character, the fact that propaganda was congenial to it, is seen in its beginning in Calvin, the Moses of the movement, who was as great a practical genius as he was a logical theologian. It was as akin to the world of the Will as Lutheranism was to that of the Feelings.

Ultimately, human nature was too much for Cal-

vinism. But in the countries which passed under its influence it left an ineffaceable mark upon the national character, a mark which in many cases, as in modern England, especially among the middle classes, has survived the complete or partial disintegration and collapse of the Puritan theology.

This is especially true of the political elements of life. If Plutarch's *Lives* sustained the spirit of the Girondins of the French Revolution, the English Bible, especially in the Genevan version with its fierce anti-papal notes, and Foxe's *Book of Martyrs*, fed the temper of the saints of the Cromwellian Commonwealth, the rank and file of English Puritanism, even while in the case of the greater Puritans, such as Milton and Marvell, the Hebraic element was tempered with the Classical, the mind of Hebrew prophecy with that of Greek philosophy, the spirit of Platonism with the genius of Israel.

But after all, in the case of the Revolt of The Netherlands, the most conspicuous instance of the political influence of the Calvinistic version of Christianity, the Dutch Republic sprang into existence and became an example to all struggling for liberty, because its mentality, which knew not defeat, was Hebraic rather than Hellenic in type.

Humanist as the Low Countries were, the motherland of Erasmus, of Rembrandt, of Grotius, it was not humanism which provided the iron element to their resistance to the tyranny of Spain. The main fibre of the inspiration of that struggle, matchless in its heroism, was not humanist as much as theocratic, its driving force was from Jerusalem rather than from Athens. The deepest and most enduring demand was not for the Rights of Man, but for

freedom to serve God "according to His Law." This, rather than freedom to follow the implications of the soul's rational nature, was the secret of the indomitable element, the basal constituent in the Dutch war of independence. The ancient classical liberties seemed to hover over those wrestling with tyranny, but the onward thrust of the spirit was from the Hebrew Bible and the Augustinian doctrine of grace.

The claim for religious liberty came first, for political independence later, while the humane spirit of mental freedom which realizes the rights of conscience of others as well as of ourselves came last of all.

Yet at the start, Calvinism supplied the impetus to the will to be free. Luther's system, or want of system, was too subjective, too much a thing of an inwardness which was out of relation to the social organism to be effective in the gaining or support of political liberty or the ethical development of the Christian commonwealth. Luther was originally the monk, Calvin the jurist. The latter had more affinity with the canon law, in spite of his contempt for it, and with its sense of the Church's authority, than with those later mediæval mystics of Germany and Holland, with whom, in certain respects, the spirit of Luther was in kinship. The Lutheran temper, with all its boldness and revolutionary consequences, was more at home with the farewell discourses of the Johannine Christ than with Moses descending from Sinai amid the thunder, or with Elijah overthrowing Baal. Luther had not the theocratic temper which made the Old Testament methods and ideals so congenial both to the mind

of Hildebrand in one age and to that of Calvin in another.

It is remarkable that while mystic souls have been most at home in the pages of the Gospels, it is those who in the name of religion have stirred and guided the storms of public movements in whom the spirit of Hebrew prophecy seems to have revived, a Savonarola or a de Lamennais in Catholic Christianity, a Latimer in the Christianity of the Reformation.

If, however, the English Puritans secured constitutional liberty by their alliance with such masters of law as Coke and Selden in opposition to political absolutism, they were in matters of religion more decidedly intolerant than their rivals.

The Anglican Churchmen no doubt, in the universal spirit of their age, leant upon the arm of secular power. Their theory of the fusion of Church and State in one politico-religious organism, itself a legacy of mediævalism, was adapted with fatal ease to the justification of the acts and temper of Laud's coercive policy. Yet the foundation principle of the Right Divine of Kings, regarded not only as civil rulers but as consecrated guardians of the Church's life—a theory on which the Church of England leant until James II used it for the attempted destruction of Anglicanism—was capable of being used for the defence and not only for the suppression of liberty of thought. It was by the Royal Supremacy in the hands of Charles I that the Thirty-nine Articles were secured from an exclusively Calvinist interpretation. The Monarchy was the palladium of the Church of England against both Rome and Geneva. In spite of the harshness

which drove the Pilgrim Fathers across the Atlantic, the bigotry of their temper equalled or exceeded that of Charles and his advisers. The sufferings of the early Quakers witness to the intolerance of the saints of the *Mayflower*. The Brownist exiles, however, present an honourable exception. They had in their souls the Anabaptist strain, with its dislike of force, its belief in the spirit.

The general outlook of the distinctively Anglican divines of the period upon life in its larger and less political aspects and departments was much more humane and reasonable, in a word, more modern, than that of the Puritans. We may compare, for instance, the respective attitudes of Anglican and Puritan towards the Roman Communion and towards the Sabbatarian question. In general with regard to the Bible, to Church history, to the office of reason in religion, the attitude of the Puritan mind represented the more illiberal and uncritical position.

If the Church of England in her more distinctively Anglo-Catholic period, that of the Caroline divines, failed to uphold the ancient political liberties of the nation, yet in other respects she stood for comparative comprehension and breadth of mind as against the dogmatic closing of disputed questions by narrow Puritan theology, posing under the authority of what it called the "Word of God," meaning, by that expression, the Puritan tradition and those portions of Scripture which Puritans used to justify that tradition.

Jeremy Taylor's *Liberty of Prophesying*, for instance, is in favour of extensive toleration and deprecates the multiplying of doctrinal definitions

and formulæ, the lust for hyper-definition, especially of the undefinable. The erastian Selden, with his wide and deep learning and with his distrust of amateur infallibilities even more than of hierarchic authority, had a greater degree of agreement with the Caroline school, at least on its broader side (for, after all, Laud was the protector of such thinkers as Chillingworth), than he had with the Westminster Assembly, of which he was himself a member. In fact, it was a Puritan who wished of Chillingworth's famous book that it might rot with its author, as he hurled it on its author's coffin.

The Elizabethan Settlement was comparatively tolerant in matters of *opinion*, even while it demanded outward uniformity. It was not as a disciple of the Reformation theology, with a conscience against the Mass, but of the Renaissance statecraft, with the will and the power to prevent a war of religion in England, that Elizabeth sent the Jesuit emissaries to the scaffold. The Tudor Queen, with clear brain and cold heart, met the imperial Church with weapons as trenchant as its own. Unlike her minister Walsingham, she was a political rather than a doctrinal persecutor. Her sister Mary had been the reverse, luckless as a stateswoman, merciless as to God's honour. Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity*, the first great work of constructive Anglican divinity after the Reformation, is a storehouse not only of sound learning but of humanist principles and ideas. The regard of its author for history and for reason is a proof of this. The same cannot be said of the writings of Hooker's opponents, or even for Calvin's *Institutes* itself.

After Anglicanism emerged from the storms of the Reformation period, the Erasmian mind found a refuge within her and has never entirely left her borders. If the work of Erasmus, as the anticipator of a scriptural and liberal type of Catholic belief and practice, is to be taken up again, the Anglican Church, provided she is true to her own best ideals, will be found to be organically and temperamentally suited for such a venture. How much more truly liberal in temper than any of the Puritans, in spite often of strong prejudices, were such Anglican Churchmen as Donne, or Sir Thomas Browne, or Jeremy Taylor, or at a later time Dr. Samuel Johnson. Who would not have rather met the latter than any of the Pilgrim Fathers, for instance?

The truth is, as to this country at least, that the doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings, which hardened into a superstition about the hereditary or legitimist principle, had as its original and substantial content the effort of the lay and non-ecclesiastical element to get free from the leading-strings of the Pope and, at a later time, of the Calvinist Kirk. No doubt the Divine Right doctrine was made a stalking-horse for the despotism of the Tudors, and in a more doctrinaire fashion and with the addition to it of the necessity of hereditary succession, of the weaker and therefore more offensive autocracy of the Stuarts.

Yet the wiser and broader minds among the adherents of the regalism of the period undoubtedly saw in the Divine Right theory a security against fanatical violence, against the views, defended by Ultramontane and Calvinist alike, which made states-

manship a department of theology. Both the anti-sacerdotalist and the anti-Puritan saw in the conception of the Christian Monarchy as *de jure divino* a bulwark against ecclesiastical or sectarian interference with affairs of State. The origin of the theory was not with the clergy, although in England the latter came to use it as against the Puritans. The genesis of Divine Right lay in the attempt to oppose the pretensions of theocracy by pretensions equal to its own, by making the secular power itself theocratic, and robing the civil commonwealth in the vestments of a divine consecration.

No doubt, as in the policy of Philip of Spain and of Elizabeth of England as well (at least on the political side), and in the instance of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes by Louis XIV, regalism in Church and State had as its consequence persecution in the interests of religious uniformity. More often, as seen in the mind of L'Hôpital, the tolerant spirit of Bodin's great treatise, the policy of Sully and of his master Henri Quatre, and later in the attitude to the Churches of the benevolent despots of the eighteenth century, of such rulers as Frederic the Great of Prussia and of the Emperor Joseph II, we discern the anticipation of that modern standpoint to which, whether from indifference or from charity, coercion in matters of belief is at once repulsive, impolitic, and even mentally inconceivable.

An intermediate stage is represented by the substitution of exile for death as the penalty for nonconformity from the national type of Christianity. National unity in religion took the place of the universal theocratic unanimity of member-

ship in the European Church Commonwealth. No longer did the pope determine the creed and worship of Europe, but the king determined the religion of his people.

Cujus Regio, ejus Religio was the famous motto expressive of the partial religious settlement in central Europe made as one of the provisions of the Peace of Westphalia which, in 1648, ended the Thirty Years' War.

This marks a stage in the relations of the secular power to the organized religious community which involves the definite abandonment of the mediæval Church State or Christian world unity, but yet retains the mediæval identity of the civil and ecclesiastical elements as two sides of one organism, although the organism is now the National State and no longer the *Christiana Respublica*. The identity remains, but on a national not a cosmopolitan basis. The inhabitants of each State must, at least publicly, profess the creed of their Head, the "godly prince" or "Catholic ruler," as the case may be.

But individual belief cannot be completely merged in national uniformity. Calvinists and Jesuits were, as the most uncompromising and intransigent of believers, driven to secure self-preservation or, ultimately, supremacy, by distinguishing between the Civil Power and the Church as two kingdoms, two *Societates Perfectæ*, though this admission is often made grudgingly, by either religious extreme, as far as the rights and functions of the State are concerned, whenever the State is not of their respective theological colour. Extremes meet in the case of those to whom the Church is

everything, and the State a lower secular organization. Here John Knox and the Spanish Jesuits are at one as against Lutherans and Anglicans. The German Lutherans were ultra-erastian, the Laudian Church of England was at least byzantine.

The modern Anglo-Catholic trend towards the position of a "free Church in a free State" can claim no precedent in the teaching of Hooker or in the principles and policy of Laud, for both of whom the mediæval unity is still the theory of thought and action. The Nonjurors are the first High Anglicans (as in Leslie's *Regale and Pontificale*), who hold the Two Kingdom Theory. Later, however, in the Hanoverian period, the same view is maintained, though as involving distinctness of the two organisms rather than any desire to separate them, in Bishop Warburton's once celebrated work, *The Alliance of Church and State*. Whatever its other merits, this book is remarkable, especially in a fundamentally erastian period, as having as the postulate of its whole position the implicit denial or ignoring of the theory of Hooker that Church and State are one thing.

Warburton's book is as little on a level as a classic with Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity* as was the personality of the former writer with that of the latter. Yet his view is in accordance with the facts of the changed situation ever since even a limited toleration became the rule, while Hooker's noble conception has been put hopelessly out of date by the logic of the accomplished facts of the whole course of English history subsequent to the Tudor Settlement, or attempt at settlement, in religion. The later development has moved gradually but none the

less certainly away from the identification of the English Church and the English Nation as one thing with two facets or aspects.

At the period of the Tractarian controversies the same difference appeared, and that not only as between the Oxford Movement and its opponents. Among the leaders of the latter, there was sharp opposition of view between Dr. Arnold's advocacy of the identity of Church and State and Dr. (afterwards Archbishop) Whately's logical demonstration of the distinctness in existence and character of the two societies. Newman tells us in the *Apologia* that it was from the teaching of Whately, in spite of Whately's anti-Tractarianism, that he first received the idea of the Visible Church, considered, that is, as a spiritually independent body.

Whately went to the root of the matter when he denied that the fact of the same persons belonging to two distinct social groups or organizations proves the identity of the two as one society. His conception of Church membership and of the nature of the Church is therefore more akin to that of primitive pre-Constantine Christianity than that of subsequent times, while the view of the identity of Church and State expounded in the splendid language of Hooker and later of Burke is essentially mediæval, although modified by the nationalism and regalism of the Renaissance.

The developments in the direction of the modernizing and secularizing of the State which have reached their fullest extent since the period of Newman, Whately, and Arnold by the removal of all religious tests in regard to citizenship in the British Commonwealth and by leaving even Theism

an open question, as far as politics are concerned—for nothing less than this is logically involved in the present constitution of the House of Commons—have from the point of view at once of logic and of the recognition of things as they are immensely strengthened Whately's view and ruled that of Arnold out of court.

Strangely enough, in spite of his anti-mediævalism, Arnold must be regarded as one of the last English thinkers of outstanding influence to uphold and even passionately champion the view of the identity of the Christian Society and of the civil commonwealth, a view which underlies all mediæval political conceptions, whether those of Aquinas, as papalist, or Dante, as imperialist, or even of the pioneer of the modern democratic State, Marsilio. For whether the Church uses the State as its executive instrument or the State reduces the priesthood to a chaplaincy, in either case the identity conception is the implied postulate—there is at root and in the main substance but one and only one organism. There can be no concordat or alliance on such a theory, for there are no two contracting parties.

In Coleridge's *Treatise on Church and State*, the Church of England appears in a double attitude, i.e. first, as part, though only part, of the "Clerisy" or teaching body of the nation (like the Guardians of Plato's Commonwealth), but also, second, as representing to the nation the Christian Society. This conception mediates between the absolute distinction view of the Tractarians and the purely erastian one of Dr. Arnold. Coleridge's view combines the necessity of the State recognizing

Christianity in some outward and concrete form with the acknowledgment of the Church's spiritual function as not derived from its civil or secular partner. The influence of Platonism is in Coleridge's mind like the blood in the veins. His Church-Nation is essentially of the Platonic order of society.

For Frederick Denison Maurice, who along with Coleridge and Westcott is equally removed from Tractarianism and erastianism, both the Church as a divine creation and the sacredness of its organic union with the national and human commonwealths are fundamental truths. The Broad Church erastianism which is the heir of Hoadley's spirit, the Tractarian aloofness from social interests in the period of Newman's influence, were alike repugnant to the mind of Maurice. He could not conceive either of the Church as absorbed into the State (for his *Letters to a Quaker on The Kingdom of Christ* spring from thoroughly Catholic sacramentalist convictions) nor of the Church as an association owning no vital ties with the national life and with the State as its embodiment.

Maurice anticipates the continual insistence of Bishop Westcott upon the Church's office as "the spiritual organ of the nation," while neither Coleridge, Maurice, nor Westcott so merged the idea of the Church in that of the nation as did Dr. Arnold. Arbitrary and in the teeth of the logic of facts as was Arnold's theory, it was not without a real nobility of character. His hatred was for that isolation of ecclesiastical from human and national subjects and interests which has so often made the clergy and their adherents *gens de sacristie* and which caused George Meredith, unjustly no

doubt, but with some apparent justification, to write of the typical rigid High Church clergyman as having the mentality of an embittered and scolding female.

Arnold made churchmanship and citizenship one thing, the latter practically subsuming the former. This conception of the nation-church, however virile, was undoubtedly an anachronism. It was a throw-back to the days of the Roman Republic, when religion was but the State in its ideal aspect; or at best it was an attempted revival of the consecrated patriotism of the Hebrew prophets, with their view of Israel as at once political commonwealth and theocratic community.

This way of looking at English Christianity has a robust dignity which it shares with the character of its author. There is much that is noble in the conception of the acts of the civil community as being the exercise of a religious function, the outcome of the life of the nation-state regarded as a consecrated body, an ecclesia of all citizens. If the affinity of primitive Catholicism is with the Mysteries, as the school which follows Arnold would tell us, the congenial anticipation of the latter's view would be the city-state of Aristotle, or the Roman Republic in its earlier and more stalwart condition.

On Arnold's view, pressed to its necessary and logical conclusions, there is no Church except the State. The ultimate outcome of the Spirit's action at Pentecost was the Christianizing of the State. The creation or evolution of the Catholic and Apostolic Church as a distinct spiritual organism was, on this view, a mistake, well-nigh aboriginal, a per-

version of Christianity almost from its cradle, but a mistake and a perversion no less.

Hence Arnold's dislike of the Apostolic Father, S. Ignatius, almost a contemporary of the Apostles, because his letters, written on the way to martyrdom at Rome, urge obedience to the primitive episcopate. Arnold regards this as the beginning of the Hildebrandine apostasy. The Church, in his view, went wrong in its very cradle, and that by a fundamental perversion of its own nature. Dr. Arnold's recoil from ecclesiasticism explains his theory. His strong lay type of mind was at once profoundly religious and also suspicious of any kind of dualist theory which seemed to place human citizenship and the religion of the Church in opposite and possibly antagonistic spheres. Hence comes the fact that so many English laymen, especially lawyers, hold this view, often half unconsciously.

For Arnold, the true Extension of the Incarnation was not the Catholic Church but the Christian State. His ethical standpoint involved a fusion of the teaching of the Sermon on the Mount, for Christ, whom he loved passionately, was to him absolutely supreme, with the spirit of disinterested citizenship, the living *pro bono publico* of the noble Greeks and Romans of Plutarch's pages.

The erastian view, in one form or another, Arnoldian or less clearly thought out, has been in this country part of the spiritual *Weltanschauung* of what used to be called the Broad Church party, the advanced members of which now prefer the title of "Modernist," in spite of the fact that the genesis and historical environment, originally French Neo-Catholic, of the latter phrase are en-

tirely distinct from those of the mentality of the representatives of Dean Stanley's spirit.

Whatever Loisy's and Tyrrell's critical and philosophical positions may have been respectively, they had little in common with English Liberal Protestantism. The latter is the joint product of the more intellectual type of early Victorian religion, in its reaction from the Oxford Movement, and of the school of Harnack in Germany, the Ritschlian school which Johann Weiss's and Schweitzer's eschatology has since deprived of its supremacy.

The English Broad Church leaders have often described themselves as persecuted and misunderstood pioneers, but in reality deaneries or similar places have been their "coigns of vantage," while Tyrrell and his confederates have been thrust out on to the doorstep of their original Communion.

If both schools alike are liberal, they wear their liberalism, like Ophelia's rue, "with a difference." However they may agree as to certain principles of Biblical criticism, Anglo-Saxon Liberal Protestantism and Continental quasi-Catholic Modernism have differences deeper than those on the surface.

Whatever the mistakes of the latter, its exponents were more "of the centre," to use Matthew Arnold's expressive phrase, more European and less provincial, than our Broad Churchmen, at least of the Victorian and English Public Schoolman type, excellent as it is.

The outcome of the critical situation into which in England the relations of Church and State with one another are drifting is by no means certain. Among a people so illogical and so distrustful of abstract ideas as our own, a condition of things that

is a fundamental anachronism, such as the possibility of Parliamentary regulation of the mode of celebrating the Eucharist in the Church of England, may survive as long as the clearing up of the public mind by the light of facts and reason appears to be a more difficult process than the familiar one of letting things drift. Yet *Quieta non movere* is only a sensible piece of advice when the epithet *quieta* is really appropriate to the circumstances in question.

The Prayer Book controversy is forcing to the front certain inherent weaknesses latent in the combination of the surviving portions of the Elizabethan Settlement of Religion, in its more political connexions, with the new elements and conditions of the life of the modern State and of present-day civilization; of a Church which comes from days of enforced uniformity, and of a State in which all religious tests whatever are entirely gone.

The older type of Catholicism, whether in its nobler theocratic aspects or in the meddlesome clericalism, diplomatic rather than idealist, into which it has too often degenerated, is something which is uncongenial at once to what is independent and to what is commonplace in the English character, at once to the will of the latter to do things in its own way, without control or criticism, and to its association of religion with what is tame and domesticated.

In the history of Anglicanism, the methods of Laud were exactly calculated to rouse to antagonism the temper of the great central and property-owning classes, increasingly Puritan, who, while they had in a loose or sometimes in a fierce way

adopted the general principles of the Calvinist phase of the Reformation, were, in their inner temper, as hostile to the theocratic "Discipline" initiated by the spiritual despot of Geneva, as they were either to prelacy or to pope.

The conception of Christianity as the "New Law" as embodied in institutional religion, a conception congenial both to Rome and to Geneva, is not that which attracts the Anglo-Saxon mind, except so far as it involves a sense of the essentially moral obligations of our religion. In other respects, the Englishman is a sentimentalist. In no respect is he a logician. But even if there is a truth in the saying, "Scratch the Englishman and you find an erastian; scratch the Scotchman and you find an ultramontane," there has broken forth again and again in English religion a passionate bigotry, the outcome of which tends to imperil the sobriety and moderation which are the best qualities of an erastian type of Christianity, as tameness and dullness are its worst.

Challenge of the conditions involved in the present national Establishment of Religion in England, which has, up to this time, generally come from without the State Church, may very easily and very quickly come in increasing distinctness from within the Church itself.

The Anglo-Catholicism of the present day has in it potentialities of a spiritually explosive character. Its adherents are not so likely to go out or to submit to extrusion as were the followers of Wesley. The temper of the Movement, ever since the disintegration of Tractarianism, has been much more restless, dynamic, and evolutionary than was that

of the original Oxford School, before the fiery ferment of the mind of Hurrell Froude set the genius of Newman on the move.

We are standing by what is, it may be, the death-bed of the politico-religious conditions prevailing in the Church of England since the Elizabethan age. A critical stage has been reached in the gradual passing from power and influence within the Anglican Communion of the Hanoverian and early Victorian temper and traditions. The Church is changing, but how far the nation realizes this and what will be the consequence of this realization is not so apparent. The evolution in question, however, is one which is but part of a larger and European process, affecting all the Churches, the Roman not excepted. It is the extrication of the Church of Christ as a spiritual body with a source of life and action of its own from a sort of union with the State which confuses the issues both political and religious. Such extrication need not mean antagonism, and it may be consistent with the kind of connexion which has been described as a concordat, but it will mean practically the ending of such a system as the present English Establishment, or the passing of the latter into conditions so removed from its former ones that the change will be no less fundamental because it is the outcome of an evolution, one effected with comparative goodwill, we may reasonably hope, on the side both of the Church and of the State. The absorption by the State of the Church's spiritual powers or any permanent antagonism between Church and State should be alike unthinkable.

There is enough fundamental sanity in England

to save its people from the dilemma involved in any division of the national life in regard to religion between reactionary clericalism on the one hand and a State avowedly or at least practically pagan on the other. As to Europe as a whole, this undoubted trend towards the accentuation and realization of the separateness of the spheres of Church and State may mean the rejection under the influence of practical materialism of the claims of Christianity to be organically coherent with all life, national and human.

Even outside Christendom, as in Turkey to-day, the State is asserting its newly found secular independence by stripping from itself all the theocratic sanctions and limitations. The social and political renaissance in Asia is following on similar lines the European movement of that name in the later and more rationalistic developments which were implied in certain phases of the New Learning of the sixteenth century, and which reached open expression in the *Aufklärung*, the eighteenth-century enlightenment.

But in Christendom to-day there is a brighter side to the forecast than the materialistic one. The movement for the increasing interpretation of the nature and office of the State as of an organization in which, since religious tests have in it no place, there is no regulation by the civil power of matters of belief and worship, in other words the frank recognition that we are as a matter of fact living under and as part of the Modern State, and not, in regard to this country for instance, the Tudor one, may result intentionally or even indirectly and unexpectedly, in a freedom of the range of influence

and action of the visible Church in which the glow of her meridian may surpass the purity and promise of her dawn. The right answers to the present calls for service and witness, the right use of the present opportunities for making men and women virtuous and noble citizens, may cause both the national State and the Christian spiritual society to meet in a way much more fruitful and genuine than in the past, in a true, increasing, and beneficent reciprocity of ideals and actions.

A new chapter is undoubtedly opening in the history both of the Church and of the world, of the universal Church and of that in this land. What characters shall be inscribed within it depends partly at least upon ourselves. However gradual the change may be, we stand at the parting of the ways. The cross-roads are everywhere. The reality of change is all that we can be certain of. Yet the nature of the change is not wholly outside our control. Events do not merely pass by us as in a dream. We ourselves, our own wills, are proximate efficient causes in regard to their nature and direction.

CHAPTER VII

WAR, PATRIOTISM, AND THE INTERNATIONAL SPIRIT

IN the present chapter we will consider the problem of peace in Christendom and some past efforts to secure it. The mediæval period, regarded from the point of view of impartial history and not merely of romantic fiction, was one in which, in spite of much brutal and sordid realism, of much static monotony, of overstrained ascetic unnaturalness, a noble way of regarding life as the sacramental expression of great ideas was present in the best minds. Such minds were possessed by a sort of sense of the logical necessity of the existence of an actual reign of justice, in spite of the pressure of visible facts and the stubbornness of human tendencies.

The all-embracing sky of reason lay behind the shifting clouds of violence and disregard of law. Even if function was unfulfilled, it was felt that the human soul was made to fulfil it, and must answer to an unseen authority for disobedience and dereliction.

Among all the various characteristics in Old Testament prophecy of the ideal kingdom of the Messiah in which God's will is to be done on earth as it is in Heaven, there are two to which the best minds of the Middle Ages continually recur. The one is the *universality* and the other the *peace-bringing and peace-securing* character of the kingdom. The ideals of an age, as of an individual, are,

as a rule, the expression not of its attainments but of its aspirations. The favourite mediæval illustration of political and social life was that of the physical body representing the functional variety in collective unity of the human race, its underlying equality forming the basis of a hierarchic distribution of duties and responsibilities.

The constant danger of relapse into the barbarism out of which mediæval civilization had emerged and which in some ways it had but half conquered must have made the ideal of civil society as that of a human body in which each part and limb has its appropriate office, congenial and attractive to the thinkers of that age. Order, harmony, peace, were the aims sought after; such were the desires of the heart and the dreams of the spirit of those better natures whose lot was cast amid scenes of constant violence and confusion, and in a period when cruelty was so frequent and so disregarded that it was not even stigmatized as a deadly sin.

It is out of a society like this that there arise again and again dreams of a world of peace.

To Dante's estimate of peace we have already alluded. It also gives the sting to the *Defensor Pacis*, for Pope John XXII, by his very office as the chief shepherd of Christendom, should have been the upholder of peace, instead of being, as he is in Marsilio's accusation, the author of confusion.

A striking anticipation of the hopes which the League of Nations witnesses to and embodies is given by that remarkable treatise of Pierre Dubois,

De Recuperatione Terre Sancte,¹ to which the attention of students of history has lately been directed. Written in that early part of the fourteenth century which was the seed-plot of change, at about the same time as Dante's *De Monarchia* and Marsilio's *Defensor*, the immediate object of this tract by this quick-witted regalist and anti-clericalist lawyer was to bring France well to the front in the loosely knit European polity as being, as she really was, under her King, Philip le Bel, in spite of much still unaccomplished as to internal unity and solidarity, a new nation, the leading one in the Europe of the earlier Renaissance. This France was emerging as great politically and later as great in the world of thought, through the university movement. It was seeking its embodiment in a national monarchy supported against papalist claims to world supremacy and against the centrifugal tendencies of its own feudal principalities by the zeal of the new lawyers who stood as a curia around the throne. At the same time the rising French spirit became through the results of the crusades the chief representative of Christendom in the Eastern lands, tending to absorb the interests there of other European peoples, a process which has gone on through history down to modern times.

The second object advocated in the *Recuperatione* is a startling one for those times. The demand involved is an echo of the violence with which Nogaret and Colonna insulted the haughty yet baffled Pope Boniface VIII, when "Anagni

¹ For an account of the two works of Dubois, the *Summaria Brevis* and the *De Recuperatione*, see Ter Meulen's *Gedanke der internationalen Organisation*, chap. I.

avenged Canossa." It anticipates also the demand of the English Wyclif at the end of the same century. It is the forcible disendowment of the Church and in effect the declericalizing of society. Here the mentality of Dubois is at one with that of Marsilio. Both are among the anti-clericals of Christian history.

The third object, that which gives its meaning to the title of the treatise, is the keeping back the advance of Islam by a Christian confederation in which France should be the standard-bearer and from the successes of which in the East she, as the premier power of Christendom, should derive substantial gains.

Underlying the whole is a sincere dislike of war between Christian nations. Like the popes in this respect, Dubois seems to urge war with the Moslems as a means of hindering internecine war among Christians. In this sense, Dubois is a pacifist. He holds that Catholic Christendom should be a realm of peace. The Christian sword should only be used against the Infidel or as the instrument of an international police force. Used by Christian against Christian, the sword is that of Cain, not of Christ. Warfare between Christians is but fratricidal slaughter. *Nullus Catholicus contra Catholicos currat ad arma, nullus sanguinem baptismatum effundat.* Militarist leaders are *Raptores et interfectores*, birds of prey who rend the Christian people. The end of government is the good of the people. The ruler must ensue peace *Quid poterit sanctius esse quam Christiani populi salus et quid pretiosus.*

Parts of the work of Dubois raise a smile, such

as the extraordinary object of the excellent scheme of giving an all-round education, both refined and thorough, to a number of Christian ladies. The object is to qualify them to fascinate, marry, and convert the leading Saracen chiefs or Nestorian potentates.

But it is not that presence of the New Woman in Dubois' treatise which so amused Bishop Creighton, nor even the prophetic anticipation of much of the future greatness of France, which is the most critical element in this remarkable composition. Though it is in a sense a *livre de circonstance*, being part of the literature which arose out of the struggle of the French King with the Papacy, it is raised above the character of a mere *jeu d'esprit* by Dubois' refusal to acquiesce in the supposed necessity and normality of the slaying of Christian by Christian, as a means of settling racial differences. In spite of the quarrelsomeness and cruelty of the Middle Ages, the theory at least was pacific, and probably had this not been so matters would have been far worse than they were. The Truce of God, even if enforced with difficulty, was not merely an act of lip homage to the spirit of peace.

Nor is the practical and constructive element of internationalism wanting in Dubois, as far as internationalism can then be said to exist. His forecast of almost the very machinery of the League of Nations and his advocacy of the economic boycott for a recalcitrant and criminal member of the Christian World-State is an almost unprecedented anticipation of present-day hopes and ideals in regard to the outlawry of war.

The *De Recuperatione* was written as early as the

beginning of the gradual disintegration of mediæval Europe. It is therefore not an outcome but an anticipation of the intellectual alertness of the Renaissance.

But when we arrive at the actual Renaissance itself, we find an atmosphere the least suited for the growth of pacific ideals. It is not without reason that Nietzsche, from his own naturalistic point of view, regarded the Renaissance period as a new spring when life emerged and nature unfolded, after the long winter, the glacial era of Mediævalism. It was in his view a spring, the promise of which, however, was to be largely in vain, frustrated by the rise of Puritan Protestantism, alike, in its earlier rigour and in its later sentimentalism, the enemy of life. Both Machiavelli and Nietzsche were admirers of Cæsar Borgia, the man of *virtu* in the sixteenth-century sense, of audacity, resource, capacity to seize the opportunity.

With such qualities ethics have nothing to do, or rather such qualities are in themselves ethical in the only practical sense of that word in the life of States. They are efficient and accomplish the end desired.

As to Cæsar Borgia as the realist, the model for *Il Principe*, we need not trouble ourselves about a tiger's ethics, when we admire the colour of his hide, the play of his limbs, and the exactness of his spring.

If the severance of politics from morals is characteristic of sixteenth-century Italy, it was Holland which, in the following century, gave a noble lead to the cause of international justice, as to

so many other departments of human life. The great Hugo Grotius strove to bring the conduct of nations towards one another under the rule of law, while such law is for him, even when most a thing of custom, in its underlying principles no system of merely artificial convention, but something that has behind it as its sanction the majesty of the immanent justice by which the moral universe is held together.

Before Grotius, another great Dutchman had, like Falkland in our own history, "ingeminated peace," though, like Falkland also, with the result of apparent and immediate failure. In comparison with the unethical nationalism to which the Renaissance period gave birth, Erasmus was an internationalist in his broad and deep feeling for the life of Christendom as a whole. Like Goethe afterwards (as contrasted with Schiller), he was more European than patriotic. He has been rightly called "the last great European," though Goethe might almost dispute the title with him. Erasmus, in his sense for Christendom as still a whole, was in that way mediævalist. His hatred of war, however, was stronger than that of any of the great mediæval thinkers. His feelings as a Christian and as a humanist in favour of peace were so much those of a man of culture and of one who had mixed with military aristocrats as well as with poor students that he could not have been classed with the Anabaptist uncompromising pacifists with their fanaticism against all things having to do with war. Yet in every allusion of his to this subject he shews that he is to be numbered emphatically as

in the forefront among the great peace lovers of history, from Dante to Kant.

The same temper and attitude were shared by the friends of Erasmus, Colet and More. The former was delated to the young King Henry VIII, soldier and sportsman, for "weakening the hands of the men of war" by an anti-militarist sermon which he preached as Dean of St. Paul's, and which the King was large-minded enough to overlook. Sir Thomas More's *Utopia* gives ample evidence of an ideal of human life the most remote possible from that of writers for whom Cæsar Borgia was the pattern.

In this, as in regard to the liberal attitude in religion, to toleration, to the raising of the children of the poor by education, to the securing of land and of opportunities for its cultivation to the peasantry, as contrasted with the policy of the new nobility, the English friends and disciples of Erasmus were well ahead of their age.

The message of More's *Utopia* is a blend of intellectually aristocratic Platonism and of a sort of Christian socialism. The attitude of Colet and More, and, among those on the side of the religious revolution, of Bishop Latimer, the Amos of the Reformation, stands out against the "will to power" and the contempt for poverty of the "new men" of the Tudor period.

So unable, however, was even More on the one hand or Latimer on the other to rise completely above the spirit of his age that the author of *Utopia* committed Zuinglians to the stake, and Latimer preached the "burning sermon" when Friar Forrest perished for "denying the King to be Supreme Head."

In strong contrast to all the above, Tyndale, the translator of the New Testament, a religious and literary genius comparable to Bunyan, was the author of the *Obedience of a Christian Man*, a work advocating, in the style of Luther's attitude in the Peasants' War, the most slavish attitude of subjects to kings, servants to masters, peasants to squires. Of the above type are many startling sentences in this book, a favourite with Henry VIII, who on first perusing it locked it in his desk, saying, "This is a book for me and for all kings to read." Tyndale writes of the servant in regard to his master, he is "to obey him as God. Thou art his good and possession as his ox or his ass." The subject is told, "Thou seest that the King is in this world without master, and may at his best do right or wrong, and shall give account but to God only." Again (let us contrast this with John of Salisbury's advocacy of tyrant killing), "It is better to have a tyrant for a King than a shadow. Though he be the greatest tyrant in the world, yet is he unto thee a great benefit of God, a thing for which thou oughtest to thank God daily." Parallel with this is Tyndale's scorn for reason and for natural virtue, and for the ancient philosophers who have been their expounders.

"Of like pride are all the moral virtues of Aristotle, Plato, and Socrates, and all the doctrine of the philosophers, the very gods of our schoolmen." So Luther calls reason a "harlot."

If Erasmus has the mind of Origen, the synthetic Alexandrian temper, Tyndale has that of Tertullian, the fierce North African. We owe him genuine gratitude for his translation of the New

Testament. But his bigoted notes to it are a different matter.

While Lutheranism and Anglicanism leant to absolutism in politics, both Calvinism and the Jesuits of the Counter-Reformation, in countries where the former had no "Godly Prince" to appeal to and the latter no Catholic Sovereign, being in either case a religion not that of the Government, assumed the character of an *imperium in imperio*, sustained and recruited from without by the forces of an international propaganda.

In regard to the Jesuits, it is, however, necessary in justice to note the really noble services rendered to the cause of internationalism by the distinguished line of Spanish Catholic Jurists, culminating in the great Jesuit writer, Suarez, who developed the principles involved in the mediæval *Jus Gentium*, and anticipated the best efforts of the post-war mind. These writers formed a link between the cosmopolitan ideals of the Middle Ages and the later growth of federalist conceptions. It is remarkable that the greatest services to international law should have been rendered by the Spanish sons of Loyola, such as Suarez, and by members of the Dutch family of Calvin, such as Grotius. But both Loyola and Calvin were, by the nature of the case, more internationalist in the consequences of their beliefs and actions than was Luther or our own typical theologian, Hooker.

Albericus Gentilis, an Italian refugee who became Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford in 1608, soon after the accession of James I, anticipated much of the work of Grotius, whose celebrated treatise, *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, was a synthesis

of international principles, especially in regard to warfare. It was based ultimately on the theory of the *Lex Naturæ* or original law of justice, as developed by history, custom, and recognized authorities into the *Jus Gentium* or Law of Nations.

Grotius drew from many quarters, especially, as we have noted and as detractors of the Jesuits should freely acknowledge, from the stores of good work done in the direction of international ethics by the Spanish members of the Society of Jesus, as well as from Swiss and Dutch sources, often the theological antipodes to the Spanish school. His attitude in regard to internationalism stands midway between the theological implications of the mediæval canon law and the non-ethical and even non-rational politics of the jungle, arising from the view of human nature and history involved in the mental orientation of such thinkers as Machiavelli and Hobbes.

But moral and humane as are the outlook and the underlying convictions of Grotius, his treatment of international questions is essentially different from that of those advocates of peace who assail war directly and call for its outlawry or for a universal strike of peoples against it. The mind of Grotius is marked by the absence of any prophetic vision of ultimate and universal peace. War he considered natural under the principle of self-preservation. His aim was to keep it in reserve as a last resort when reason had failed, and to restrain its operations, even when it was practically inevitable, by the control of international law.

Under the circumstances, the moderation of Grotius, his conservative temperament, his dislike

of vague and flamboyant theories and language, and the strong support which he gave to royal authority (in this agreeing with Bodin), made his work popular with the ruling monarchs. It helps to explain the influence it exerted at the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which ranks as a European Conference with the Council of Constance before it and the Congress of Vienna afterwards, and which ended the Thirty Years War and the Wars of Religion generally.

The logical and abstract condemnation of war as under all circumstances whatever sinful and anti-Christian was one of the main planks in the Anabaptist programme, a position which the respectable elements in the sixteenth-century Reformation, as in the Anglican Thirty-nine Articles, condemned, as they did the Anabaptist communism. The condemnation of war had its root and background in the Stoic Law of Nature. But the Anabaptist position, itself the precursor of the Quaker one, via Menno and Fox, claimed the Sermon on the Mount, not the philosophy of the Porch as its justification. The disregard of historic development and the abrupt application of abstract principles to complicated social questions are features of the Anabaptist attitude which it shares with that phase of the modern humanitarian and revolutionary movement in which the genius of Rousseau and that of Shelley were involved. Grotius and the other international juristic writers are divided from the revolutionary school by a regard for history and by constant reference to human experience as embodied in the collective instincts and traditions of nations, which is entirely

foreign to the mind of 1789. Grotius stands in the same group of thinkers, in regard to social philosophy, as Montesquieu and Burke. All alike are possessed by a genuine hatred of injustice, by a sincere love of mankind, and a deep conviction of the reality and universal range of the law which enjoins nations as well as men to do to one another as they would the other should do to them, but all alike decline to tread the "high *a priori* road." It is this temper which severs them from the purely revolutionary school, deriving its laws of social perfection direct from the logical brain.

It is remarkable that it is often towards the end of a world-convulsing war or after the exhaustion caused by civil strife, when brother has had his hand upon the throat of brother, and life seems resolving again into the confusion of the primal atoms, that some proposal for a social or international utopia makes its reappearance. The *Leviathan* of Hobbes, the *Oceana* of Harrington, the former a unique philosophic defence of the absolutism of the omniscient State, and incidentally an attack on all theories of Church authority and of all independent life of societies within the State ("the worms within the entrails of Leviathan"), the latter anticipating in a striking way the Distributivism favoured by Mr. Chesterton and others, are both of them outcomes, or the expressions of symptoms in temper and ideas, of the English Civil War.

The French Wars of Religion, which were terminated by Henri IV's purchase of a kingdom by a Mass, are the background of the *Grand Design* for the permanent pacification of Europe, which was represented as the above King's political

legacy, but which more probably is the composition of his great minister, Sully, or at least has the latter's inspiration as its origin.

The issue of Kant's *Zum ewigen Frieden* (tract in favour of perpetual peace) during the Napoleonic Wars is an impressive instance of a similar phenomenon.

The subsidence of the wave of war seems to bring speculations of this kind to the front, as if the mind of man were perpetually deceiving itself in the hope that now at last the era of wars is at an end. The vogue at the present time of Mr. Wells' grandiose yet finely conceived dreams, as to the possibility of the World State, is an instance of the same tendency.

The *Grand Design*, however, was, in the opinion of some critics, not intended to be taken too seriously. It may possibly be regarded as a somewhat ironical reflection on the appalling condition of Europe, distracted as the latter was at the time by "religious wars," racial hate, and dynastic ambitions.

Sully is said to have ascribed the suggestion of the *Grand Design* to Queen Elizabeth of England, who certainly, though she could strike hard on occasion, did not favour unnecessary wars. Politique as she was, like her French neighbour, Henri IV, vigilant patriotism left in her no place for religious zeal. In an age of fanaticism, caution rather than pugnacity was the main characteristic of her tortuous policy.

The "Grand Design" displays much largeness of conception. It advocates common toleration for Catholic, Calvinist, and Lutheran, and the forma-

tion of a peaceful confederation of Western Europe in a federalist system of thirteen States, the nature of the government of each, whether monarchical or republican, to be an open question. The Emperor presides, but sixty-four delegates administer the affairs common to all the confederate States. All disputes are settled by the Council, which must have an international army and navy to support its decisions.

Here we have the second anticipation of the League of Nations, that contained in Dubois' *De Recuperatione* being the first. Both are remarkable for their thoroughness, and both provide for material sanctions in the enforcement of decisions made in the interests of international justice and peace. Both emanate from the French brain and sentiment. It should be noted that however militarist and chauvinist the mind of France has often been, yet again and again noble humanitarian visions have had their origin and their nourishment in the intelligence and imagination of that great nation. Even the spirit of 1789, which so soon became the nursing-ground of Napoleon's grandiose ambitions, was in its beginning a favourer of peace.

"Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive,
But to be young was very heaven!"

So Wordsworth, recalling his early humanitarian fervour, described the feeling with which he had greeted the French Revolution. In its beginning the latter was against the militarist claims and temper represented by its European opponents. It unfurled the banner of fraternity and justice. Its

sentiments were high-flown, but they had nothing in common with beliefs in the biological necessity of war. Its teachers rather attributed militarism to the ambition of princes supported by the craft of priests. Whatever its inner logic, it was at its start congenial to pacifism rather than to the forces opposing the latter.

The subsequent call of war alarm by the fiercer republicans was not due to acquisitive motives, nor to exclusive patriotism, but to the threatened interests of the defence of France from invasion, the liberation of humanity, and the cause of new-born democratic ideals.

At a much earlier period, at the time of the Peace of Utrecht (1713), the advocacy at once wise and impassioned of permanent peace by the pen and speech of the Abbé Charles Irénée de Saint-Pierre, secretary to the French plenipotentiary at Utrecht and before that chaplain to the royal Duchess of Orleans, was a notable milestone in the progress of pacific ideals. The plea of the Abbé was for an international congress of Europe composed of delegates from each State, and empowered to take common action against an offending nation. This, the third detailed anticipation of the League of Nations, is, like the earlier ones, the outcome of a French mind, and appeared at a time when there had been, just before, experience of a European war of extreme strain, and when therefore the possibility of permanent peace presented itself acutely to those tempted to acquiesce in the inevitability of war.

The ideas of Saint-Pierre were given to the world in a volume entitled *Mémoires pour rendre la Paix perpétuelle en Europe*. The work is obviously the

outcome of a mind at once burning with zeal for the attainment of the object aimed at, perpetual peace and the abolition of war, and yet also patient and sane to an extraordinary degree. The author did not anticipate any immediate realization of his ideals, nor adoption of his methods. He was content to labour for an end in the distance, but this patience was combined with a strong certainty of the ultimate attainment of the aim. He was not surprised that his work was met with good-humoured banter, or even with cynical contempt. As an ecclesiastic he could not be supposed to know much about matters outside those of the sacristy. Even his admirers, and he had many, spoke of his anti-militarist theories as the dreams of a good and amiable priest.

The contemporary statesman, Cardinal Dubois, who had a sincere regard for Saint-Pierre's noble character and high intelligence, spoke of his book as containing *Les rêves d'un homme de bien*. Voltaire, who professed to admire Saint-Pierre, expressed much interest, but while agreeing with the object, felt dubious as to mankind's possession of sufficient sense to attain it. Perhaps also the sage of Ferney was a little jealous of the enlightened liberalism of a priest.

Frederick the Great at first expressed sympathy. This was in his youthful "anti-Machiavel" days. Later in life, in writing to Voltaire (1742), he ironically dismissed Saint-Pierre's conceptions as although noble, yet needing "the consent of Europe and some other trifles." In his view the natural *Kriegslust* was too strong. Leibniz, who was then hopeful of effecting a reunion of Catholics and Protestants, under the primacy of a possibly liberal-

ized or less intransigent Rome, and whose correspondence with Bossuet has been already alluded to, was optimistic about the Abbé de Saint-Pierre's ideas, for the interest of the German philosopher in the reunion of Christendom was largely inspired rather by social and political than by purely theological and religious considerations. Like Saint-Pierre, he was an internationalist, a believer in *Weltharmonie*.

Leibniz' effort came to nothing. The parallel attempt of Saint-Pierre was ineffectual at the time, but he helped in the passing on of that torch which the League of Nations and Locarno and the American Pact are now attempting to rekindle, or rather he anticipated in idea what we now see tentatively essaying to emerge in fact.

The name of this noble-minded priest should be added to those others in that far too small list of members of the Christian clergy who, in the oft-quoted words of the comedy of Terence, could each have said, "I am a man, and to me all things human are matters of concern."

The Abbé de Saint-Pierre, less known perhaps than some others of the past workers in the same field, has a full and honourable place in the exhaustive volume of Dr. Jacob Ter Meulen, published at The Hague at the significant date, 1917, under the title, *Der Gedanke der internationalen Organisation in seiner Entwicklung, 1300-1800*. In this volume, the lives and works of all who have "sought and ensued" the peace of the world—of all the great internationalists in thought and action—are recorded with a fullness made possible by exact research, by scholarship kindled by enthusiasm.

A work of this kind is as typical of the trend of thought and feeling in the Teutonic and Anglo-Saxon countries to-day as is Treitschke's *History of Germany*—with its anti-pacifist undercurrent and its agreement with such writers as Clausewitz with his tiger philosophy as to the perpetual necessity of war and its perpetual benefit—of the pre-war Prussian temper.

Saint-Pierre's work was published at the beginning of the period of the "enlightened despots" of the eighteenth century. The time which followed was marked by the decline of French political power, and by the intrigues and experiments in statecraft of Frederick of Prussia, Joseph of Austria, and Catherine of Russia. Very different surroundings were those of the appearance of Kant's *Zum ewigen Frieden* in 1795.

The two voices that were raised in favour of permanent peace in Europe, the one during the domination of Napoleon and the other at the attempted settlement at the Congress of Vienna, were respectively that of the hermit philosopher of Königsberg, Emmanuel Kant, and that of the brilliant, facile, and romantic Alexander I, Autocrat of All the Russias.

During the backwash of the Enlightenment Era, the young Czar had entered into public life as the ardent protagonist of Christian Liberalism. Dreams of a new Europe of brotherhood and justice swam into his ken. If he tried to get possession of all Poland, he told himself that it was to train that country towards independent political life, under his suzerainty. Even when he was most entirely the dupe of Napoleon, who knew how to play on his

susceptibilities, or the unconscious accomplice of Metternich in the latter's war against freedom, even when he was the victim of disillusion and panic, there was a strain of youthful idealism that was attractive in Alexander, although often there was "nothing doing" on his part when a constructive policy was required.

Although Alexander entered the ranks of reaction, it was because he believed that the Holy Alliance proposed by himself and engineered by such cynical realists as Metternich and Talleyrand was really a brotherhood of Christian rulers, acting as standard-bearers in the cause of the Prince of Peace and of the fraternity of mankind. Like the wings of an "ineffectual angel" (to use the phrase which Joubert applied to Plato and afterwards Matthew Arnold to Shelley), Alexander's influence and ideas hovered around yet never really pervaded the council chamber of the Congress of Vienna, the greatest European assembly since the Council of Constance, and, like it, disappointing in its results. In both cases idealism was outwitted by diplomacy, and the chief idealists converted to practical politics. The idealogues (to use Napoleon's contemptuous title) were no match for the turn of events and the interests of the situation.

Metternich the *doyen* among diplomatists, held the boards from the rise of the curtain to its fall. His brain, politic rather than wise, was the force behind the captains and the kings. A more adroit mentality was, however, at work, that of a man whose practical intelligence was as transcendent as his moral character was low. The sinister ex-bishop, ex-minister of Napoleon, Talleyrand, with at once

all the vices and all the experience of the Old Régime and of the Revolution, "Talleyrand with the goat's foot," as Treitschke calls him, was this curious figure, apologetic, insinuating, and in a supple and indirect way masterful.

Such were the two leading minds of the holy synod of the revived diplomacy of Europe. They played off the various hatreds and jealousies against one another.

The essential mistake of the Congress of Vienna lay in its ignoring and even contradicting the principles and instincts of nationality as far as the peoples themselves were concerned. The terms of the Holy Alliance which followed it provided for a sort of religious and international camouflage to the inherently reactionary character of the entire construction, the latter being inspired by distrust and fear as to popular forces whether nationalist or humanitarian.

This arrangement ignored or rather antagonized the spirit of 1789, not only as to the bad elements of the latter, its fanaticism and its contempt for history, but also as to its good ones, its attempt at securing human rights for all. The hegemony of Austria in Central Europe was Metternich's object. The actual result was the steady rise of Prussia, the power embodying practical realism, as the ultimate changer of the map of Germany, and still more of the German spirit. The Holy Alliance was a sop to the sentimental idealism of Alexander of Russia. On the forefront of its programme was the aim—the adoption of Christian principles by the European Governments. What really mattered was that by it the autocrats of Russia, Prussia, and

Austria became the *Tres Magi* of the new Epiphany of European conservatism and legitimacy, pledging themselves to common support against popular agitation.

As under the benevolent despots of the eighteenth century, the crowned Rotarians of the Enlightenment Era, everything was to be done for the people, nothing to be done by the people. The disillusionment through which so many of the wisest minds are now passing with regard to democracy in general may diminish the antagonistic feelings against the Peace of Vienna often shewn by Liberal writers. It certainly secured for some time a species of order after the Napoleonic storm. Apart, however, from the anti-democratic trend of that settlement, the ignoring or scorning of the very principle of nationality which when outraged had, in Spain, Prussia, and Russia, been the driving force in the victory of the Allies, and the treating the great complementary ideal of internationalism with practically hypocritical lip-homage, mark with ultimate and actual ineffectuality the entire attempt at the settlement of Europe. Taken together, the Peace of Vienna and the Holy Alliance between them unite a temporary and superficial political realism, that of Metternich, with the benevolent and sentimental verbiage which pleased Alexander while he insisted on extending the limits of the Russian ownership of unwilling Poland.

Alexander honestly wished to have a right to stand as the friend of the oppressed. Like the carpenter in *Alice in Wonderland*, he deeply sympathized, while he chose an oyster by no means of the smallest size. England as represented by Castle-

reagh, whose record at Vienna is more creditable than that associated with his family name in Ireland, was the champion of "the Balance of Power," and in that interest, as being always that of Britain, helped to restrain the Prussian vengeance against France. Castlereagh also secured the insertion in the terms of the Peace of a provision for the gradual abolition of the slave trade. The advocacy of this piece of practical Christianity was pressed on him by the influence of English religion and English humanitarianism combined. The main honour for it lies, of course, with Wilberforce and his Evangelical supporters.

Subsequent history proved, in the nationalist upheavals of the nineteenth century, that the realism of events was to take its course neither on the machiavellian lines of Metternich nor the sentimental ones of Alexander. It had demonstrated as against the spirit of the former

"How fireily alive those things
We took for fools' imaginings,"

and as against that of the latter the uselessness of an idealism which infers that the facts of a stubborn and tangled situation can be put right merely by what is called in America "sob stuff," whether in talk or feelings.

If Alexander's brain fermented with dreams of the regeneration of Europe as a new family of nations, under the authority of the Holy Alliance—the Kings coming, as at Bethlehem, to worship before the Prince of Peace—the mind of a much wiser and older man had brooded for some years before over the same problem. From Kant's

hermitage at Königsberg proceeded the latter's plea for perpetual peace, and guidance in securing it—the famous *Zum ewigen Frieden*.

There was in Kant something of the Old Testament austerity as well as of Greek sanity. It was not for nothing that he was by origin a fellow-countryman of John Knox, and yet his contribution to the cause of peace is as much the fruit of solid reason as of moral conviction. It has nothing of the sentimental glamour of the Czar Alexander's project.

No two personalities could be more different than that of the Scotch-German philosopher and of the Slav dreamer on the throne. Evolution combined with the growth of experience is the keynote of Kant's argument. As in all departments of life, harmony has come out of the experience of the necessity of controlling unbridled struggle; as civil war has been gradually eliminated; so, he holds, the trend of things in human history is inevitably towards the disappearance of war, for the gradual substitution for a reign of violence and anarchy by "a system of international right, founded upon public laws conjoined with power, to which every State must submit." But Kant's root idea was not that of the corporate organic life of mankind. It was rather that of the right of each State to fulfil the laws of its being in freedom and peace, analogous to the possession of similar rights by each individual. The League of Nations idea is again anticipated. Each State is to grow on its own lines, subject to the power of intervention by the general European will when such State threatens the common peace and scouts the common law of nations.

Kant did not, like Clausewitz, view war as a school of heroic virtue, or even as a necessary, though unpleasant, means for national security and honour, demanded at times by the interests of one's country, which interests must always be supreme. He regarded it as causing all evils and overthrowing morals—*Betrachtet Kant den Krieg als die Quelle aller Übel und das Verderbnis der Sitten* (Dr. Ter Meulen).¹ The *blond beast* of Nietzsche (anticipator of the *Übermensch*), and the *Wilde Mensch* of Kant are practically the same type. But in Nietzsche's mad world this creature represents the race's inherent vitality, at once its model and its goal. For Kant he is the savagery which it must outgrow. Once a beast to be tolerated even if avoided, he is now a monster to be either tamed or else expelled from man's saner world. Kant, however, admits that the warlike instincts have their uses, and that their sublimation is necessarily gradual.

While, like Goethe, Kant was a sincere lover of Germany, he did not find the main interests of his life to lie along the channel of patriotism. Though scarcely ever quitting the surroundings of an old-fashioned East Prussian town, he was in spirit a citizen of the world, as much so as the cosmopolitan and many-sided Goethe himself, though in a different way. He was too individualist on the one hand and on the other too internationalist in his outlook on the world-crisis in the midst of which he lived to be classed among the powerful succession of thinkers and writers from Fichte onwards, for

¹ Dr. Ter Meulen, *Kant's Internationale Organisations Gedanke*, chap. 29.

whom German nationalism, its recovery and its preservation, became more and more the main absorbing passion of their lives. Kant was loyal to Germany, the land to which his fathers had migrated, but his deepest interests were in the soul and in humanity, rather than in what Germans love to call "the Fatherland." Nor did he regard the German *Aufklärung* as the supreme instrument and model of true civilization.

As to questions involved in nationalism, Goethe must be considered apart. In many ways he powerfully influenced the revival of the Teutonic spirit, but he cannot absolutely be claimed for it any more than for Romanticism. He was classical and he was European; he felt the attraction both of Greek and Latin culture, and, though never a mediævalist, of the Gothic mediæval spirit; but he was no precursor of Prussianism. For that, his humanism was too wide and deep. It is with Hegel that there begins the practical identification of the Teutonic spirit with the interests and development of the Prussian Monarchy, as its most adequate symbol and instrument. Whatever the significance of Hegel as a philosopher, and it was of course of the first order, as even those of opposite schools of thought to his own must admit, in regard to the question with which we are now concerned, he marks a turn in a direction which later events have shewn to be of sinister significance. In the philosophy of realism in Prussian uniform the Absolute State becomes practically identified with the reviving Hohenzollern power with its hard militarist traditions, with contempt for international

ideals as the dreams of pedants and sentimentalists, and above all with the praise of war as the great school of loyalty, discipline, and courage. War is viewed as the tonic cordial which God or Fate administers from time to time to a drooping world. From the point of view of Christ's Kingdom as that of the "Prince of Peace" and as involving the doing of God's will on earth, and of Christ's mind as to the contents of that will being shewn in the beatitude *Beati Pacifici*, the anti-pacifist and anti-internationalist trend of German social philosophy from Hegel onwards is frankly without Christian social instincts, not of course as to family life, but certainly as to any vital connexion of Christ's teaching with the ethics of politics. It is much more so indeed than the mental outlook on the world of such a writer as Anatole France. The latter was no doubt an enemy of Christianity, misunderstanding it as being anti-natural rather than supernatural, and of the Christian Church, identifying the Church of France with clericalism allied with militarism and high finance. The Christian law of sexual purity no doubt seemed to him, as to all his school, overstrained, unnatural, and impossible. His dislike of asceticism led him to the service, practical as well as theoretical, of the goddess Lubricity. Yet he was not, like Nietzsche, a hater of the Christian spirit of service and of the honour of poverty and of the common man. As to our present subject, Anatole France was a sincere humanitarian and a foe of injustice. He views life both with irony and pity. He makes ridiculous the school which glorifies war and regards recurrent slaughter as an inevitable element in the life

of nations and of man considered as a fighting animal.

Anatole France said many things against the religion of Christ, but he did not actually blaspheme against the Holy Spirit. He was anti-Church, but he was pro-Humanity. The same could be said for Zola, when the latter was at his best. But it cannot be said for Treitschke and his school. Their type of patriotism, with its practical resolution of ethics into nationalism and with their doctrine of the biological inevitability of war and of the undesirability of abolishing it, even were it possible, is frankly pagan. Indeed many pagans, of the types of Virgil or Seneca for instance, were more Christian, or at least more humane in temper. The devotion of such a writer as Treitschke to the personality and influence of Luther, and the former's undogmatic but intolerant Protestantism, are elements which do not interfere with his view of the State as an end in itself. Luther's view cut life in two. He left the world of history outside Christ's Kingdom of souls, as the latter's framework, not its arena.

The men of the mediæval Church attempted to build for Christ a palace of cedar, which should house all the powers of life, organized under His imperial rule. The non-realization of this is one of the great disillusiones of history, though still kings, as our own, are reminded in the liturgy of the crowning that they hold their office under the Prince of Peace.

Yet the frank realism which gives to Christ no varied world that lies within His dominion as that of the universal king, but only a prayer-

room, as it were, in a military fortress, is something more satisfactory, because more candid, than the practical refusal to see Him as the "Lord of all good life" combined with an exclusive eagerness for the supposed interests of the Church.

Nietzsche poured scorn on Christianity as the vampire which had sucked out the blood of the virile pagan life. As compared with the school of Treitschke, Nietzsche is a solitary pirate ship, while the others are a hostile fleet, yet his attitude is more natural and intelligible, considering his violently atheistic pose, than is the combination in the Prussian school of historians of the profession of Protestant Christian belief with their idealization of war.

In the case of the ideas of the great historian of Prussia, and indeed of the type of German thought which has followed him, there is a characteristic combination of the necessity of Christian piety for the individual soul and as a *penates* for the German fireside, with, in public life, the ethic of the pre-Stoic paganism, the deification of the State, with the tribal God borrowed from the Jews as a figure-head. The temper of such religion is subjective and pietist, that of such a political spirit is self-assertive and unmoral, suggesting the Will to Power of Thrasymachus in Plato's *Republic* rather than the Socratic reference to the rational and the just.

This is partly to be explained by the curious and inveterate dualism in Luther's type of religion, making the latter to shrink from any claim to assert the Law of Christ beyond the limits of the soul and of the family, seeing in Him the saviour of the believer and the guardian of the home, rather

than the Lord of all Life. Here Calvinism, in spite of its harder and less tender side, has been the sower of richer and more social ideas, as far as the history of the world is concerned. For it has claimed for the New Law that it is to inspire, control, and train human existence as brought into Christ's visible kingdom and covenant; aiming at the mastery of man's whole life; at once discipline and propaganda; in its relation with the civil government insisting on liberty, a liberty, in the past at least, mounting up often to supremacy. The Calvinist and the Catholic types of Christianity, when each was most vital, strove to regulate the ruling forces of human life by conforming them to Christian ideals. They may often have attempted this by methods which conscience now condemns as unjust. But they did attempt it. They recognized in Christianity something with obligations and claims for man's existence here as well as hereafter, and they tried to retain hold, even if in ways sometimes mistaken, over life as a whole. Their failure in this respect was largely due to the inherent difficulties of the problem.

The German Pietism, which is the heir of Luther's subjective view of Christ's kingdom, has given signs again and again of an inward serenity of soul, of a peculiar charm, not so manifest amid the stormy efforts of the Puritan conscience, representing the other type of Reformation religion, to shape the world to its liking. The continual attitude of attack, the blowing of the trumpet in Zion, the clearing the decks for action, however necessary at times, is not the permanent condition for man's weary soul. "In quietness and in confidence shall

be thy strength"—not in noise and confusion. Rest as well as conflict has its allurements and its power. Peace is the permanent and heavenly attitude. Viewed *sub specie æternitatis*, strife is but a temporary expedient.

But mysticism and subjective piety can play into the hands of those who would destroy manhood as a whole. It was Calvinism not Lutheranism which overthrew the *Machtpolitik* of Spain and the Empire, as far as Holland was concerned, while the influence of Luther's version of Christianity has rather helped than hindered the system which culminated in the militarism of Potsdam and which poisoned with unethical racial patriotism the docile German mind. Darwinism, exaggerated and misunderstood, came in to complete the process, war being viewed as a biological necessity, and ethics following theology as a subject extruded or debarred from political life and interests.

This misapplication of physical science was all the more fatally easy of accomplishment in the case of a people like the Germans, who, unlike the English, are widely susceptible to the influence of ideas, even if of perverted ones. "They have perverted ideas, we have no ideas" was said by an eminent man in England during the World War.

The false and exaggerated type of patriotism or nationalism which makes war inevitable and which has been, in the past, the background of political and social life, is not, however, to be eradicated by the inculcation of a vague cosmopolitan sentimentalism. Patriotism is a root instinct of our nature

and it is part of our original and God-given equipment. The love of country is the necessary and intermediate element between the love of the family and that of humanity at large. The greatness of Mazzini, for instance, as a political thinker and leader, lies in the fact that while inspired by the "Enthusiasm of Humanity," he recognized the master-strength of nationality as a real and necessary element in the human synthesis and did not seek to ignore or eradicate it in the interests of the individual, as did Rousseau, or of Europe or of the race, as did Comte.

But the patriotism and nationalism of Mazzini is not of the Fascist type. The latter scorns or ignores the international spirit, and has no real place in its standard of values for the League of Nations and all the hopes that it implies. On the other hand, for Bolshevism there is no national life or patriotic interests. All must be pooled in the universal stagnation of communist uniformity. In either system of which we have now the extremest and most logical object-lessons, in Russia and in Italy respectively, the machine triumphs over the human personality, things ride men, life exists for organization, not organization for life.

The Christian spirit at its best does not seek to eradicate any genuinely natural instinct, however great the danger of its perversion. The patriotic and the combative instincts, both of which have been played upon by the promoters of war, are, in either case, fundamental parts of the equipment of our being. They need control and right direction, not destruction.

The true kind of pacifism which is involved in

the Christian teaching and ideal is a different thing from the love of comfort or from the fear of change. "Live dangerously" is a motto of Christ as well as of Nietzsche. The crusader and the Puritan may, neither of them, represent the best, the original, and the ultimate type of Christ's religion. Yet each of them had his significance and fulfilled a function, overruled for good. The soldier's life has been made at times, and that not rarely, a nursery of virtues, as well as a school of vice. Christ's admiration for the centurion is not without its significance. The spirit of discipline and obedience appealed to Him who loved the loyalty of simple men. The feudal system and the Cromwellian "New Model" were, both of them, with all their faults, nearer to the Christian ideal than a condition of society in which the leading feature is the unrestrained pursuit of wealth, gained unscrupulously and used selfishly, or the wayward or passionate gratification of individual desire.

However peace-loving Christianity is when it reflects the mind of the Prince of Peace, it would be a false view of the Church's attitude to war which ignores the order of the words in the apostolic injunction, "first pure, then peaceable." It would be a false view of the Christian attitude to war which would tear such heroic figures as those of King Alfred, King Oswald, S. Louis of France, S. Joan of Arc out of their niches in the great cathedral of humanity, because they bore the sword even while they bent the knee to pray or opened the hand to serve.

The vital need is of an adequate substitute for the discipline involved in the readiness for war, and

in responding to its call for the sacrifice of ease and it may be of life. Our children should learn that there can be found, in many ways, a moral equivalent for anything that is good in militarism, containing any benefits supposed to arise from preparation for war, yet without war's crimes. There is no doubt that we need a bracing substitute for the discipline, the cheerful loyal temper of the life of a good soldier, if ever the soldier himself is to become unnecessary.

Not only the Churches, but all men and women of goodwill, can so influence the minds of the young, that the boys and girls of the nation shall learn that honest industry has a glory denied to war's bloodstained splendour, that the man who makes two blades of grass grow where one grew before is doing what is far more efficacious than the man who kills his fellow, often in some national quarrel with which he has personally no concern and of the rights and wrongs of which he has no personal knowledge. Looked at in this way, the ploughman's jacket is a finer uniform than any of those associated with the "pride, pomp, and circumstance of glorious war."

The "drum-and-trumpet history" with its noisy superficiality should no longer set a false standard of values. The fatalism of the idea of the biological necessity of war, paralysing all efforts for permanent peace, the criminal character of that type of patriotism which shouts "My country right or wrong," should be exposed to the souls of children for the vicious falsehoods that they are.

It is in the minds of the young and for the possession of the minds of the young that the fight

between racial hate and suspicion with their tribal gods on the one hand, and international good understanding with growing sympathy as its nutriment on the other, must take place. The great Victorian, Tennyson, aspired in glowing words for the time—

“When the drum shall throb no longer and the battle flag be
furled,
In the parliament of man, the federation of the world.”

Subsequent experience bids us realize that men are in the hands of tendencies stronger than reason, even than love. Thomas Hardy's “Dynasts” sees behind the war drama the unconscious action of a conscienceless and immanent Will. This may be pessimism, yet we now know that the Prince Consort's views of the Crystal Palace Exhibition as maker of European peace did not realize how difficult are the factors of the problem. The Kingdom of the devil as well as that of God is within us. If ever the hideous scourge of war is to be stayed in its descent upon the nations, if ever war is to be outlawed, it is the mentality of the young that must be kept unpoisoned by prejudice and hate, humane, and with the love of Kind as well as of Kin.

It is not this or that factor in human society, but human society itself which is at the cross-roads at the present supreme crisis in history. Both capacity and will, however, are required in order to make by a decisive turning a step towards the attainment of organic fellowship. This ideal, which agnostic Positivism claims as its own discovery, is really the expression of the fundamentally Christian principle of solidarity, which is involved

in S. Paul's doctrine of the Body of Christ, and which underlies his and his Master's inculcation of the supremacy of love. As the summary of the teaching of the Positivist Catechism, we find, on the first page of the latter, the following:

“Love for Principle,
Order for Basis,
Progress for End.”

If we interpret progress as moral in essence, this is as old as the First Epistle to the Corinthians. It is a view which finds expression in a word congenial to the modern and European mind of Goethe—a mind which, if brilliantly pagan in some respects, was sympathetically human in others—*der Gemeindrang*, the forward thrust of life in which all parts share.

This is the kind of life in which, as that pleader for the humane and the international, Dr. F. W. Förster, of Munich, says with true wisdom in his estimate of the character and influence of the phenomena marking the *jugendliche Bewegung* or Movement of Youth in post-war Germany, the separate cells will not be the result of the alliances of *Partei* but will grow out of the stem of *Nachbarschaft*. Every approximation to the realization of such conditions, and of the change and development of the general mentality which they necessarily involve, will be but a ladder of dreams leading to the clouds, unless the arduous and gradual nature of the effort required, its far-reaching and exacting character becomes a challenge to youth's generous inexperience to come to the aid of the disappointed idealism of age.

CHAPTER VIII

THE REFORMATION AND THE REVOLUTION IN RELATION TO SOCIAL EVOLUTION

THE sixteenth century was the era when religion, both institutional and spiritual, became the storm-centre, and when, in consequence, the Christianity of Western Europe was split asunder to its foundations. Religious beliefs, not shut away decently in church buildings, became as living and as dangerous as the lightning. The whole hemisphere of human affairs was inflamed rather than illuminated.

The end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth were also marked by convulsion, but this time the sphere of disturbance was the world of politics. A revolutionary experience unique in thoroughness and violence in the whole course of European history, had its beginning and focus in France, while we can scarcely say that its end has yet come.

It is, however, in the region in which the social and economic order, rather than the purely political, is the more important that dynamic forces make themselves felt, and are most likely to manifest themselves still more, in the period in which we now live. What was once known as the "dismal science" of economics is now found to be vitally connected with history, with politics, with religion, in a word, with life. Anthropology is now viewed as a whole. For man is certainly not the mere animal

that materialism would represent him to be, but neither is he a disembodied spirit. He is neither a ghost nor a beast, but man, the spirit-animal, the amphibian creature who is a link between two worlds. Hence economic science cannot exhaustively describe him, nor can his romantic and complex history with its incalculable surprises be explained on the hypothesis of stomach rather than of brain or of spirit as the main or sole factor.

This is the fundamental mistake of the Marxian materialist school, i.e. the attempt to find in economics the sole key to the explanation of the tangled problems involved in human history regarded as a science.

But neither is man a spirit enmeshed in a hostile bodily environment, the heavenly exile, the star gone wrong, of Orphic or Gnostic dreams. On the contrary, the spiritual in him is organically one with the social and even with the corporeal. Matter is its vehicle and expression, the brain the throne and chariot of the unseen personality.

A natural sacramentalism of the *genus Homo*, a synthesis of inward and outward, nature and super-nature, spirit and flesh, is the true and adequate description, loyal to all the apparently contradictory phenomena, of the mystery of our condition—not materialism on the one hand or Manicheanism on the other. Each of these simplify the problem by leaving out as inconvenient or unnecessary one or other of the two primary factors, sense and spirit, given in experience.

The subject of economics cannot be divorced from the study of social science, of which it is a factor. Such science itself is at its basis and in its

implications, in part at any rate, a spiritual study, since it involves the knowledge of man's nature, at least in regard to the relationship of the personal units that compose society to one another and to the whole. It is also political, since it is the science of human well-being, teaching man in the words in which Aristotle describes the object of the civil commonwealth, not only how to live, but how to "live well." Humanity, and human history as the outcome of its life, is, in spite of what Bishop Butler calls "the manifold disorders of the world," at basis and in idea a coherent whole, being itself part of a universe that is a cosmos rather than a chaos. We cannot keep the essential elements of life in compartments isolated from one another.

As has happened in the case of the recent World War, mistaken attempts to dominate civilization and the resistance to such attempts cause inevitably by reaction a period of exhaustion and disintegration, like that through which European life and thought are now passing.

This critical condition also becomes manifest in the region of the soul and of spiritual conviction. The shaking of the earth is accompanied by the shaking of the heavens. Nothing seems to be secure. The tempest of the war is followed not only by social restlessness but also by a swaying hither and thither of man's inner nature, by a sort of surging and backwash of the mind.

The difficult and yet vitally necessary task of the leaders of thought of the present is that of promoting and developing the spirit of a true synthesis, not the arbitrary piecing together of broken frag-

ments of life's meaning, but the recognition, in spite of spiritual impoverishment and disillusion, of the rich fullness of man's articulated yet unified existence, one yet manifold, and the refusal to hastily simplify the problem by ignoring or destroying any element which may be able to act as an organ for the expression and interpretation of the essential spirit of the whole. We no longer hope to see the world aright, still less to set it right, by the flare of one torch flashed into its evasive darkness, one all curative theory or factor applied to its apparently bewildering confusion.

It may be said, surely Christianity is such an all-sovereign remedy? The answer is that Christianity itself is, as Heiler rightly calls it, a *Unio Oppositorum*, a divine simplicity in complexity, and that its central potency of redeeming love has necessarily to be applied to human life in various ways and measures, suited to the ever-changing conditions of the recipient. The central light is broken up into rays of divergent potency.

Readers of M. Maurois' recent charming work, *Ariel, la Vie de Shelley*, may be led to turn from its pages to open again *Prometheus Unbound*, the interpretation by the genius of Shelley in glorious poetry of the political and social individualism of his father-in-law, William Godwin. As the theology involved in Dante's immortal poem is that of the *Summa* of S. Thomas, so behind the lyric splendours of the *Prometheus Unbound* lies the indictment of society of Godwin's once famous essay, the *Enquiry concerning Political Justice*. The author of the latter was a personality who reproduced, in the London of the beginning of the nine-

teenth century, in his life and in his writings, many of the characteristics of those spinners of the webs of imaginary commonwealths who appeared in this country under the rule of Cromwell, and to whom they were a source of irritation rather than of support. The radiant enthusiast, Shelley, and the unpoetic rationalist Godwin, the youth and the philosopher, came together through common antagonisms. Poles asunder as to the constitutions of their minds, they both hated the same things, Shelley with the flaming ardour of an angry seraph, Godwin with the persistent political nonconformity of a Commonwealth man born out of due time.

In *Prometheus Unbound* the Godwinian philosophy of theoretic anarchism became clothed in the Shelleyan vesture of star-like and celestial verse. Shelley's lyric genius gave wings to the somewhat leaden speculation of Godwin, a thinker who was a revolutionist in logic rather than in action. Here we have, raised to the empyrean, Shelley's faith in the reality of those "Rights of Man," the approaching realization of which Rousseau foretold, and of the ultimate victory of which Paine, even after the Terror, without disillusion, without consciousness of defeat, prophesied the certainty.

"The loathesome mask has fallen, the Man remains,
Sceptreless, free, uncircumscribed, but man equal, unclassed,
tribeless, and *nationless*,
Exempt from awe, worship, degree, the King over himself."

In the above Shelley appears to relapse from the heights on which, granting his premises, the *Prometheus* moves with unfaltering steps, to the

crudities, even in expression as well as in ideas, of his earlier *Queen Mab*.

The lines are crude enough, in all conscience—the boyish, ill-considered idealism that has its spring in instinct, strengthened by repulsion, but is untempered by the wisdom of experience, either of the race or of the individual. Yet the seraph-like passion, like the torch of a *mænad*, of this youth at war with the world, has a splendid sincerity of its own, a sort of lonely consecration, like and yet unlike to Milton's self-devotion to the cause of the liberties of the commonwealth. "I have a passion for reforming the world," said Shelley with absolute truth. His hatred of the injustice of man to his fellows was, in spite of his own one great lapse from duty in regard to personal obligations, truly the result of an irresistible instinct which he had in common with one who was his political antipodes, Edmund Burke. The souls of both alike, of the apostle of reaction and of the torch-bearer of revolution, were as a nerve responding in generous pain to the unconsidered cruelties of the world—uncompromising quixotic spirits. A passion for justice inflamed them alike. Burke was not illiberal, nor was Shelley insane.

In a remarkable passage of his treatise on the *Political Theories of the Middle Ages*, Dr. Gierke notes as the two most distinctive and fundamental social principles of mediæval thought: (1) the "articulated organic structure" of the Human Race and of Christendom as its representative; (2) "the aboriginal and inalienable" rights of the Individual.

Rousseau, the French Revolutionists, and Shelley

took their stand on the second principle, though without reference to the character of personality as that of an immortal spirit akin to God and made in His image. The Individual was, for them, autonomous. Nor did they realize that Individuality grows out of Society, not vice versa—that man is born into Society.

But the first of these principles finds, in modern times, its most characteristic and exhaustive exposition in the pages of Edmund Burke. In spite of the fury with which he mocks and castigates those elements in the French Revolution which ran counter to his own deepest and most vital instincts about history and mankind—in spite of his unintentional but none the less actual and influential canonisation of the forces of stupidity and reaction—Burke was after all a fundamental liberal, in that sense of the word which really matters, that is, in regard to the hatred of injustice. It was this itself which was the cause of his mistakes, of his unfairness, of his liability to see red where any *flair*, even the slightest, of Jacobin tendencies appeared to make itself apparent, even under the most modest exterior. Wide-minded, even complex-minded as he was, Burke was incapable of all-round views, of cold-blooded tolerance, wherever a violation of justice was involved. Then his hatred of injustice made him unjust. Qualifications and modifications of judgment could not live in that consuming flame. Yet, equal to Burke's sympathy with the under-dog was his sense of something mysterious in the co-operative character of human life. To his mind, no attempt to raise the oppressed could be legitimate or effective which in-

volved the disintegration of the articulate structure of civilization, the product not merely of human wills but of a "divine tactic" and the result of the painful and age-long process by which society has emerged from savagery under the guiding discipline of law. For law in its main character is for Burke as for the mediæval thinkers not merely the result of the commands of human superiors or of the necessities of political expediency, but is always conceived as in its ideal principles, basal and common, the emergence in various measures and at various times of the underlying and immanent Reason of which man's moral nature, itself the root and foundation of human law, is the outcome and the flower.

To quote the incomparable passage in the *Reflections on the French Revolution*, in which Burke proclaims his deepest convictions on this point—"society is indeed a contract. Subordinate contracts for objects of mere occasional interest may be dissolved at pleasure. But the State is to be looked on with other reverence. It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection. A partnership between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born. Each contract of each particular State is but a clause in the great primæval contract of eternal society."

Burke holds that there *are* "rights" of man--the right to justice and all that is involved in that august and mysterious word, a word in which for him, as for Stoic philosophers and mediæval schoolmen, all the Godhead seems to lie hid, involving as it does the essential human obligations as springing from

that will of God which is the expression of His nature. Yet he holds that these rights are no metaphysical abstractions but rights of man regarded as a "civic politic" being—of men as members of the "mysterious incorporation of the human race."

It is of course true that the philosophy of society implied all through Burke's speeches and writings is mainly political, in a wide and deep sense of that word, and that its author does not face the more distinctively economic and industrial problems of society as a leader of similar genius and knowledge would have to do to-day. The economic problems latent in such questions as those concerned with nationalism, race, and social classes, could not in Burke's time have been central or even strongly perceptible elements in his field of vision. But as to the principles involved in the view of human society as being either in essentials co-operative and organic or voluntarist and individualist, Burke was pre-eminently a social philosopher of the Catholic type, viewing the individual from the standpoint of the whole, and seeing in the whole the coherent structure, the result of the nexus of groups, without incorporation in which the individual cannot realize his fullness or even his distinctness of existence—personality involving society as its pre-supposition. Yet when this great thinker proceeds to idealize the conditions of society and of the State in Hanoverian England and to see only the madness of a lunatic or the malignity of a fiend in the revolutionary spirit, one's thoughts wander to the counterblast to Burke's *Reflections*, i.e. Tom Paine's *Rights of Man*, and to such a human document as Cobbett's *Rural Rides*; the latter work more effective than

Paine's because less abstract and doctrinaire—a thing of English fields and English villages, of the period of the Enclosures.

What a contrast in methods of mental approach to a complicated social situation could be greater than that between those of Burke and of Paine. The political mysticism of the former, a sort of Catholic Whig attitude, reverent yet acute, authoritative but unslavish, invests the British Constitution with an almost sacramental character. It is a palladium at once of liberty and order; hence it is dear to Burke's synthetic intelligence. Yet he does not ignore the necessity of change, whenever change can grow out of a past situation and clothe itself in the garments of honoured tradition. How different the attitude of the latter, Paine, the rationalist of politics as Burke is its hierophant, cutting down through the skin and flesh of tradition to the bones of fact, stripping off formulæ, the disguises of unjust conditions, and leaving the latter exposed, naked, yet generally unashamed.

For Burke, George III, "honest farmer George," whose limitations he had had full experience of, was, in his capacity as King, the *persona publica* of mediæval political thought, the living symbol of ordered and continuous society.

By Tom Paine—to the horror of those English readers who looked on George III with the same affectionate respect as that with which Queen Victoria was regarded by her people, especially by the middle classes, at a later time—the males of the royal family, including King George himself, were described in print as "Mr. Guelph and his

profligate sons"! We read in Paine's book the following: "When in civilized countries we see age going to the workhouse and youth to the gallows, something must be wrong in the system of government," and candid history tells us that Paine was truly describing ugly facts in the England of his day, the land of Blake's "satanic mills," the country of which it was said, with some truth at a little earlier time, that the people "were starved, were riotous and were hung." Yet that identical country was also the land of the race in regard to which Burke truly, looking at that in it which makes its men and women loved and not at the temperament in them which bullies or which cringes, writes of "the ancient integrity, piety, good nature, and good humour of the people of England."

All the more was not Paine right in urging the need not of executions in the interest of order, or in reality of vested interests' fears, but of instruction for youth and support for age, "so as to exclude," as he says, "as much as possible, profligacy from the one and despair from the other"?

The task of the present is to reconcile the truths that underlie both these conceptions, Shelley's rationalist individualism, ending, when considered alone, in philosophic anarchism, and Burke's social solidarity, tending, when instinct, habit, and tradition are treated as the *sole* factors (as indeed Burke in his cooler moments did not treat them), to obscure the truth that the will of the individual as an efficient proximate cause has its place, though not the sole place, in the life of the organism that we know as mankind, that all things human grow and move and therefore change as well as cohere.

Personality and Society has each its claim. Each is given in Man's original experience. Each is aboriginal. We may truly envisage each individual as a being around whose lonely soul courses "the unplumbed, salt, estranging sea." But the often-quoted words in which Aristotle describes human nature as in its essence and not by act, convention, or arrangement, social—*Ἀνθρώπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῶον* (Man by nature a political animal)¹—are also true. Each aspect is verified by experience. At times we feel as if we were separate islets of consciousness, at others as branches in the one life-tree which is man. In many men, however, and in all primitive races, the racial feeling, the crowd mind, is either the stronger of the two factors, or almost the sole one. As that of a social being also man's nature bifurcates. Born into the family, he grows as member both of a nation and of humanity; he is originally and innately at one and the same time nationalist and internationalist, patriot and cosmopolitan, child of a tribe and citizen of the world.

A writer who was more than a writer, being pre-eminently not only a man of intellect but still more of spirit and affection, of action and of will, a pure-souled prophet who was at once patriot and humanitarian, with twofold passion of love given to Italy and to mankind, true both to kin and to kind, Joseph Mazzini, has thrown out lines of thought, the result of both inspiration and experience, which can guide us to that reconciliation between apparently conflicting forces and ideals which is so vitally essential if life is to progress in sanity, harmony, and peace.

¹ Aristotle, *Politics*, I. ii. 9.

Mazzini supplies the antidote to the metaphysical abstractions which Burke detested not by denying the reality of the wrongs denounced by the apostles of equality, but by shewing the reciprocal character of duties and rights, by putting duties in the first place and rights in the second, by regarding rights as opportunities for the fulfilment of duties, and by insisting that when duties are fulfilled on all sides, rights will inevitably be respected.

Again Mazzini, with all his idealism, lived not merely amid the clouds of philosophic abstractions, but in the real world, in Italy, in Europe. His feet were on the solid earth. He was one of those rare spirits of each of whom it might be truly said that his treading was upon the mountains, while his heart was with the crowd.

When Mazzini addressed Italian workmen as his brothers, he was not talking the language of a sort of partisan fraternity, but that of experience and fact, of heart, rather than of theory. He had lived, starved, worked among them, and knew and loved them, not as specimens of the *genus Homo* and "members of the proletariat," but as individual men with personality and character, comrades and friends, joint possessors of man's heroic heart, of man's unconquerable soul. Above all, the distinctive inspiration of Mazzini lay in his conviction that patriotism and humanitarianism, love of kin and love of kind, should never be considered separately, much less be thought of as in opposition. To Mazzini there was no value but rather positive evil in the self-regarding type of patriotism which manifests itself as an expression of the spirit of unrestrained and unethical competition, the *Étatisme*

which puts the national State on a pedestal, making it a heartless idol, and hears with suspicious fear the utterances of any thoughts of human brotherhood, if they are really sincere and generous and not merely platitudes and lip homage. M. Maurras, the brilliant leader of *L'Action française* (the attempt to harness Rome to the interests of an anti-republican crusade), the praiser of Catholicism because, in his opinion, it changed the originally democratic sentiment of the early Church, has described the distinctive Christian temper as "the poison of the Magnificat," a phrase that Nietzsche might have envied. All who put power above goodness should logically feel bound to agree with him.

Yet Mazzini was no mere Marxian cosmopolitan, regarding nationality as an invention of the bourgeoisie and making the international supremacy of the proletariat a substitute for the sense of kin. His feeling of love for Italy was to the full as genuine and passionate as that which rises to such a splendid note in the appeal to Lorenzo de Medici which ends the *Il Principe*, redeeming partially the otherwise sinister influence of Machiavelli's masterpiece. For Mazzini, the succession of the family, the nation, humanity, constitutes the progressive enlargement of the circumference within which man's heart is to grow in generous love towards his fellows and towards God. In this, patriotism is mediate rather than ultimate. Christianity is too practical a thing to ignore or suppress patriotic feelings, but also too universal a thing to allow such feelings to annex it to their exclusive service. Christianity can be no trumpet-blower for a tribal god, unless,

indeed, it ceases to be that thing at once divine and human, Christianity. Christ wept over Jerusalem, but He died on the cross for Mankind. Mazzini is a noble example of the possibility of combining the feelings of a true nationalist with those of a true humanitarian. Enthusiast as he was, he steered the middle course of sanity between extremes which have since become respectively the Fascist discipleship of Nietzsche and the Bolshevist discipleship of Marx.

The ultimate outcome of the political teaching of Machiavelli and afterwards of Hobbes, falling upon all too willing ears, has not been merely the removal from a position of dominance and control above and over the State of that theocratic power and influence of the Church which Machiavelli ignored and Hobbes hated, but beyond that the regarding as impracticable and illegitimate any attempt to apply definitely Christian standards to the life of the community; not only to its strictly political existence, but to its social, industrial, and economic life as well.

It is not merely those illegitimate attempts to reduce the State to the position of the executive officer or swordbearer of the Church which, whether they are Hildebrandine, or Calvinist, history so decisively condemns, but it is any effort to bring social questions and conditions under the influence of the Christian spirit and principles (and this is the true way to extend Christ's kingship), which appears to so many as an intrusion of Christianity and of its interpreters into a region where its presence is out of place, not to say unwelcome. It is as if the figure of a venerated ancestor in a gallery of family portraits were to become animated and, walking out

of its frame, begin to interfere in the affairs of the household of which it had been from time immemorial a passive and non-objecting spectator.

This practical withdrawal from any claim to bring spiritual authority (using the word "authority" in its widest sense) to bear upon affairs of public life, including commerce and industry, has been a very gradual thing on the part of organized Christianity. The Reformation did not imply any abandonment on the part of the Reformed Church or Churches of the claim to regulate life as a whole. If there is less or nothing of pope or prelate commanding from above, there is, in Calvinism at least, almost more of the preacher, wielding a prophet's office direct from God, insisting on the fulfilment of God's will by the State as well as by the individual. In dealing with the relations of German and Anglo-Saxon Protestantism respectively to modern democratic and kindred social movements, it is necessary to revert to the original influences, distinct and even making for opposition as they were, of the personalities and teaching of Luther and Calvin in regard to questions of secular society and government.

In civil and political tendencies Calvinism and Lutheranism fell asunder. For Geneva as for Rome, Christianity was the "New Law," a law to be obeyed by nations as well as individuals, and a law embracing all sections of life, social as well as personal, and having visible sanctions in the discipline of the Christian society. The tendency of the post-Reformation Christianity, however, and that both of the Roman and of the Protestant communions,

has been towards confining the interests of Christ's kingdom to the purely individual aspects of religion, and in regard to human society to the relation of the sexes to one another.

Industry, property, the gaining and the use of wealth, all such questions tended, except as regards direct personal honesty, to be left untouched as being too complicated in their details or too dangerous in their character to be handled by the Church of Christ with any safety or efficiency. The Lutheran temper has promoted this attitude of putting all that is involved in commercial and industrial relations into a category of things indifferent for the Christian soul. This is, however, entirely contrary to Luther's own views upon economics, views which were very much the same as those involved in that canon law which he abhorred.

The classic text of Lutheranism, the expression of its *ratio seminalis*, or inner root and core, in regard to the feelings and ideas most cultivated by it, is that one so congenial to the best elements of its founder's spiritual genius, "the kingdom of God is within you." It is the favourite and symbolic text of the great Liberal Protestant, Professor Harnack. In spite of Luther's storm-tossed nature, his violence of temper, his want of mental calm, harmony, and proportion—indeed, rather because of these—his fundamental ideal was inward peace. For the German religious temper and for German religious thought both Liberal and Evangelical, this blessing, bringing with it the subjective and the inward Kingdom, is more truly an *articulus stantis vel cadentis ecclesiæ* than Luther's doctrine, so capable of perversion into what is immoral or at least un-

moral, so forensic and transactional, the Imputation theory of the Atonement.

The historical development of the calmer side of Luther was from the later Middle Ages, the Christian mysticism of which was as a deep pool of peace and health in surroundings often of spiritual aridity, or amid the torrential approach to the great religious revolution.

The tendency of Lutheranism at its best is to inwardness, to cheerful piety, to indifference, like and yet entirely unlike to that of Stoicism, to the storms of a changing world.

Luther, unlike Calvin, had no master-ideal of a reconstruction on earth of redeemed society, nor of the visible Church as the "sacrament of the kingdom." In Calvin's essential institutionalism in religion and in his conception of Christianity as the New Law, rather than as the change of law into feeling, he is nearer to the spirit of Rome than he is to that of his great fellow Reformer.

Luther's likeness to S. Augustine does not extend to the side of the great African Churchman's influence which made the latter, in some sense, the precursor of the ecclesiastical citizenship of mediæval Christendom. Augustine as predestinarian, as the apostle of Grace, appealed to him, not Augustine as prophet of the Christian State. He had nothing of the historic sense. Compared to Erasmus he was a "philistine." Matthew Arnold describes Luther and Cromwell as the two great "philistines of genius." Cromwell's attitude to Falkland would probably have been similar to that of Luther towards Erasmus.

Luther's deep inwardness of feeling, his fierce-

ness of vision, made it impossible for him to believe that the delicate poise of the mind of Erasmus, its richness and complexity, its scornful wit and its versatile sympathy, the union in him of art and of religion, were the make-up of a personality as truth-loving and sincere as his own.

The outcome of Luther's spiritual experience was not, on the one hand, the flaming apocalyptic visions of the Anabaptists, bodying forth a new earth as well as a new heaven, nor, on the other, the humanist sense of joy in living and of the value of mankind, but rather faith as the supreme rediscovered faculty, itself a divine gift, knitting God and the believer into a never-to-be-severed coherence, the *Unio Mystica* of the seeker and saviour with the sought and the found. He was at once patriarchal and pietist in his influence, the former in the social sphere, the latter in that of the soul.

In Troeltsch's masterly study of the influence of Protestantism on the rise of the modern world (*Die Bedeutung des Protestantismus für die Entstehung der modernen Welt*), the author distinguishes in Luther's teaching and influence the elements of the Way and the Goal. The way, personal conviction; the goal, supernatural salvation, (*Der Weg der persönlichen Überzeugung: das Ziel der übernatürlichen Rettung*). "The first," says the Liberal, "is what matters." "The Way" is, in Troeltsch's judgment, the permanent value of Luther's contribution to human life and progress. He made men realise the vital necessity of conscious personal touch of reality, the privilege and dignity of the existence of each as that of a spiritual being with unique potentialities. "The Goal," on the

other hand, has become, thinks the German critic, more dim, less clearly discerned, than in Luther's age, the *sæculum theologicum*, the confidence of which in its own conclusions it is so hard for us to recapture, even almost to understand.

It is depth of Feeling which Troeltsch regards as the distinctive feature of what is most enduring in Luther's influence. In him "deep answered unto deep," the soul discovered itself at the touch of One greater than itself. Calvinism, on the contrary, he regards as the Religion of Will, and as such having a kinship with commerce, industry, and middle-class ideals generally, which is not apparent in regard to the other Reformation system.

It was Calvinism, not Lutheranism, which smote the worn-out theocracy of Europe with the ringing challenge of the predestination weapon, the instrument of the foundation of a new Covenant kingdom. Calvin's conception of "the New Law" at once broke up the older Christendom and made Protestantism an international and organic force—a band of fighting brothers rather than a knot of students. As to questions of trade, the surroundings of Calvin's life-work, as the inspirer of the international and militant phases of the Reformation, were those of the merchant Free City of Geneva. The immense vitality of the latter was turned under the Reformed discipline into the channels of strenuous labour and disinterested citizenship.

It was a conception of society in which Stoicism and Judaism seemed blended together by no gentle hand, with the regulative side of Plato's public spirit tempering the austere mind of the Old Testament.

The citizenship of Geneva, sober and burgher-like as it was, was the breeding-ground of brave soldiers as well as honest traders, of magistrates who were fearless instruments of justice, and preachers who were fearless proclaimers of the Word. There were fighters there when occasion needed, for the Puritan was a good fighter though no militarist.

Calvin's attitude to questions of trade and commerce was, in the main, a continuation of the regulative spirit of the mediæval canonists, though tempered by close personal knowledge of and contact with the merchant class of the new era. In one remarkable respect he departed from the mediæval system, and that in one of its main features, though a feature which equivocating qualifications had already in the Middle Ages been busy with on the canonist side, especially in and since the time of the Avignon Papacy. Calvin allowed interest on capital to a moderate degree, in this departing from the prohibition of interest as usury which had at first absolutely and then theoretically prevailed by the authority and legislation of the mediæval Church. In other respects Calvin insisted on questions of property, trade, commerce, in fact all matters relating to money and ownership, being fit and proper subjects for the legislation of the commonwealth, and for the discipline of the Church over her members. Here he was at one with all the other Reformers of his own school; his disciples, John Knox the Scotchman and the English Cartwright, strongly contended for what would now be called "interference" in industrial conditions. To leave such matters alone

would have seemed to them disloyalty to God to whom the commonwealth belonged.

In regard to the whole region of economic ethics, as Prof. Tawney has proved, there was no substantial breach in teaching between the mediæval Church and those who supplanted it.

As against the claim of property to irresponsibility before the law, S. Thomas and Calvin are at one.

The ideal was, in its own stark way, a noble one, though its even partial realization was only maintained at Geneva by an iron discipline. Sexual immorality was punished as crime by civil penalties. A child was beheaded for striking its parent. Hundreds of sorcerers and witches were burnt. Continually the Rhone received the drowned bodies of rebels against the theocracy.

The spirit of the Pentateuch alike in its fierceness and in its simplicity awoke again.

Yet Calvin's sanity and legality, his Latin spirit, his cold, intellectual humanism, at least as far as appreciation of scholarship and capacity for it were concerned, all this prevented Geneva, in spite of the cruelties which alienate our sympathy, from becoming merely a focus of religious frenzy, like the notorious centres of the more violent and apocalyptic type of Anabaptism.

Even when most enflamed by zeal, there was always in the background of Calvinism a fundamental element of respectability, of the mind of the merchant and of the magistrate. Hence the contrast of even the sternest Calvinism with the Anabaptist world of dreams. The burgher and the fanatic are, as a rule, not long found together. The spiritual and social atmosphere, however, was one of a

tension too severe to last when the inward temper became relaxed after Calvin and Beza had passed away. The intolerance which knew nothing of the relativity of truth and the watchful suspicion of human nature which had no trust in natural goodness were bound to be dissolved by the rationalist and sentimentalist temper of the later Geneva, the city of the French optimist, Rousseau, as it had been of the other Frenchman who was pessimist for all save the elect, Calvin. Yet Geneva did not quickly change. Its magistrates gave the *Contrat Social* to the flames. Calvin would have sent its author to the same destination.

The inability to compromise which characterized the great French Reformer, his inelastic idealism combined with an unbending will as its appropriate instrument, constituted one side of a nature in which commanding qualities had defects in a similar proportion. The most admirable feature of his character was his splendid disinterestedness. Material gain was to him no temptation. His knowledge of the world, which was very considerable, as his immense correspondence with all kinds of people (like that of S. Jerome in the fifth century) testifies; his genius for organizing, and therefore for using and managing men; all this prevented Calvinism, and Puritanism as its outcome in our own country, from becoming merely other-worldly. Its asceticism was what German historians of religion call an *innerweltliche Askese*, a discipline of life, not a flight from it. Hence in Holland, England, the Lowlands of Scotland, its spirit became knit into a close connexion with the commercial and middle-class elements of the population.

Puritanism and trade supported and interpenetrated one another. Such cities as London were centres at once of mercantile greatness and of Puritan religion. Puritanism had its aristocratic and academic side, however, as well as its commercial one. In such families as that into which Milton was born, or that of Colonel Hutchinson, as described by his wife Lucy, we see religion blended with a serious type of culture, the legacy of the Teutonic phase of the Renaissance, a type of noble simplicity, a Christian Stoicism. "Plain living and high thinking" go together. The daily business of life is recognized as the sphere of vocation. Money is to be gained and to be used, but "as ever in the great Taskmaster's eye," and for His purposes. Yet money is not, for the Puritan, a thing evil in itself, as the semi-Manichean sects of the later Middle Ages appeared to regard it. The orthodox Puritan view on this and kindred subjects is nearer to the Thomist, Aristotelian, Old Testament set of ideas than it is to those of the extremer Neo-Platonists, the semi-oriental Hellenists, or in the later Middle Ages the Fraticelli or *Spiritual Franciscans* with their horror of the very touch of gold, literally or in spirit.

In other words, Puritanism recognized not only money, but all private property as constituting a relation and a means necessary and advantageous for the exercise of moral responsibility on the part of each man, regarded as a steward accountable to his Master.

As to the bourgeois characteristics of Puritanism—using that adjective in a neutral rather than condemnatory sense, with no scornful connotation—

there are certain lines of development which constitute and account for the inward harmony between capitalism and Calvinism, including in the latter the religious denominations and groups that are descended directly or in spirit from the Genevan Reformation. Among the causes of this connexion, the principal ones are, on the one hand, that specially noted by Troeltsch, the immense incentive to industry "in one's vocation" given by Calvin's teaching, and especially by that view of commercial prosperity as being a divinely arranged reward and consequence of godly labour, which the Reformer of Geneva derived from the Old Testament, and on the other, the encouragement of thrift and the discouragement of all expenditure on worldly pleasures. In the words of Troeltsch, the *Arbeitsgebot* and the *Luxusverbot*, the divine command to work and the divine ban upon expenditure on luxuries or amusements, beyond that of the most staid and simple description, had, taken together, the inevitable result of promoting an accumulation of wealth, even in cases where liberality in regard to works of benevolence was the rule. To realize the Deuteronomic promise by being "blest in basket and in store" was the reasonable hope of every God-fearing Puritan, especially after the heroic age of Puritanism was past.

It is not without good reason that the revived interest in S. Francis and in the Franciscan spirit coincides in point of time with the passing of political supremacy from the class with whom Puritanism has been most influential. The Moses of Geneva, bearing in his hands the fiery law, recedes before the "Little Poor Man of Assisi," with the

marks of the wounds. The Franciscan spirit makes the nakedness and poverty, the self-emptying of the "strange Man on the cross," something which can give simplicity, dignity, and beauty to a democratic civilization and save it from the materialism, mediocrity, vulgarity of mind and temper, and spirit of social envy which are the inevitable and characteristic dangers of such a condition of society. The ideal temper of S. Francis is at once light and serious, gay and recollected, that union of the spirit of fellowship with mankind with that of mastery of the world which is the very essence of joy. This is of course true of what is essential in S. Francis, and in his message and movement, not of any attempt to galvanize into life the purely temporary and solely mediæval elements of the Franciscan spirit, touched as it was, in spite of all its greatness and purity, with something of the dualism of the time. Puritanism at its best is Pauline, though never entirely so. The Franciscan spirit finds its congenial environment rather in Galilee and in the Synoptic Gospels. The cross is central in both, in the gospel of Francis and of Bunyan, for devotion to Christ Crucified was the core and spring of Franciscan religion; but in the case of the more Catholic and sacramental type it blossoms into the fragrance and colour of a faith in which nature and grace are blended into one.

In regard to that conception of religion which views it and values it, not only in its personal relations, but as a commonwealth sustainer, an unseen architect of noble social living, S. Thomas and Milton are on one side, S. Francis and Bunyan on the other, that in which the loving intercourse

between the soul and Jesus is all in all. It would not have been natural to S. Francis to write a *De Regimime Principum*, nor was Bunyan capable of producing a *Treatise on the Tenure of Kings and Magistrates*.

The religious genius of Bunyan indeed was nearer to that of Wesley afterwards than to that of his contemporary and fellow Puritan Baxter. His Christianity is evangelistic and mystical rather than ethical, subjective than theocratic. Lover of Jesus as he is, Bunyan's religious romance takes the form of an heroic adventure, in this being essentially true to the original genius of Christianity, but while the mission of S. Francis has the same character, the same *Wanderlust* or pilgrim spirit slaying giants and sounding trumpets, the religion of the *Little Flowers* or of the *Song of the Creatures* has a divine playfulness, a joy as of a child let loose in God's world of wonder and surprise, which is unlike the typical piety either of Calvinist Puritan or of dualist ascetic. S. Francis is indeed himself ascetic. His rule is the very opposite of hedonism in the pagan sense, though he sublimates the instinct for pleasure, rather than denounces it. He is no mere pantheistic nature worshipper, yet he sees Supernature in Nature, and not as antagonistic to it.

This note is scarcely heard again till we come to Treherne and the English Platonists.

Even S. Francis, though at once child and interpreter of a more European type of religion than that of Bunyan, does not fully exhibit in his presentation of Christianity that sort of corporate mysticism which makes S. Paul in the Epistle to

the Ephesians infer the solidarity of humanity as underlying the character of the Church as a God indwelt temple. It is this truth of the articulated unity of mankind which, in spite of striking anticipations of its emergence, has almost lain hidden or largely unnoticed until its practical rediscovery by the instincts and ideals, the hopes and the needs, of the best elements in the reason, conscience, and imagination of the present time.

CHAPTER IX

THE ROMANTIC AND THE CHRISTIAN SOCIALIST MOVEMENTS

THAT the Calvinist spirit and tone of mind can survive its parent dogmatic system is proved by the personality and writings of Thomas Carlyle, who once described Calvinism itself as "godlike." A parallel case is seen in the Catholicism without Theism of the Positivist Church, the child of the agnostic brain and of the French Catholic heart of Auguste Comte. Traditions and inherited strains which have, as it were, entered into the blood, survive in individuals, and even in nations, the decay of the corresponding creeds, both as to the belief in and the organized life of the latter. To-day, all types of institutional Christianity which count for anything in the life of this country, share, more or less, in the Franciscan trend, rather than in any one marked by less of simplicity and humanness. There is, in the more modern-minded Christians of to-day, and not least in many of those of the distinctively Catholic type, a feeling of fraternity which overflows beyond human limits and in its recognition of affinity with the animal creation and even with inanimate nature has something in it of a strain that would be pantheist were not those who exhibit it Christian to the core.

Translated into the political sphere, this characteristic becomes a sort of mystical democracy, of

a type which, while recognizing or even pressing the claims of labour to a juster social development, can never be merely the tool or engine of any political party, Labour or otherwise.

The development of sympathy with the masses, as far as the Church of England is concerned, has not been reached, as a rule, via political Liberalism, though to this there have been some prominent exceptions. Strange as this may seem, it has an indirect derivation from the group of ideas and sentiments associated with the Romantic Movement, a group including the idealism of the Tractarians, in the general outlook of the latter, though wider and more European in its range of interests and connexions. Though destined to contribute powerfully to the forces breaking through the insularity of Anglicanism, the Oxford Movement was itself insular in its origin. The Kantianism of its ethical and religious philosophy, the Romanticism in which it found affinity and expression, were alike implicit and underived consciously from foreign sources, whether intellectual or æsthetic. The way of looking at public life congenial to the author of the *Waverley Novels*, regarded by George Borrow as the real author of the mischief, the romanticist and older Tory type of mind, very different from that of modern Conservatism, was a legacy from the Nonjurors to the remnant of High Churchmen from whom the Oxford Movement started. Liberalism was to them anathema. But Newman's brilliant friend and colleague, Richard Hurrell Froude, who idealized the Mediæval Church, and before his early death was the pioneer of those who were to take the whole enterprize off sober Church of England

lines, pointed the way in social sympathies, Tory as he was, towards the cause of the disinherited, and in an opposite direction to that of the teaching of Ricardo, Malthus, and the *laissez-faire* school of economists generally. It is natural that those who admire the nobler features of the Middle Ages are attracted by ideas opposite to those of saving one's own soul, and being unrestricted in methods leading to commercial success. R. H. Froude was nearer to Cobbett, who hated the Reformation, than to his own *bête noire*, the Whigs.

His more famous brother, James Anthony Froude, was opposite to them, in a different direction, as an Elizabethan. The latter's fierce, unorthodox Protestantism was a reaction from his elder brother's influence. J. A. Froude's sixteenth-century temper infected Kingsley, not always happily.

The Toryism and Churchmanship of the "Young England" school, allied as it was in spirit to the continental Romantic Movement, had indeed strong prejudices. Its prejudices were feudal, chivalric, and ecclesiastical. But it had nothing in common with the commercialist temper, the interests of which modern Conservatism has adopted or with which it has become blended.

After the close of the first phase of the Oxford Movement, i.e. the more intellectual one, the sympathies of several of the younger Anglo-Catholics, living with and for the poor of the great cities as they had begun to do, were drawn to the teaching of the group whose principles were described by themselves and by others by a phrase more expressive of a general tendency in thought and action than one capable of exact definition, i.e. "Christian

Socialism." Some of this school were more idealist than practical, others the reverse. Men of thought, men of sentiment, men of action, were included among them, as also many intelligent women of various types. All agreed in regarding co-operation rather than competition as the true law of life, and as the foundation principle of Christ's social teaching. They agreed also in the repudiation as anti-Christian of the orthodox "non-interference" economics. For all, men were greater than things. This movement actualized fifteen years later than the Oxford one. Its leaders were Frederic Denison Maurice, Vansittart Neale, Ludlow, and Charles Kingsley. The last named was the popularizer of the enterprise. He had both the gifts and defects of one who could, without difficulty, catch the popular ear. As novelist, journalist, and preacher, Kingsley, under the pseudonym of "Parson Lot," poured forth scornful criticism on the Manchester School of Economics and its general view of life, and expressed enthusiastic support of Maurice the man of vision, and of the sons of the prophets who extended his message. For Maurice and Kingsley, the priests among the little band of friends, the movement was a prophetic rather than a political one, or at least only political in an ideal sense, above and beyond that associated with party. As a matter of fact, the leaders were divided politically. Maurice, like Aristotle, S. Thomas, and Calvin, distrusted absolute and unlimited democracy, preferring a mixed constitution, as that of England, especially since 1688. In many respects his political philosophy was like that of Edmund Burke, but with the added development of principles in a

general sense socialist of which the latter statesman never dreamt and would have opposed had they come to the surface to any powerful degree in his time. As has been noted, Burke's ruling conviction of the organic nature of society was without application to economics. Charles Kingsley also, though a practical Radical, was not a theoretical one. In his later years the rigour of his criticism of the existing social and economic order underwent a thawing process under the influence of his genuine devotion to the historic institutions and traditions of his country, and especially to the throne and to Victoria as its occupant. He was never a political Liberal, but rather, like Carlyle and Ruskin, anti-commercialist with an infusion of the nobler kind of aristocratic spirit in the more chivalric sense of the word. J. M. Ludlow was a convinced Radical in the political sense. He was as certain of the rightness of the democratic principles, as he was of the wrongness of Roman Catholicism, and of Tractarianism as sharing in the latter's attitude to life.

Yet the bond of union among the leaders was not purely emotional and vague. Like most great idealists, they were men of will as well as of ideas. They meant to set something going, not merely to blow bubbles of sentiment into the air of thought. They desired to startle and disquiet those who were stagnantly content with things as they are. The little company was a sort of pentecostal nucleus of enthusiastic Christians, convinced Churchmen, and challengers of a system that they believed to be, in its principles and consequences, a practical denial of the kingship of Christ and of the law of God. The orthodox economists and the world of British

common-sense were at first only amused by what they considered to be the sentimentalist fallacies of some well-meaning individuals, men of books rather than of business experience. The fact that two at least of these were clergymen confirmed this estimate. The modern clergy are as generally identified with unpractical emotionalism as those of former times were with fanatical hardness. The critics forgot, however, that the great Mr. Malthus had been a parson.

The real precursor of the attitude of the Christian Socialists of 1848 was the poet Southey, at once Tory, Churchman, and enemy of economic Individualism. Coleridge also had sowed seed, the growth of which they developed.

The ingeminator of the entire design, although we might say in the words of Newman relative to the Oxford Movement, that "an unseen Incendiary was at work," was the brilliant young thinker and scholar already mentioned, J. M. Ludlow, educated at Paris and steeped in French thought and literature. He was spared, as an old man, aged eighty-eight, to attend the Pan-Anglican Congress of 1908, and to speak, by invitation, on the subject of his life's devotion, the social ethics of Christianity. He died in 1911, having sung his *Nunc dimittis*, after seeing the inception of what afterwards became the Copec Conference. Prof. F. D. Maurice was, from the time that it gained his adhesion, the invaluable centre of the group. He held the important position of Chaplain at Lincoln's Inn, where his sermons made profound impression on thoughtful minds, similar and yet dissimilar to the effect produced by Newman's *Parochial and Plain*

Sermons at S. Mary's, Oxford. Maurice, as we need scarcely add, was a man of truly prophetic cast of mind and spirit, many-sided intelligence, and singular nobility of character.

His influence may be said, without exaggeration, to have been one of the most formative in the Church of England in modern times. Like Wesley and like Newman, he was a religious genius as well as a religious leader. His whole-souled adhesion to the little utopian adventure gave to it a weight and prestige similar to that which the accession of Dr. Pusey, ὁ μέγας, had conferred on the Oxford Movement when the latter also was small and despised.

While the two groups in question, i.e. the Tractarians and the Mauricians, had in common a sense of the corporate and organic side of life and religion, their disciples and descendants respectively moved for some time in absolutely different atmospheres, and only touched to start away from each other in common repulsion. Dr. Pusey himself wrote that Mr. Maurice and he "worshipped a different God," and the doctor also regarded Kingsley's *Hypatia* as an immoral book. Maurice, with a more gentle spirit, wished that the Tractarians would be really "Catholic," instead of, as he held them to be, partly Papist and partly Protestant. He feared that they would never supply that *tertium quid*, the "glorious" reconciliation, as he termed it, of the good element in the two great types of Christianity, which he felt would come, when it did come, not along the road of doctrinal polemics, but by that of a sociology at once true to the Catholic ideal of the unity of the race under Christ's Headship and to

the Protestant one of the inherent sacredness and distinctness of character of national and individual life.

The consciousness of Frederic Denison Maurice that God was using him was as keen and as really humble in him as was the similar feeling which Newman records about himself in the *Apologia*. "I was sent into the world," writes Maurice, "that I might persuade men to recognize Christ as the centre of their fellowship with each other, that so they might be united in their families, their countries and as men, not in schools and factions." The root of the Maurician philosophy of society lay in the conviction that a man's relationship to God and to his fellow-men is not the result of his opinions about or feelings towards either Him or them, but that it arises from the very nature of things. Real social relations can be *perceived* by reasonings and feelings, not *created* by them. Hence society is organic, not voluntarist.

Many among the younger Anglo-Catholics, some as students, some like Stanton and Dolling, naturally Radicals in spirit, though more evangelical than political, Gospel democrats, if we might call them so, carried their *esprit de corps* enthusiasm beyond the limits of the Catholic revival as its object and found wider range for it in the social movement of their time. Their sacramentalism led them to socialism, though not necessarily to that involved in the Marxian rigour. Both as being Catholic and as being socialist in this larger sense they were anti-Puritan. The chasm between the old-fashioned Puseyite and the later Christian Socialist school was bridged over by the work

and influence of these younger men. Several of the more advanced section formed a society known as the Guild of S. Matthew. The founder and first warden of this daring little body, the stormy petrel of the movement, was the well-known Rev. Stewart Headlam, who afterwards filled admirably the post of chairman of the London School Board. The aims of the Guild, had they been known to the Protestant well-to-do classes, would have made the hair of the latter stand on end or their flesh creep, for the objects of its campaign were announced as "the restoration of the Mass to its true position," and the spread of the slogan that as "the land is the Lord's it cannot be the landlord's." In the phrase due at a later time to Mr. Birrell, though no doubt in a different sense to his, they felt that "it is the Mass that matters." The system of these knights-errant was one which involved violent shocks, the opposite of peaceful penetration. Yet they were not merely mischievous schoolboys. The bread and wine of the Eucharist meant for these younger Catholics the office of Christianity as consecrating the whole of life and not merely as rescuing the individual.

The modern eucharistic revival in the Anglican Church and, in some tentative forms, outside it, has of course many causes and many contributory influences. What we are concerned with here, however, is not the questions involved in it as a whole, but the relation of this restoration to the social message of the Church, and to the social issues of the gospel. Many have helped to restore the Lord's Service who have little instinct for that side of Christian duty which we are considering.

For those for whom Christianity involves a new social order, embodying service and sacrifice, the Holy Communion as the supreme act and instance of sacrifice, service, and fellowship, regarded as present realities, the sacrificial meal of the New Covenant, becomes an embodied prophecy of a common life, a foretaste of the wine which we shall all drink together in the inn at our journey's end.

In regard to what have been called the social implications of the Eucharist, it seemed to the ordinary Liberal Protestant as if the ideas connoted by the word "Mass" were essentially and always of a retrograde type, the half-dispelled and lurking shadows of a past era of priestly magic. Yet the fact remains that, over and above the liturgical, theological, and even artistic reasons which have led in so many quarters to a strong reaction against the violent and wholesale condemnation of the Mass at the sixteenth-century Reformation, there are also indications of the feeling of a certain fitness and coherence between the placing the social element of religion in the forefront, on the one hand, and the need, on the other, for a central and dramatic act of worship, the meeting-point of the entire Church, in which both sacrifice and fellowship should be represented and made effectual by the supreme Sacrifice of Christ, regarded as a present reality in the midst of the worshipping congregation. If the Reformation had contented itself with restoring the congregational character of the Mass involved in its being rendered as a *rationabile obsequium*, public worship would never have become, as it has so largely done in Protestant countries, the preliminary before a

sermon, and have lost its essentially corporate and social nature as the heart of Christianity.

The interest raised in Protestant circles in Germany by the increasing influence of Prof. Heiler, a brilliant convert from Rome to Lutheranism, and yet a severe critic of his new religious environment and of Protestantism in general, is largely connected with the views in regard to worship of this theologian, who has, as Newman had, the gift of style as well as of thought. Heiler's difference with Rome is rather with Vaticanism than with Catholicism. He encourages a strong appreciation of the presentation of the Church as the organism which represents the ideal of society, the polity not made with hands, and so, because of the inherently social character of the sacraments and of the Eucharist especially, advocates in the Lutheran Communion the restoration of the eucharistic sacrifice, in its primitive, liturgical form—the share of the congregation in the Mass again outwardly expressed—as the Gospel embodied in visible, “efficacious symbols.” These ideas find expression in Heiler's masterly work on Prayer (*Das Gebet*), in his “Spirit of Worship” (for English readers), and in his exhaustive treatment of Catholicism (*Das Katholizismus*). Of his two chief convictions one is that Vaticanism and Catholicism are not one and the same, but the union of bureaucracy with organic life, to the injury of the latter. The second is characteristic of his aspiration for a condition of Christianity at once Catholic and Evangelical.

It is that Luther's message—significant and vital as it was, and even still is, in relation to the poison of religious legalism—is neither relevant nor ade-

quate in regard to that regeneration and restoration of the visible Church, in a grander Catholicism than that of the past, and of mankind through its fellowship, which the age so pathetically, even if unconsciously, needs. Schweitzer, also, in his charming little book describing his own boyhood and early years, *Aus meiner Kindheit und Jugendzeit*, a message from the heart of one always young, writes of his youthful attraction towards Catholic worship, and of his ever-growing longing for the reconciliation of Catholic and Protestant Christianity.

From an author who does not write from the standpoint of dogmatic orthodoxy, whatever his own beliefs, comes a similar view, and that from the United States of America. The eminent psychologist, Prof. Pratt, in his book *The Religious Consciousness* writes: "The Mass was the almost irreplaceable stimulus to the religious sentiment that was left behind when our Protestant fathers went out from the old Church." But what is needed is not only the sacrament but that which the sacrament means.

Prof. Webb, in his recent *Religious Thought in the Oxford Movement*, considers that until the publication of *Lux Mundi* the adherents of that revival failed to present that social aspect of the sacraments which he holds to be of the very essence of their meaning and to be involved in the root idea of sacramental religion. An increasing school of modern thinkers regards the question of worship as organically coherent not only with the life of the soul but with the life of human society as that of a corporate personality, as political in the Greek sense because expressing and consecrating

the organized and social elements of life, and not only with religion in the more direct sense but with art as her twin sister though often separated from her by deeply rooted misunderstandings. In this aspect sacraments mediate between senses and spirit.

Pater, in *Marius*, compares the growth of the eucharistic liturgy to that of a Gothic cathedral. The mediæval cathedrals, with all their intricate beauty, had as a primary object the providing a shelter for the celebration of the sacrament. The altar, behind the rood screen, was almost the *raison d'être* of the whole building. The cathedral was a "sacrament house." By a compensation of love, like that involved in the pouring of the spikenard, "the house exceeding magnificent" encased the mystery of the altar, as the cattle-shed of Bethlehem had done that of the Nativity. The strains of the eucharistic liturgy prolonged the first *Gloria in Excelsis*. The Puritans rightly sensed this, and so called the cathedrals of Christendom "mass-houses," regretting their non-demolition. These glorious buildings, at least in regard to their popular uses, and they were many, were undoubtedly the expressions of a communal religion, a *Volksreligion*. Everyone had a share, real though graduated, in the fellowship of a tradition, theoretically as wide as humanity itself, and practically and actually European.

The truth that the spiritual and the social, the religion of the soul and the religion of humanity, are organically interdependent, so that man is nearest to God when he is closest to his fellows in fraternal co-inherence in God—this truth, the foundation of all true social and political philo-

sophy, is what underlies the Eucharist and is expressed by it; though as a matter of history, it must be admitted that the circumstances of its celebration have often sunk far below the ideal, both in relation to worship and to life.

The strongly social trend in the life and teaching of the school of Anglican Catholic humanists, small but pregnant with consequences, was vitally and inherently connected, like the artistic and dramatic instincts of its members, their love for colour, motion, symbolism in public worship, above all their devotion to the sacrament, with their conviction of the centrality of the truth of the Incarnation as the *Cor cordium*, the very heart of Christianity. This centrality they had learnt alike from the Tractarians, in a more intellectual, though also vital and spiritual presentation of it and from the Maurice and Kingsley School (the orthodox modern, if we may call it so), in regard to the rich implications and consequences of the Incarnation, touching and throbbing through all life.

Whatever may be thought of the wisdom of the policy of these advanced guards, it must be admitted that the conditions of things which gave them their opportunity also largely afforded them their justification. They were in revolt alike against respectable Establishmentarianism, the least spiritual resultant of the eighteenth-century latitude in the Church of England, and also against the exaggerated individualist Augustinianism of the Evangelical School.

Although the Evangelical Movement in the Church of England was still beneficently alive, the beginning of the nineteenth century, prior to the

emergence of Tractarianism, was perhaps the dullest bit of Anglican Church history since the Reformation. It was more so even than the eighteenth century, for the latter, after all, in spite of the worldliness of the Hanoverian time, was the age of Bishops Berkeley and Butler, and of such laymen as Dr. Johnson and Edmund Burke, both of them devoted to the Church of England at a time when there was little in her to foreshew her future development. But the Establishment was at its worst as the nineteenth century began. It was stirred within itself by no murmur of criticism against social conditions involving the grossest injustice, while the working masses, the product of the industrial system, who were just beginning to think, were being told, and that with success, that unbelief was the true road to the emancipation of their class. It is to their immense credit that several of the young priests, of the London diocese especially, boldly faced the secularist lecturers in the workmen's clubs and in the parks, repudiating the connexion of the Faith with the viewpoint of Mr. Galsworthy's Forsyte family.

The line taken by the virile little band of Don Quixotes who followed the Charles Kingsley of the *Alton Locke* period was one which continued and developed his challenge on the one hand to the blind alliance of the Church with the existing commercial order, including the latter's most indefensible features, and on the other to the claim of militant unbelief that rejection of Christianity was the road to social redemption, that religion was used by capitalism as a drug inducing torpor when revolutionary stimulants were in the air, and that it had no

other use. Each of these mistakes was proving fatal in its consequences, and unconsciously those guilty of the former played into the hands of those responsible for the latter. The Church was misrepresented with impunity and was largely itself to blame for this. The Secularists quite incorrectly quoted with triumph the Prayer-Book Catechism as teaching people "to do their duty in that state of life into which it *has* pleased God to call them" (misquoting "has" for "shall," the correct rendering). Maurice, Kingsley and their disciples insisted that the correct word "shall" involves a totally different sociology to that of tame and static acquiescence in conditions often of physical vileness, moral danger, and social injustice. Many a young man—artisan, clerk, university student—who came under the influence of the school alluded to, the more liberal Anglo-Catholic, no longer conceived of the Christian life as consisting mainly of some dull taboos: Thou shalt not smoke, nor drink, nor go to the theatre, nor play games on Sunday. He came to suspect that Puritanism was a smaller and narrower thing than the Christianity of the Church, and that the word "Catholic," rightly understood, meant something unprovincial and humane—something into which had entered the vast experience of the world.

The strength of the appeal made by the Evangelical Revival had lain in the centrality of Christ Crucified and in the conviction of the value of the individual soul as the object of His Atonement. The school, which was at once Catholic and socially progressive, tended in its presentation of Christianity to absorb the Atonement into the Incarna-

tion, while the human race as a whole became the subject of redemption. Hence followed the recognition of the place of the senses in the entire scheme of life, and of their sacramental character. Hence the refusal to leave politics (in a large sense), literature, art, the drama especially outside the sphere of religion. The foundation of the Church and Stage Guild, now the Actors' Church Union, was a consequence and expression of this.

Meanwhile, in the higher world of educated thought, such kindred spirits to Maurice as Dean Church (the friend of Newman, and yet the least distinctively Tractarian of all those connected with the great Tractarians in sympathy and personal relationship) and Bishop Westcott—students of Plato or of Dante, and "mighty in the Scriptures"—had in the spirit of a true synthesis claimed both the secular and the spiritual elements of life, as sharing, each in its own place and degree, in the Kingdom of Christ.

They held that civilization can be and ought to be effectually Christianized, and that it is not so at present, or only very partially so. They also regarded the Catholic Faith as intended to purify and exalt human life in all its essential elements; the social included, and as indeed chief. Westcott loved the phrase, "the Empire of Christ."

Westcott had arrived on lines of his own by a kind of pre-established harmony at conclusions similar to those held by Maurice before him. But he was no copier of Maurice's teaching. In a non-Christian quarter, the *Positive Catechism* of Comte, Westcott found much that was congenial to his own conception of human life as inherently and

corporately a unity, rather than voluntarist or individualist. Profoundly Christian as Westcott was, the founder of Positivism was for him, in a sort of Balaam-like way, among the prophets, as if helping Christianity, without intending it, by reviving that kind of mental atmosphere in regard to the structure of human society which is akin to the Catholic and Christian conception of the character of the Church. Comte's view of Humanity as organic outweighed his agnosticism, in Westcott's mind.

At the present time the vital value of liberty which was fed by the unflinching spirit of the Puritans and afterwards by the idealism of Rousseau, and of the early humanitarians who hailed the dawn of that day of revolution which was to close in blood, is no longer the main feature in the political programme. It is being increasingly felt that it is no longer liberty in itself which is the thing that really matters, but the use which people are likely to make of their liberty when they have got it. The aim of the best present-day thinkers and workers is essentially constructive, even though at first sight it appears to be predominantly critical and analytic. Yet the taking to pieces has, in the case of the best minds, as its ultimate aim, synthesis and building up. The way in which socialist ideals and tendencies haunt the consciousness of the present, and that even in spite of repeated and severe disillusion, is an instance of this.

Socialism, in a wide sense of the word, as implying mainly an original implication, a basal principle, and an essential strain in human evolution rather than the Marxian Fundamentalism, intolerant,

absolute, Koran-like, is akin to Catholicity. The *idée mère* in both is the same, that, in S. Augustine's words in the *De Civitate*, the Family is the *Principium et quasi seminarium reipublicæ*, i.e. that the ultimate unit is social not individual, the family rather than isolated personality, and that this truth involves a better social order than the present one as its representative. The reassertion, after the Renaissance autocracy, of our ancient political liberties, and the extension of them in modern times, have been largely due to the Puritan spirit and to the action of those who have inherited it. The "Independence" of the North American Commonwealth has also its roots in Puritanism. But it is a significant fact that the movement, both favouring and inspired by the rise of collectivist ideas, and recognizing as the normal system the articulation of life in forms based on co-operation rather than on those exhibiting unrestrained competition—the all-pervading movement, conscious propaganda or unconscious ferment, which has successfully challenged the irresponsible commercialism of modern times, and has influenced vitally the reasonable and intelligent sections of central non-political society, has not had congenital Puritan affinities, though it has often absorbed and been aided by the Puritan temper, the spirit, in the latter, of resistance and of antagonism to what is taken for granted.

In the Anglican Church, the Evangelical side, that nearest to Puritanism, did not, any more than the original Tractarians, understand or realize the social forces of the age in which they lived. Their interests, even in regard to their zeal for foreign missions, were, in the needs of the individual soul,

regarded as a sinful creature. Still, they produced Wilberforce, who, though no social reformer as far as England was concerned, was the emancipator of the victims of negro slavery, and Lord Shaftesbury, the saviour of the children who were caught into the meshes of the factory system and crushed by its greed. It is significant that this latter dauntless Christian reformer was a political Conservative, while so noble a Liberal and Nonconformist as John Bright opposed the factory legislation as interfering with "liberty of contract."

Neither of the great religious movements, in different centuries in England, inspired by such men of genius as Wesley and Newman respectively, ever delivered with the same depth and power as that noble preacher and ideal Christian, F. W. Robertson, what the latter (as the title of one of his most inspired sermons) calls "the Message of the Church to the Man of Wealth."

This is true, although both Wesley at one period and Pusey at another constantly warned men of the responsibility of possessions, and urged the rich to unselfish giving. Methodism helped to save the England of its time from political and social revolution, or at least from the action of sullen and smouldering class hate, but noble as was that great propaganda in its spirit and in its effects, the movement of Wesley just missed the prophetic touch, though being ethical through and through and having the evangelistic and the pastoral gifts in abundance.

Newman, at a later date, lived outside the popular life altogether, in spirit and not merely in circumstances. Some have considered this to be a serious

limitation in the case of so representative and of so saintly a Christian. Yet Newman was essentially a humanist, which is seldom or ever the same as being a humanitarian. The two are often poles asunder. Manning, on the contrary, was as genuinely humanitarian as he was loyally ultramontane. He combined zeal for the Papacy with love of the common people, like de Lamennais before the latter's revolt.

As far as Anglicanism is concerned, of the various religious revivals in the Church of England that which touched the social conscience, as distinct from the kindling of personal religion or the revival of the life of the Church as a spiritual institution, came last in point of time.

At the present day, when so great a change in this respect is manifest, it is hard to believe that it could have been said, not in sarcasm, of the social duty of the Church, as far as she had any, that it was "To secure the propertied in their possessions, and to restrain the vicious poor." Such a sentiment would not have been inappropriate on the lips of Mr. Collins, with special reference to the position of his patroness, Lady Catherine de Bourg, in Miss Austen's *Pride and Prejudice*.

Every vital movement in religious thought and life has its counterpart in some element of Holy Scripture which springs to light out of obscurity and potentiality. So it is that the social movement in the Church of to-day is largely due to, and connected with, the entirely new way of regarding the subject of Old Testament prophecy, i.e. as the work of those who saw into the heart of things, and not merely who foretold future events. F. D. Maurice

was almost the discoverer in modern theology of the social message of the prophets of Israel, and of its capacity of present-day and perpetual application to the facts of life.

In the grand sense of justice as the very expression of the nature of God, as that without which

“The pillared firmament is rottenness,
And earth's base built on stubble,”

as, in Wordsworth's description of Duty—

“Stern Daughter of the Voice of God,”

as that which holds mankind together, and which is the principle of solidarity in the complex structure of human society—in all this the Hebrew Prophets are at one with the loftiest utterances of Greek drama and philosophy, with Æschylus and Sophocles, with Plato, with Aquinas and Dante. Here Calvin and Latimer, though less universally minded, unite with the mighty voices of Israel and of the older Christian Church.

The message of the Old Testament prophets is of perpetual application. “Let judgment roll down as waters, and righteousness as a mighty stream.”¹ The torrential “burden” of the challenge of the prophets to the conscience of their age and of all ages, is largely social. Their theology and their ethical teaching alike are vivid, instinctive, dynamic; there is in them the power of a living God, not the echo of a dead formula. Though they view the religion which they preach as rooted in history, yet the fundamental element of their life and ministry is revelation, and not merely reminiscence. The form of Hebrew prophecy is different also from that which clothes and

¹ Amos V, 24.

expresses the Platonic conception of the calm "eternal" world of the Unseen, the universe of Ideas which finds in justice the underlying, over-arching, all-encompassing, present reality. The justice of God has in the Prophets a more passionate and active character. The difference between them and the Hellenic thinkers is that between instinct and conviction on the one hand and thought and reason on the other. Ruskin had a mind on which the English version of the Bible exercised an influence from childhood equal or even superior to that of the masterpieces of art or of that spirit of beauty in things of which he was a priest and interpreter. His inability "to be at ease in Zion" was caused as much by his sense of injustice in the existing order of human life, a sense fed by his study of Old Testament prophecy, as by his conviction that the degradation and triviality of art was directly connected with the acceptance of unmoral standards in the industrial and business world. Carlyle's debt to the Old Testament is obvious, both as to style and ideas. In spite of his call to the modern spirit "to clear out of Houndsditch" and to cast off "Jewish old clothes" in the interests of an attitude to life and to religion that is that of Goethe rather than of Moses—in spite of his desperate efforts to Hellenize himself—Carlyle remains a Hebrew at basis. The Hebrew theology no doubt dropped off from his mind. But he never lost the Hebrew temper. He was in this respect to the end a child of the Kirk. In his grander phases he was like the oak rent with the storm. In his more pedestrian moments, the Scotch thistle, deep-rooted, hardy, prickly as well, might have been Carlyle's symbol.

But the social teaching of Ruskin also had in it a severity as of Christ's later parables. His most characteristic and provocative economic literary production bore the title *Unto this Last*. As in the case of Edmund Spenser, and of John Milton, the ethical and the æsthetic, the artistic and austere are blended in the very basis of his nature.

There is, in Ruskin's view of life, a purity as of the landscape in early Italian painting, in which Carlyle's storm-tossed message, at times murky and misty, was deficient. Ruskin's raid into the region of Political Economy, as the guardians of the latter considered his attitude to it to be, was connected not only with ethics but also with that side of his life and work which was occupied in questions of art. Ruskin felt that the adoption of the money standard to the exclusion of human values, and the unrestrained development or positive consecration of the acquisitive faculty, was an inevitable cause of that vulgarization of life before which the spirit of beauty flies, while art, divorced from the vital interests of existence, shrinks within itself into trifling or sensuality.

CHAPTER X

THE CHRISTIAN ATTITUDE TO COMMERCE AND LABOUR—SYNTHESIS OF THE SPIRITUAL AND THE SOCIAL

Now that social science represents a condition of thought about industrial life, for instance, as at once more fluid and more experimental, less fixed and dogmatic than that of previous times, so that its generalizations have not stiffened into conclusions defying modification, and its attempts at synthesis are often tentative and incomplete, it is hard to realize at the present what courage and persistence were required in those who first ventured to criticize and oppose the older economy with its air of static infallibility. The latter was, however, not really old, for it was comparatively modern. It first came into existence to any great extent after the Restoration, when, in the then stage of development of political science, as far as it could at that time have been called a science, the tendency of the Renaissance mercantile spirit had practically succeeded in extending the economic outlook and in evading or ignoring those rules and principles of commercial ethics originally connected with mediæval Catholicism, which had in theory at least, though to a decreasing extent, survived, wherever, at any rate, the Genevan discipline and the Genevan influence prevailed, and also which held their ground, though in a losing way, in the Church of England till the end of the Laudian regime.

But the lay and commercial mind came more and

more inevitably under the influence of a rational view of society, to regard the State as secular and autonomous, more evolutionary and less static than in the mediæval and Reformation views, as distinct from the older attempts to regulate the conditions of Christian civilization in a theocratic or bibliocratic manner, in accordance with Church canons or with scripture texts.

Aquinas and Moses alike were ignored where economics were concerned. While the Sermon on the Mount was left to be watered down at the discretion of the individual believer, men felt that it had nothing to do with world ethics, which indeed were in reality non-existent. The undoubted problems which Christ's teaching on these subjects presents were not faced with the desire to extricate and apply their value, but simply shelved by orthodox camouflage.

So gradually everywhere, while some of the old phrases remained, the old spirit had disappeared. It must be admitted that its ethical character had often been evaded and its discipline used against the weak, rather than the strong. After the Revolution of 1688, the former regulative and controlling temper as to economics, at least as to control of the acquisitive spirit of possessors and would-be possessors, had gone, along with the last shreds of the mediæval and Calvinist view of Church or Covenant respectively having power of moral regulation in regard to the world of industry and commerce on their ethical side, if against the interests of those in whose hands were the chief resources of the country, or, later on, against the play of natural economic law.

The *sæculum rationalisticum* was fairly on its way. The power of science was in the air among the educated, and it became a science more and more directed towards considerations of utility. The Baconian revolution was long in producing its full results, but it did produce them.

Everything favoured the view that commerce and industry, in a word, money-making, as practically their exclusive object, should operate unchecked and uninterfered with by troublesome restrictions. Or rather restrictions were defended when restraining the workers from raising, as by combination, the price of their labour, and only discouraged when such restrictions interfered with the operations of capital.

We have been considering the criticisms of the established economics made by such men as Maurice and his friends, by Carlyle and by Ruskin. These criticisms were inspired by a splendid sense of the supremacy of justice and by a rejection of the view which puts private interests above the public good. The Platonic and mediævalist regard for justice as the chief of the *Imponderabilia*, the unseen and silent forces by which the world is sustained and moved onward; the Hebrew passion for righteousness which makes the Old Testament so fireily alive—these things awoke once more as they have done along the centuries, as Plato inspired Sir Thomas More to dream the *Utopia*, and as such a prophet as Amos the herdsman appeared again in the yeoman bishop, Latimer.

Men's consciences were touched, their hearts grew tender. The Church of England, whose Primate in George III's reign, Dr. Manners Sutton,

voted against the abolition of the hanging penalty for the theft of five shillings, now produced priests who were also prophets, haters of the hypocritical praise of things as they are, and the slothful belief in the inevitableness of what is unjust.

Yet why were those spirits finely touched to fine issues if a law as impregnable and changeless as that of gravitation had decreed the necessity of the conditions which they denounced, conditions apparently unjust, if you will, but no more so than the effects of any resistless law in the natural world?

Slavery and sweating were regarded as inevitable. Even kindly men felt that facts remain facts, and that experience proves the impotence of weaponless ideas in regard to the big unethical substantiality of things in the world as it is.

The Fabian Society had not then arisen to attempt to shew by statistics and reports about industry and trade, that economic change was not only desirable but inevitable, however gradual. To face the financiers on their own ground of appeal to hard facts, George Bernard Shaw, anti-sentimentalist, realist, and also socialist, was as yet within the womb of time. The "Intelligent Woman" had not yet arrived as an enquirer, a possible "proselyte of the gate" at the temple of Socialism.

The type of mind of the well-to-do middle classes then in power—at the best of the Forsytes, or at the worst of Dickens' Mr. Podsnap—was that of those who bid Keats "go back to his gallipots," and regarded Shelley as a criminal atheist. It dismissed Maurice from its mind with the reflection that clergymen know nothing about business and thought of Ruskin as an amiable eccentric, rich and

therefore not criminal, deserving pity rather than condemnation.

Even in the case of those finer natures who could not easily silence the echoes of the questioning voices, there was always in the background the rebutting consideration to such criticisms of the established social and economic order, that economic law forbade change except at the risk of destruction of all society, rich and poor together.

The African Church Father, Tertullian, in his *De Præscriptione Hæreticorum* meets the attempt of the Gnostics to remodel Christianity according to their own dreams by a plea of what the law knows as demurrer—a plea which treats the criticism or objection as ruled out by some consideration which, as it were, bars entry to the court to the complainant. So the fact that the science of economics through its high priests, Adam Smith, Ricardo, and Mill, had spoken, settled the question beforehand and barred it against reconsideration, even by the platonist of Coniston or the prophet of Chelsea.

“Rhetoric and sentiment are the weapons of such gentlemen, but against law, my dear sir, a law of nature, their objections are powerless.”

You may prophesy against the law of gravitation and write essays shewing its cruelty, but when all is said and done you must reconcile yourself to the universe and accept its terms, which are generally hard.

Hence the question of the nature of the so-called economic laws which barred out any change in the social order interfering with unrestricted competition became the burning point of the controversy.

Can Adam Smith, like Tertullian, rule out criticism beforehand? Is the "iron law of wages" a *præscriptio* locking the door against audacious, economic heretics?

The publication of Smith's famous *Wealth of Nations* in 1776 furnished an arsenal of argument in favour of complete and unchecked *laissez-faire* as the discovery, as it were, of an absolute and natural law, which human will or initiative is powerless to oppose or even to modify with any advantage.

Adam Smith himself was a just thinker and a man of humane instincts. He was not responsible for one-sided applications of his plea for all-round freedom, as against the worn-out Mercantile System, and the action of Government in promoting selfish class interests. He denounced corn laws and other protective duties, laws against workmen's combination, and Settlement Acts restricting the freedom of labour. His instincts and hopes were largely liberal, as were those of many of the original advocates of *laissez-faire*. Several of the promoters of its supremacy believed that it would automatically benefit the workers. But the selfish commercialism of the age used Adam Smith's classical treatise in its own interests, while ignoring those conclusions of his principles which tended to liberate forces which the interests of capital disliked or suspected. Restrictions and modifications which were latent in Adam Smith's views were conveniently ignored by the ruling classes, who appealed to the teaching of his book as a scientific standard of values.

After Smith as an economist came Ricardo. The

latter's influence, which was immense, was that of a great financial expert rather than of a deep and acute thinker in regard to social forces and movements viewed in their relation to life as a whole. Ricardo was a master of the power of abstraction and deduction in regard to his subject. His laws of rent and value, and above all his "iron law of wages," completed the severance of the "economic man," the imagined creature of greed mitigated by sloth, from the complex life of actual human experience.

Finally, a thinker of nobler type and of genuinely democratic sympathy, John Stuart Mill, gave to the so-called orthodox political economy the sanction of his logical mind, and thereby lulled the public conscience to rest in a way that was made possible by the very nobility of his character and the sympathetic nature of his heart. It was Mill's admission, subsequent to the publication in 1848 of his classic work on political economy, that he had been mistaken, especially as to the law of wages (an admission made when he renounced the Wages Fund Theory in 1869), which was the beginning of the complete turning of the tide in regions of thought where the warnings of Maurice, Ruskin, and Carlyle would have been discounted as those of unpractical idealists, of men whose heart and imagination had overpowered their intelligence and common sense.

It is a characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon mind, if not of the human mind generally, that the static tendency which maintains what is customary only gives way to a demand for change when a sense of positive injustice and injury rouses the desire to

alter the cause of the wrong. The irrationality of injustice is pleaded in vain. It is the felt suffering of self, or, in the case of generous souls, of others, which rouses the stagnant will to action.

No want of rationality, no offence to the logical faculty, is likely, of itself, least of all in England, to cause men to take the trouble of altering a long-established situation or institution. It is only when the sting is felt, in the case of self or kin, that remedy is insisted on at whatever cost. At least this is true of men at large, as distinct from exceptional idealists. Hence it is the manifest injustices, not merely perceived by the reason but felt in hunger, cold, and overcrowded hovels, which have always impelled men to insist, even by violence, on such change, legislative or otherwise, as would mean improvement of conditions, and that whether or no such change involved an imagined breaking of a "law of political economy" regarded less as a generalization of approximate accuracy than as a sort of biological necessity. For the assailed *Laissez-faire* pressed the Darwinian theory into its service. When the starving and riotous workers heard that any alteration in the state of things, which, as they were told, rendered their condition inevitable, would mean the sending to Saturn of the laws of political economy, the practical answer given was, "Well, then, to Saturn they must go." The conclusions of the brain of the scientific economist were thrown to the winds as a consequence of the cravings of the stomachs of the half-starved artisan or miner or agricultural labourer and his family. But the real victory was not won by the masses themselves, inert till roused as they always

are. It was won by the junction of the influence of educated men and women of thought, sympathy, and knowledge of life, often persons with business experience, with the workers whose complaint appealed to them as being fundamentally just. It was the common influence and action of three factors, i.e. intelligentsia, agitators, and the unenfranchised poor which ultimately, and bit by bit, gained the day.

Subsequent history has proved that the raising of the standard of life which has ensued since the older economy has been so considerably modified, or, as some would say, practically deposed, has not ruined the country (in spite, no doubt, of the entry of many unanticipated evils, along with the elimination of others), and therefore that to a certain and real extent the supposed "laws" of that economy were not of the nature imagined, that is, as if they were biological necessities or inherent in the very nature of things. In fact, such history has proved, on the contrary, that they were rather, in many cases, generalizations from a social condition capable, within reasonable limits, of alteration by the will of man and by influence upon human character.

But such alteration to be effective cannot be of the nature which ignores the limits to possible change that must and do exist everywhere except in dreamland and forgets the necessity of the rigour of the will, of disciplined activity, of public spirit, and of renewal of mind and heart, corresponding to all these things. Reform has no magic side to it, and it must begin with self. The earth will not produce more nor will its wealth be distributed in a juster way because resolutions are passed by enthusi-

astic meetings and excited speeches made on public platforms.

The most adverse critics of the older economy are coming to admit that the consequence of the enthronement of the omniscient State as universal producer and distributor, with a necessary hierarchy of bureaucrats and officials would very likely replace king log by king stork.

To judge by impartial accounts, the present Russian Government is only made possible by an abolition of liberty of every description. The entrance of the communist theory into the region of experiment and actuality, and that on an immense scale, has been a phenomenon unknown before in the history of European civilization. In spite, however, of the fanatical, though no doubt in many cases honest zeal of its adherents, of the powers of organization possessed by some of the leaders, and of the exceptional spirit of docility of the ignorant masses of Russia, while the structure of the new despotism raised on the ruins of an old one gives as yet few visible signs of cracking, its character as that of a suspicious and bureaucratic tyranny is more plainly perceived by impartial observers. It sacrifices man to the machine in an even more absolute manner than is the case with Western capitalisms. Its total absence of humour, its fanatical worship of a book, its spirit of one-ideaed propaganda attempting to inflict its thin metallic creed on the world, with a mentality compared with which Calvin's was as Shakespeare's, all go to form a type which no industry or disinterestedness on the part of any of the leaders can redeem

from conveying a general impression of tyrannical monotony, varied by occasional enforcing of a mechanical type of recreation to order.

The fact that the Bolshevist movement, in the light of the recent impartial and exhaustive investigation of René Fülöp Miller, bears the character of an anti-religious campaign both in Russia and outside, marks it as an anachronism. The crude simplicity of this attitude is becoming more and more, even among the most advanced democratic parties of Western Europe, a thing of the day before yesterday. In such quarters complete religious indifference, not the militant temper of an atheistic Peter the Hermit, is the prevailing vogue. By the non-Christians in the rest of Europe to-day, an "anti-God crusade" would be voted bad form.

The fanatical pedantry of the Bolshevist temper in its anti-religious attitude has nothing in common with the rapier-like wit and mental elasticity of an Anatole France, who, along with Zola, Victor Hugo, and Heine, blended a certain appreciation of the setting of Catholicism with the antagonism to the Church of leaders of Naturalism. They understood the enchantment of the Middle Ages even while standing at the farthest limits of emancipation from their spell. The spirit which makes Marx's *das Kapital* into a Koran is a static spirit of the worst kind. The forces of life are against it. It is Asiatic or Moslem in its character, and has little in common with the mind of modern Europe, whether sceptical or religious. Its concrete embodiment in the Russia of to-day is the proof of its hopeless inadequacy in the world of the living forces of human nature.

It is remarkable that two of the most thorough-going atheists of modern times and the most scornful towards Christianity, Marx and Nietzsche, have regarded that religion as the enemy to the realization of the Ideal by human society for diametrically opposite reasons. Marx viewed Christianity as the inveterate obstacle to the establishment of materialist Socialism by its holding before the minds of the exploited masses a utopia in the clouds, the hope of which renders unnecessary a bread-and-butter utopia here below. On the other hand, for Nietzsche and his precursor Gobineau, as well as for his able European disciples, for whom *Zarathustra* is the tonic antidote to sentimentalism, Christianity is in its true character and effects, however soothing its poison may be to the lip, the curse which has emasculated civilization. In their view the Religion of Christ has disparaged and weakened those aristocratic values which natural evolution favours, and substituted for the heroic *virtus* of classical antiquity (the *virtu* of Renaissance energy and will), the slave qualities which make for the levelling of society, for its submerging under a mud deluge. It may justly be considered as an unconscious witness to the richly many-sided and concrete character of Christianity, its relativity of application, and its genuine realism and humanism, that it is hated alike by Marxians and by Nietzscheans for reasons as opposite from each other as the poles, the one seeing in it the tame accomplice of caste and capital, and the other the encourager and flatterer of the ignorance of the mob.

No Church was less influenced by the modern social movement than was the pre-Revolution Church

of Russia. With all the august splendour of an ancient and venerated ritual, with real power of touching popular devotional instincts, organized religion did not realize that anti-supernatural ideas were surging or creeping through the brains of the students of the universities—students representing even the poorer members of the city populations. Since the Revolution, exiled Russian churchmen are learning in the West that there is a middle way, nobler and more practical than either, between Czardom and Leninism, between Christianity in a condition of arrested development and in State fetters, and the crude denial of the reality of all spiritual instincts and experiences altogether.

The school of suffering through which the Russian Church is passing and the friendly contact which she is experiencing with the Anglican Communion cannot be without effect in thawing the static condition to which byzantinism in politics and crystallized traditions had reduced her. On the other hand, in her mystical temper, and in her capacity and instinct for adoration, she has much to teach the busy English Church, weak on the side on which the Orthodox Church is strong. To the intelligentsia outside the Russian Churches, to eager revolutionary youth, God Himself seemed as a worn-out figure of one very old and at once angry and impotent—His dominion, a czardom in the sky, in the world of dreams, tottering to its fall. The Christianity of Western Europe, both Catholic and Protestant, is becoming more and more a Christianity instinct with sympathy for man's life *as a whole*, regarding his being not in the Hellenist dualist fashion, but as at once body and spirit, a

psycho-somatic unity, as the Bible, following the mind of ancient Israel, views it, and therefore treating questions of the soul and of social well-being as essentially interconnected and, both of them, within the region of its interest. The Church of the West, even in the official utterances of its hierarchy or other authorities, is no longer content to be a tame chaplain of existing interests. She no longer sees the only enemy of Christ in some atheist lecturer. She begins to see an enemy, perhaps even more dangerous, and certainly more culpable, in the profiteer or exploiter who is quite ready to silence her voice with the gift of a handsome cheque or even by the building of a church.

Of the highest significance in regard to their consequences were the Encyclicals on Labour, following the teaching of S. Thomas, of the wise Pope Leo XIII. It may be noted also that to this Pope is due the firm severance of the French Church from legitimist alliances, making it possible, even in spite of fanatical anti-clericalism, for a good Catholic, as in the United States of America, to be a good citizen of a republic. Of this far-seeing policy the recent condemnation of Catholic membership in *L'Action française* is a resultant. Here Thomist principles, sanctioning various forms of constructed government, were acted on, with the legitimation by the Papacy of the recognition by Catholics of the authority *de facto*, but none the less under divine sanction, of the modern unclerical State. The Syllabus of Pius IX against *Liberalismus* is in part diluted and modified by the more conciliatory present policy. However she may cling in theory or, in those corners of the earth where it is still

possible, in practice to the older order of the exclusively Catholic State, with coercive prohibitions of heretical citizenship, Rome is too astute, too experienced in affairs, and in a sense too modern to be under any illusion as to the probable or even possible restoration at the present day of a condition of things in which Church and State formed one whole, at once theocratic and political, with the logical and practical consequence of the denial of the rights of citizenship and of civilization to those who are not in the membership of the Church. The heads of the Church of England at present seem more likely than those of the Roman Communion to fail to realize that Church and State under modern conditions are now seen to be two entirely distinct organisms, and this by the inevitable logic of events.

To return to the question more directly in hand, i.e. the right of the Church to have a distinct mind, judgment and message in regard to commercial and industrial questions on their ethical as distinct from their purely economic and financial aspects; Anglicanism here is full of promise. The uncompromising repudiation of uncontrolled and unethical commercialism, in the exhaustive *Report on Industrial Problems*, adopted and promulgated to the whole Church as the voice of the last Pan-Anglican Conference, marks the abandonment by the highest representative authorities of the Anglican Communion of the disastrous policy of the practical withdrawal of organized Christianity in the main, since the Renaissance and Reformation and afterwards, from the making

of any attempt to bring a large portion of human life under the rule of the Christian law.

If the official utterances alluded to mean anything, and certainly we owe it to their respective authors to believe that they were intended to mean a good deal, the dividing of human life between God and Mammon, God having the vestry and the *prie-Dieu*, and Mammon the counting-house, the factory, and the workshop, is no longer acquiesced in by the Church as an institutional body, as distinguished from the former voices in the night of a few idealist remonstrants, the harbingers of a change affecting the whole of Christian thought, feeling, and action.

Rome could not, in accordance with her fixed policy, have sent representatives to Stockholm, where Anglicanism, both Catholic and Evangelical, Anglo-Saxon Free Churchmen, and Foreign Protestantism met to consider the extension of Christ's reign over human society. Yet these received contributory support from an unexpected source, the Churches of the changeless East. In spite of Rome's unfortunate absence, the Stockholm Conference has been an epoch-making event in the history of modern Christendom. Such meetings are a witness to the fundamental unity of the Christian view of life in all the Churches. German Lutheranism, as might have been expected, was behind others in regard to the ideals of the Kingdom of God, finding its interests mainly in the life of the soul.

Yet while Rome stands apart from the united expression of that social trend increasingly manifest in the case of the rest of the Christian world, conservative or liberal as each section may be in its religious traditions and policy, the Roman Church,

if not "mother and mistress of all Churches," still herself the largest in Christendom, is increasingly touched by the same tendency. The pontiff who made S. Alphonsus Liguori a Doctor of the Church was succeeded by Leo XIII, who revived the study of S. Thomas and made Newman a cardinal. Intellect was allowed breathing space. The study of the Thomist philosophy and theology, under authoritative approval and encouragement of the highest kind, has necessarily included the paying of attention to the political, economic, and social teaching of S. Thomas, teaching so coherent with the rest of his all-embracing philosophy that it cannot be severed from the latter as an excrescence, or left out as a negligible quantity. No doubt as against State Socialism or Communism—the Marxian orthodoxy—the Roman Communion stands pledged to opposition, and in this she only re-echoes S. Thomas' rejection of a similar view, the mediæval theologian in this respect practically adopting the anti-communist conclusions of Aristotle before him.

But an increasing number of Roman Catholic writers and speakers on subjects of social science are following not only the Thomist sanction of private property and rejection of Communism, bound of course to be reassuring to the well-to-do, but also the complementary Thomist treatment of property as essentially controllable by the community, gild, parish, commonwealth, as the case may be. Following Aristotle, S. Thomas, with other mediævalist thinkers, teaches that property is, in regard to its production, private, but as to its use, common, beyond what is necessary for each man's simple requirements according to his station in life.

“It is clearly better,” writes Aristotle in the *Politics*, “that property should be private, but the use of it common; and the special business of the legislator is to create in men this benevolent disposition.” The truth is that the great schoolman and Angelic Doctor did not hold that the right of private personal property, as distinct from the rights of mankind to hold property in general, was a principle of natural right. Private property, according to S. Thomas (as conclusively interpreted by Prof. Rahilly of Cork University, in his lucid treatise on *S. Thomas’ Theory of Property*), is not capable of defence on principles of a theoretic and *a priori* character. The right of private property arises from the fact that social experience justifies it as the best method of securing the vigorous stimulus of personal enterprise and also because it makes for co-ordination, specialisation, and social peace. No doubt the Socialist would deny these methods of justification of the thing in dispute. But it is remarkable that S. Thomas’ arguments do not involve belief in private property as absolute in character and unconditional in use. The truth is that *laissez-faire* economics and the organic view of society, as involved in the sociology of S. Thomas and of his master Aristotle, are not compatible. The two principles cannot house together in the same mind and in the same school of thought. In the Thomist view of property, man is superior to things, and all private property beyond that which is reasonably necessary or even suitable for the discharge of one’s duties, according to station and vocation, is indirectly held in trust for the community. Society can act, if necessary, on this prin-

ciple, i.e. *co-ownership by the community*, though not by an omniscient State. This means that the help of the needy is not merely an act of benevolence but one of natural justice—that in plain language, in the words of a later Catholic philosopher, Suarez (*De Justitia Dei*, quoted by Rahilly), “The community has a certain high ownership, i.e. of a superior order over the goods of all the citizens without excluding their private ownership.” It follows from the plain Thomist teaching that in any community an undetermined but not necessarily indeterminate quantity of private property, at present simply being of the nature of misapplied superfluity, is in reality (that is under ideal conditions) the common property of all. The tendency of the schoolmen to make almsgiving, especially in the case of the rich, a branch of justice, is highly significant and is only explicable on the Thomist principle alluded to.

It is interesting to find the same principle in so sober and unrevolutionary an English legal authority as Blackstone (on *Personal Security*), where the learned author lays down the following as involved in the theory of property of the law of England; “The law not only regards life and protects every man in the enjoyment of it, but also furnishes him with everything necessary for its support. For there is no man so indigent or wretched, but he may demand a supply sufficient for all the necessities of life from the more opulent part of the community.”

Modern social legislation, therefore, as based upon the right of the individual to work or to support from the community, is not so modern and revo-

lutionary but that it may claim S. Thomas and Blackstone as its sponsors. Such legislation, when necessary for the health and well-being of the people, is but carrying into operation principles which are embedded at once in the ideas underlying the common law and characterizing the social ethics of the canonists and schoolmen. In regard to the supreme subject of the Christian renovation of society which filled the mind of Leo XIII and occupied so fully his encyclicals on Labour, Prof. Devas quotes that pope as laying down authoritatively the principle that "the wise intervention of the civil power is indeed required for the solution of the social question, while at the same time the best laws need for their efficacy the support of religion." Here there is manifest, on the part of Leo XIII as also on that of the Lambeth Conference pronouncements, a passing beyond the view formerly usual under the influence of the "orthodox economists" that the stewardship of property exists as a principle which can be enforced only in the inner tribunal of the soul, *in foro conscientiae*, but that unrestricted and irresponsible use or non-use of private possessions, even when unjust to others, cannot be dealt with by legislative interference or control, that rack-renting, for instance, is justified by "freedom of contract" so called, and that all interference by legislation in such matters is illegitimate. The leaders of the Churches have plainly come to recognize that Christian citizenship involves the right of invoking and using State control and intervention in matters of property and industry where the higher interests of justice and human well-being are at stake. This is in reality a passing

from one economic world to another. It is only when we look back, even a little way, that we see with surprise what a distance we have traversed and what positions we have abandoned.

The three distinctive principles of the mediæval canon law in respect to the parts of human life which are at once moral and economic, in the pre-Renascence mind, are (1) the *Iustum Pretium*, (2) the prohibition of interest as being usury, and (3) the functional conception of society as the *Cropus Christianum*. All these involve a general view or *Weltanschauung* which contains principles distinct alike from those of Manchester and of Moscow, from the right of unfettered use of property uncontrolled by the community, and of unrestrained accumulation, on the one hand, and from the denial of all private right either to produce or to own what is produced, on the other.

Like his great master, Aristotle, S. Thomas is distinguished by common sense. This characteristic in the case of the Christian thinker is consecrated and elevated but not destroyed by the idealism of the Gospel. The common sense as well as the spirituality of Catholic sociology does not admit that we are constrained, as by a logical dilemma, to accept either the gospel of Malthus or the gospel of Marx. It rejects both and refuses to see man as a bit of a machine, whether that machine represents capitalistic interests or the interests of the Absolute State.

However inapplicable in detail the Thomist political or social philosophy may be to modern conditions of society, so unlike as these are to the simpler mediæval types, the general principles implicit in it are of perpetual value, the principles

of natural reason reinforced by experience, raised indeed to a higher power by grace, but never merely annihilated or absorbed. The thought of S. Thomas has its eye on humanity as well as on God, and not on humanity as a shoal of unrestrained and irresponsible atoms, but as the exhibition of an ordered, disciplined, and fruitful life. The feudal system, however, does not come directly under his ken. If in some ways feudalism was the most characteristically mediæval of all the institutions of its time, in others it was the least so. While the life of the Free Cities was like a many-celled beehive, the feudal organization tended to be that of strata. There was no attempt to any extent on the part of ecclesiastical land-owners to emancipate their serfs. The latter were the property of corporations, and this was practically inalienable. The exercise of mercy towards their serfs and tenants on the part of the monasteries is a romanticist fiction. The abbot was often a hard-headed man of business looking to the interests of the "House." Sir Thomas More mentions divers abbots as among those who turned tillage into pasturage, causing sheep to devour men, as he puts it. The breaking of bonds and the drastic alteration of custom had no encouragement from the increasingly conservative hierarchy. The spirit of the Levellers of the Commonwealth period has its foretaste among the ultra-Left of the Fraticelli, rather than in the balanced judgment of schoolmen and canonists, often pedantically static and conservative, but at its best constitutional and liberal, rather than radical and revolutionary. The truth is that no solution of our present difficulties can be found from a one-

sided idealizing of the past. Such thinkers as S. Thomas Aquinas and Cusanus before the Reformation, and as Latimer and Baxter during and after it, respectively represent rather the best social principles of their several periods than an actual condition of affairs. The *Christiana Respublica* of the Catholic Middle Ages, the Covenant People of the Reformation, existed to any full extent only in the minds of idealists. They never were realized in any adequate or satisfactory manner on the solid earth. There has been no golden age. Perhaps under our imperfect conditions of character and development there could not have been more than varying approximations—and those weak ones—to ideal conditions.

The idealizers of the Middle Ages have to face Coulton, and those of the English Reformation period the earlier Maitland, Dixon, and Gairdner. Cruelty, violence, and injustice were in full swing during both periods. Yet in a true sense the past is alive and "feeds its child the live unborn." Heredity is not only the transmission of corruption, but also the legacy of slowly gained good.

Collective experience is at once an inspiration and a warning. Shelley's refusal to look back, his scorn for history, was as much a sign and source of weakness as was the creation of an enchanted past by such romantic Tories, political and ecclesiastical, as de Maistre and Chateaubriand.

It is neither the static, on the one hand, nor the catastrophic, on the other, which is the most distinctive and vital element of Christian civilization. It is that of movement in which outward change in circumstances always, and necessarily, follows or

accompanies corresponding change for the better in mentality and character, for without the latter the former may be useless, or even dangerous.

Alterations in the social order in the direction of increased opportunities should be encouraged by the representatives of Christianity, not merely because they promote comfort but because they render more possible the development of fraternity, of neighbourliness, of goodwill. Every approach to equality, as distinct from a state of society in which millionaires and paupers abound, even every partial realization of a juster distribution of the products of industry, should be welcomed, not because it takes place in obedience to some abstract *a priori* principle, but because it gives a better chance to all to realize a truly human existence and to each to make the best of himself or herself and to be what God intended each life severally to express. Without being unduly optimistic, it can be fairly felt as true that, in spite of many and even startling set-backs, the flowing tide, almost imperceptibly it may be, is towards a reconciliation between the Christian Church and the "dim common populations." Each of these forces needs the other. For the Church without the people becomes either clericalist or sectarian, something thin in spirit, remote from the rough facts of life. But also, apart from the leaven of Christianity, as an active though often unconsciously working ferment, democracy is bound to degenerate into vulgar materialism and the cult of mediocrity. Popular movements untouched by religion develop greed and envy of a type just as bad and more hypocritical, because with more moral assumption, than the temper of the most selfish type of capitalist society.

There are, however, two certainties which are full of hope with regard to the present anxious and doubtful situation. The first directly affects the Church, the second the people.

The first is that the Christian Church, in the widest sense of the word, has been for some time past, under the guidance of the Spirit of God, discovering all that is involved in the Humanity of Jesus to a degree never realized before in her history. This is no doubt not without its dangers. It is only too easy to escape the Scylla of Docetism and Monophysitism, the picture of a Christ whose divinity absorbs and blanches His Manhood, who has in His body angelic light rather than red blood, whose humanity is a vesture and not part of His being—and yet to fall into the Charybdis of Ebionism and Liberalism, the conception of the genial, kindly Nazarene, the rustic prophet of a paternal Theism. Such a Christ is an attempted solution of the problem which satisfies only the amiable persons who form the background of the Pleasant Sunday Afternoon.

In spite, however, of this real danger, i.e. the substitution for the narrowness of the traditionalist view the shallowness of the liberal one, there has been and is a tremendous gain in finding in Christ that substantial Manhood, ideal and universal, which is at once the root and goal of all that is worthy and essential in history and in life.

To see God through humanity as it ought to be and that as realized in an historic personality and in factual happenings, is to see in all humanity a spark of the divine. With the conviction of this truth, both pietism and ecclesiasticism shrink up as

manifestly inadequate. The relation of spiritual to secular becomes not that of dualist opposition but of the substance of the sacrament to its material vehicle. Class war and racial war are seen as if, in rending the body of humanity, they rent that body on the cross, by which all that is truly and ideally human is knit together and offered to God in one sacrificial act and representative personality.

The cross is therefore discovered as lying at the basis of all true life, as the symbol and instrument of the only really practicable and satisfying kind of humanitarianism. True social progress is only possible and permanent when its spirit and aspirations are fused with the discipline and restraint of that law of liberty which the Gospel of Christ reveals, when,

“Blazoned as on Heaven’s immortal noon
The cross leads generations on.”

The second conclusion which we arrive at is that instinctively and surely men and women of goodwill in these great movements of the world that aim at emancipation and uplift are coming, from instinct and experience, to distrust the adequacy of purely secular methods, and the possibility of utopias built on negation of the spiritual. If a city that is only in the clouds is found to be the unattainable, and even undesirable, result of a mirage, so on the other hand a condition of material comfort as an end in itself will be found to be nothing better than a swine’s trough on a large scale, even if well filled, and its contents to be in the last resort “the husks which the swine did eat,” without nutriment for man’s heart or brain.

It has been said by a French thinker (Renan) that the world grows less gross but more vulgar every day. Certainly experience shews that democracy by itself, unspiritualized and therefore uncivilized, is not only unable to resist vulgarity of mind and soul, but also tends increasingly to give itself up to suspicion and hatred not only of those aristocratic values that express insolence and selfishness, but of those also which express discipline and distinction, the latter quality so hard to define, so irreplaceable when destroyed.

No economic code, no formula for social reconstruction, can supply the place of a new spirit. It is the infusion of the heroic into the ordinary, of Christ's fire and light into our set grey existence, that mankind needs. Not merely a new set of circumstances but a new power of life which moulds and masters circumstances and shapes them to its will is what the world, so pathetically, because so largely unconsciously, requires.

There can be no finality to the power of the Christian spirit to express itself in modes of influence exerted upon the forms of society. It cannot, without shrinking into itself, remain secluded and hermit-like in the individual soul. Its isolation is for the sake of fellowship. But neither can it allow itself to be annexed by any political force or party whatever as a useful agency for influencing the public mind. It is a prophet, not a chaplain, either of courts or of democracies. The congenital wildness of Christianity, its untamable and unexpected energy, its mountain-top freedom, may become, with a fatal facility, perverted into fanaticism and extravagance. The "mildness and sweet

reasonableness" which are another aspect of it may become soured and sulphurous amid controversial smoke. But the danger of the present day, at least in the Anglo-Saxon countries, is that of a tendency or policy resulting in the domesticating this elemental force, in reducing its explosive energies solely to the service of the contented factory or of the happy home, of yoking this winged Pegasus to the plough of respectable success. The first radiance of Christianity is equally lost either when it is severed from social life or when it is merely made the useful instrument of the latter. It has been a powerful spiritual agency in shaping, sustaining, disintegrating, one form of social structure after another. It has never been successfully tamed, without losing its vitality. It masters things, but cannot be mastered by them unless its life evaporates in the process.

For while, in accordance with its necessarily incarnational character, the spirit of Christ, that is essential Christianity, seeks embodiment in time and place, in the finite, and cannot attain fullness of actuality unless it is clothed in flesh, its source and its goal are with the unseen reality. Like "the neat church that tops the neighbouring hill," it is a centre of peace to quiet folk. But its commanding grandeur involves far more than this. Because it is a thing of the centre and of the heart of the universe, it claims all life for its expression and its sphere. Its parish is the world. It has no narrower limits to its service and its love.

The Christian spirit is at once the most celestial and the most homely of all things. In Man, as the recapitulation or living sacrament of matter and

spirit, the creative mind lays hold of the material and reveals itself through it, Man thus becomes a prophecy of the Incarnation, his entire history in its greatness and its failure being unfulfilled and unintelligible apart from a centre and climax at once at one with and transcending itself. By seeking, in Christ's way, communion and fellowship with all men as our brothers, by subordinating national and racial patriotism to world-patriotism, not by destroying the lesser element, but by making it contributory to the greater, there should ensue a simple and yet radical change in our habitual modes of thought and action. The spiritual element would penetrate the social and the visible, and find expression through it. The schism between inward and outward would lose its stringency. The lines along which the Good, the Beautiful, and the True are pursued respectively, would no longer seem antagonistic to or out of touch with one another, leading respectively to fanaticism, sensuality, and rationalism. They would gradually converge. Even if complete realization of such an ideal of essential harmony and reconciliation can never fully take place, except in the sphere of the Beyond, even if the converging lines never end here in ultimate and complete unity, yet strain along every vital way of advance leaves life richer and fuller, more regal because more sacrificial. Every genuine, even if partial, reflection in the world without of the kingdom that is within involves the certainty that all life, inward and outward, individual and social alike, is the sphere of the sovereignty of God. The infinite Being as disclosed in the Christian revelation is not the Absolute, reached by successive negations

and abstractions, enthroned in isolation, beyond thought itself, or even beyond existence. He is the God who is all Fullness, the *Pleroma* who is the fount and original of the rich potencies of life. In Himself, as the doctrine of the Trinity witnesses, He is the social God. Hence Westcott sees farther than Harnack, and, indeed also, than Newman, in adding to the two essentials of religion, God and the Soul, a third, the World.

The outstretched arms on the cross tell us that there is something in the very nature of things which forbids us to exclude the world, and the history of the world, from the sphere of Christ's kingly rule, and which bids us interpret man's troubled and yet splendid story, in the light of its goal, of the prophecy involved in its spiritual origin. Because of that origin and because of that goal, man cannot rest. He is dynamic in essence and in character. He changes because the world changes, and because there is a good correspondence of soul and world which masters the world.

Through all his changes, instinct within him answers to purpose without. A spiritual attraction of gravitation regulates his course, even amid its most unexpected wanderings. He feels the pull of an unseen force. He is the child at once of mystery and of law.

CHAPTER XI

EPILOGUE

IN its voyage through the historic and phenomenal world, a voyage in which it must often proceed as

“Sounding on a dim and perilous way,”

the spirit of Christianity, or the Christian Church as its representative, has to steer between Scylla and Charybdis, the Scylla of a blind hostility to the *Zeitgeist*, or spirit of the age, and the Charybdis of an equally blind acceptance of that time-spirit's often hasty and one-sided conclusions. This is as true of the social as of the intellectual environment.

On the one hand, Christianity is necessarily absolute, imperative, authoritarian, the audible and visible correlative of the inward voice and vision of the moral law. The true spirit of the Church is essentially prophetic rather than diplomatic. Its life, like that of its head, is of the heroic order. There is a stringency in its teaching and ministry which is identical with that of Christ. Like Him, it “speaks with authority.” But the Church is intended also to be susceptible to the myriad influences of its environment. The tides of time and circumstance cause to sway hither and thither, often in apparently unguided and confused directions, the net let down from heaven, as, amid all its fluctuations, its course is directed through the waters of time to the shore of eternity.

Movement and counter-movement are moments in an action transcending and enclosing each of them.

So also the Church, as being essentially the ideal organism, grows, as all living organisms do, by what it feeds on. It evolves by assimilation. However heavenly in origin and ideals, it is rooted in the soil of earthly life and history, and absorbs the forces of the atmosphere around it. No doubt change is not always enrichment nor does susceptibility to the influence of environment always cause an adequate and legitimate adaptation to new conditions. Yet in spite of the danger of perversion of type, an absolutely static condition and a vigorous organic life are ultimately incompatible. Healthy evolution is the law of energetic existence. The crux of the Christian Revelation in relation to the surging life which surrounds it in every age is that if it is true to itself, it can neither on the one hand stand aloof from the tides of thought, feeling, and action which sweep around it, resisting them and removed from them, like an erratic, supernatural boulder in the torrent of natural feelings and events, nor can it, on the other hand, surrender its unique character to be absorbed into the existence of the contemporaneous forces to which it bears resemblance. It cannot with loyalty to its own true nature, like some plastic and neutral substance, yield itself with fatal facility to one influence after another, without consistency or coherence on its own part. Should it do this, it would be guilty of spiritual suicide by process of evaporation.

Christianity necessarily draws support from elements into which, at the same time, it refuses to

be resolved. For it is essential to its healthy existence that it should master what it assimilates, and not be mastered by it. It must guard the supremacy in its life of what history and experience shew to be fundamentally characteristic elements of it, forming its *ratio seminalis*. This is, for Catholic Christianity, the Faith of the Incarnation, in its fullest sense. Its capacity for this twofold work, spiritually and intellectually conservative and progressive, traditional and modern, at one and the same time, is the secret of its issuing from crisis after crisis in history with renewed energy and with enlarged vision. Thus it finds in one enemy the destruction of another, as, for instance, in rationalism the death of fanaticism, so that in the stead of the latter, a faith rooted in wise idealism may find space in which to advance in freedom. The Christian spirit thus penetrates humanity, subduing and articulating into its common life those opposing forces which would otherwise destroy both itself and one another. Christianity can do this because while it has a solid message which involves social as well as personal redemption, since man, its object, is both corporate and individual, it is not a code of rules nor a set of philosophic abstractions. It is a ferment which can work in all sorts of dough, and shape each to its appropriate end. In the political sphere it can be at home under any kind of government which gives it that which alone it has an absolute right to ask for from the State, i.e. liberty to fulfil its mission to the glory of God and the good of humanity.

Hence the true relation of the Christian Church to great humanist and humanitarian movements

is neither one of capitulation and absorption on the one hand, nor of unreasoning hostility or stagnant indifference on the other. It can neither submit to petrification nor to evaporation. At the basis of all non-Christian humanisms lies an absence of humility, a sense of the self-sufficiency of man, a self-pity for man as for a captive of circumstance, and a practical denial of the corruption of the human heart. The evil (so such humanism holds) is not in the perversion of man's nature. It is in the network of untoward circumstances, "binding with briars his joys and desires." This view is the secular correlative of theological Pelagianism. It swings from cheerful confidence in human powers, when once desire has broken through convention, to the opposite extreme in the consciousness of man as a derelict of the universe, a victim of his own "unchartered freedom," finding by inevitable experience that all arrogant exercise of self-will is but, in the words of Shakespeare's sonnet,

"Before, a joy proposed; behind, a dream."

In either case the source of its error lies in its practical denial of the reality and necessity of what Christians call the grace of God. There is no more hopeless melancholy than that which is the inversion of a sentimentalism oblivious of the severity of fact, of a warmth of feeling combined with looseness of thought. Christianity has far more in common with Augustine or even Calvin in their most rigorous moods, their most severe and one-sided estimates of the essential unreliability and the corrupt internal potentialities of our nature, than

it has with Rousseau's pity for the human race "born free, yet everywhere in chains."

Yet the ultimate message of Christianity is neither that of Geneva's sixteenth-century prophet nor that of its eighteenth-century romanticist.

The religion of Christ when truly represented knows mankind as it really is, yet loves it better than it knows. It shares in the tenderness and pity of the great humanitarians of history, but not in any surrender to that philosophy of self-deception which in the minds of so many lovers of mankind has camouflaged the dread reality of sin by blaming not the deceitfulness of man's heart but the tangle in which his desires have been enmeshed by fate or by his fellows, desires presumed to be so innocent that they are incapable of a perverted outcome. Good nature, in Christianity, is not the first of the virtues, though it is a virtue, and a very necessary one, which many Christians lack to their own serious harm and to the discredit of their faith. The gospel of Charles Dickens has the real hearty Christian ring about it, in a sense not possessed by the ideas of Rousseau with their thinness and abstraction. Dickens as truly exhibits the spirit of Christ to the modern world in one way, as Newman in another and a widely different one. The Christ of the market-place, at home with the crowd, and the Christ who went alone to the Mount of Olives are one and the same.

Yet Christ's spirit cuts deeper into social evil, in a more penetrating, drastic, and health-restoring manner than humanitarianism by itself can do. It is no doubt essential that the Church should be reconciled to the humane spirit of the age. For the

care of the under-dog, the giving to every man his chance, is, or rather ought to be, the glory of Christianity, as when in her first ages the doors of the Great Church stood open all day to welcome to a divine and human fellowship the leper and the slave. In such respects the Church is the unique and world-wide representative of the international and humane spirit.

Yet true Christianity is not merely a name for a system of humanitarian and social ideas secured from neglect and abstraction and arresting attention by embodiment in a pathetic story, the semi-legendary clothing of a wonderful life. It is no mere emotionalism. It instinctively suspects the adequacy of remedies that are based on superficial conclusions and on hasty and incorrect diagnosis as to the real condition of the patient. It knows of no peace arising merely from comfort, no peace apart from truth. It pours into the gaping wounds of mankind "both oil and wine"; not only the oil of happiness and peace, inward and outward, but before it and as the condition of its effectual working, the wine, that is the keen vinegar of repentance, cleaning out the heart and relieving it of the "perilous stuff" that chills and deadens it. This repentance, in the case of nations, as of individuals, involves change of mind and temper, and practical reparation by the expulsion of envy and hate.

In this sense alone, along these lines, and with these pre-suppositions as convictions about human nature, derived both from intuition and experience, is Christianity the true humanitarianism. Because the religion of Christ loves man, both the race and the individual, so dearly, it is straight with him. It

does not deceive him. As "helper and friend of mankind," it teaches the necessity of the grace of God as of something given and descending. It has nothing in common with an immanentism in which God is but the higher self. Its ethics are not represented as practicable apart from the divine helper. It presents humility as the true realism, the recognition of man's creaturely position and of the need of renewal of his spirit, creaturely by nature, and weakened by sin. Its hopefulness about man springs out of and grows along with its candour and its courage. Hence in view of the problems of man's moral and spiritual being, it is the cure alike for pessimism and static lethargy on the one hand, and for superficiality and sentimentalism on the other. It is above all a cure the proof of which lies in its use. It lives amid the torrent of action in a manner more congenial to its true genius than it could do in the thin air of speculation. Christianity is profoundly thought-stimulating and thought-provocative, yet in spite of its deep and many-sided theology, its first and rousing call to humanity is not "Think about me," "Reason about me," but "Handle me and see." It furnishes to man's spiritual and social development true postulates and ideals, and its very humanness is one among the strongest and most arresting proofs of its inherent divinity. It supplies at once vision to mind and soul, and driving force to the will. The expectation of Christian hope, as in the Apocalypse, is not that involved in the uprush, through the spheres, of the exile spirit returning to its source, but it is rather that of the descent of the City of God, that through it earth and heaven may be bound in one, and that the nations

of the world may walk in its light. The *copiosa redemptio* includes corporate and social values.

Yet the Kingdom is always "becoming." Never has it so completely arrived that its potentialities can be exhausted. Its advance is due to its infinite adaptability. It is never imprisoned in its surroundings, but is ever agile and free. Like the hermit crab, it is continually acquiring fresh habitations, inns on its way, for its true home is in eternity. It embraces all that is morally great in civilization, and yet, at the same time, it transcends civilization. It is learning not to stand, as it did with Jesus and with Satan also, upon the pinnacle, tempted with the lure of power even when the latter can be used for good ends, but to kneel beside the Master at the occasion of the *pedilavum*, washing the feet of the disciples, justifying by cheerful utility and not only by exceptional heroism the world-wide claim of Christ's reign of service.

Two principles or truths are discovered by experience to lie at the very base of life and to be exhibited by every stage of its growth and manifestation. The first may be expressed in the words of a Latin mediæval proverb, *Unus Christianus est nullus Christianus* (One Christian is no Christian). It is that of the innately social nature of the religion of the cross, that it requires Humanity as its correlative, its element to work in, to live for and die for, to realize itself in. The second principle is the truth that external change is only valuable ultimately because of its effect on character, or because it is the expression of character. It is the kingdom of the mind that is the scene of the true empire building. It is within

its confines that we find the birth of those revolutions, the echoes of which fill the spaces of history with the thunders of change. For while Christianity transcends time and the senses as the religion of the spirit, as the religion of the Incarnation it is rooted in history and clothed in the element of the concrete. The universal Faith has its affinity with Humanity as a whole, the corporate child of God.

Christianity and Man were made for one another. Man needs Christ's religion. He cannot get on without it. It is therefore "still in its great morning."

FINIS

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INDEX

- Actors' Church Union, foundation of the, 263
 Alexander I of Russia and the Holy Alliance, 201, 202
 Anabaptist Movement, the, 126-8, 131, 166, 194, 240
 Anglican Church, the, 141, 165-8, 192
 its relations with the State, 177-82, 285
 Eucharistic revival in, 255-6
 at its dullest at the beginning of the nineteenth century, 260-1
 Evangelical Movement in, 262-3, 265-6
 its attitude to commercial and industrial questions, 285-6
 Aristotle, influence of his writings on mediæval thought, 61, 63, 287-8
 quotation from his *Politics* on property, 288
 Arnold, Dr., his belief in the identity of Church and State, 172-7
 Asceticism, impulse towards, in fourth century, 27, 29
 Augustine, S., his attitude to the relation of Christianity to the State, 30-46
 his definition of the State, 39-40
 influence of his asceticism on Thomist philosophy of life, 64-5
 his view that the Family is the social unit, 265
 Basle, Council of, 110
 Blackstone, on Personal Security, extract from, 289
 Bodin, Jean, philosophy of, 156-9, 194
 Bolshevik Movement, the, 280-1
 Bunyan, John, compared with S. Francis, 244-5
 Burke, Edmund, warns against ill-considered change, 11
 on political science, 156-7
 his respect for history, 158
 his belief in the identity of Church and State, 172
 his hatred of injustice, 195, 224, 225
 his philosophy, 225-8, 250-1
 Calvin, compared with Rousseau, 135-8, 139-40, 241
 compared with Luther, 164, 234, 236
 personality of, 46, 240
 political ideas of, 250
 Calvinism, 45-6, 113, 123-4, 126, 127, 140-4, 151, 152-4, 160-5, 192, 212, 234, 238-43, 247
 Carlyle, Thomas, 247, 251, 269-70, 273, 277
 Castlereagh, his work at the Congress of Vienna, 204-5
 Charlemagne, union of Church and Empire under, 50-1
 Christian Social Movement, beginnings of the, 248-9
 Christianity, idealism and realism of, 1-2
 its capacity for continual change and variety, 2-4
 blending of elements in, 15-18

- social character of, 26-7
 its attitude towards the State
 in New Testament times, 27-30
 its affinity with Humanism, 149
 its attitude to war, 214-6
 its attitude to the regulation
 of industrial life, 271-80
 necessary for the well-being
 of democracy, 294, 297, 309
 the true humanitarianism, 306-8
- Church of Christ, the failure
 of, to seize its oppor-
 tunities at the Renaissance
 and Revolution respec-
 tively, 4-6
 hostility of, to the democratic
 movement, 7
 question whether it will seize
 its opportunities to-day, 8-13
 its early fight for existence
 in the Roman State, 20-2
 its fusion with Empire under
 Charlemagne, 48-9
 its union with Empire, 49-51
 its rivalry with Empire, 54-5
 scope of, in the Middle Ages, 77-8, 80-1
 its gradual separation from
 Empire, 97-103
 approaching change in, 181-2
 duty of, to enlist youth on
 the side of peace, 216
 rediscovers the humanity of
 Christ, 295-6
 its true spirit, 301
 its growth, 302
- Cicero, his definition of the
 State compared with that
 of S. Augustine, 39-40
- Coleridge, S. T., his treatise
 on Church and State, 173-4
 the precursor of Christian
 Socialism, 252
- Commercialism, antipathy to
 the spirit of, in the Middle
 Ages, 82, 83
- Comte, Auguste, 247, 263-4
- Conciliar Movement, the, 76,
 95, 109, 111, 113
- Constance, Council of, analogy
 of its ideas and those be-
 hind English Revolution
 of 1688, 111-2
 disappointing in its results,
 202
- Coornhert, Theodore, 154-5
- Dante, his conception of the
 State compared with that
 of S. Augustine, 28, 33, 35
 his conception of the Holy
 Empire as the embodiment
 of Justice, 65-6
 his capacity of looking both
 to the Past and to the
 Future, 87-9
 his conception of Church and
 State, 89-92
 his vision of Rome as the
 genius of universal peace,
 92-3, 184
 his spirit akin to that of the
 League of Nations to-day,
 94-6
 his treatment of the unity of
 mankind, 105
 comparison of, with Marsilio,
 118
- Democratic Movement begins
 as defiance to injustice, 6-7
- Dickens, Charles, 274, 305
- Divine Right of Kings, doc-
 trine of, 165, 168-9
- Dolling, Robert Radclyffe, the
 late, ix-x, 254
- Dubois, Pierre, author of
 De Recuperatione Terre
 Sancte, 184-8
- Economics, the study of, 220-1,
 272-80
- Empire, *see* Holy Roman

- Erasmus, 115, 143, 154, 155,
168, 189
- France, Anatole, mental out-
look of, 209-10, 281
- France, birth of, as a nation,
185
- Francis, S., spirit of, 124-5,
131
 compared with Bunyan, 243-6
- Fratlicelli, the, 129, 292
- Free Cities, spirit of, in the
Middle Ages, 78, 84
- French Revolution, the, 140,
197-8, 225
- Froude, J. A., 139, 249
- Froude, R. H., 248-9
- Gierke, Dr., allusion to his
*Political Theories of the
Middle Ages*, 224
- Gladstone, Rt. Hon. W. E., on
Justice, 68
- Goethe, compared with Kant,
207
 not a precursor of Prussian-
ism, 208
- Gregory the Great, S., the
father of the Middle Ages,
46-7
- Grotius, Hugo, his efforts to
promote international law,
102, 189, 192-5
- Guild of S. Matthew, forma-
tion of, 255
- Headlam, Rev. Stewart, 255
- Hegel, his advocacy of war,
208-9
- Heiler, Prof., a convert from
Rome to Lutheranism, 257
- Hellenism compared with
Judaism, 22-4
- Henri Quatre, his "Grand
Design," 195-7
- Hobbes, his philosophy com-
pared with that of
Rousseau, 137-9
 his views on political science,
156
- allusions to his "Leviathan,"
152, 158, 195
- outcome of his political
teaching, 233
- Holland, Henry Scott, v, viii, x
- Holland, *see* Netherlands, the
- Holy Roman Empire, ideals of,
50-3, 55
- Divergence of these from
Church autocracy, 97-103
- Hooker, his *Ecclesiastical
Polity*, 167, 171
- Hügel, von, the late Baron, ix,
6, 64, 80, 107, 150
- Human nature, mediæval con-
ception of, 61-5
- Jesuits, their fight for suprem-
acy, 152-4, 170
 their services for internation-
alism, 192
- Joachim of Flora, a mediæval
mystic, 128, 131
- John of Salisbury, 46, 56, 88,
100
 his definition of justice, 66-8
 his *Statesman's Book*, 68
 a man of religion and a man
 of the world, 69-70
 his conception of the Com-
monwealth, 71, 72
- Influence of Plato on
writings of, 71, 72-3
- his views on Divine Right
and Tyrannicide, 73-6, 153,
191
- his failure to give due
honour to manual labour,
80, 81
- Judaism compared with Hel-
lenism, 22-4
- Justice, the keystone of the
virtues in mediæval
thought, 65-8
- Kant, Immanuel, an advocate
of European peace, 201,
205-8
- Kingsley, Charles, a leader of
the Christian Socialist
Movement, 250-1

- work done by his followers, 261-2
- Labour, Encyclicals on, of Pope Leo XIII, 284, 290
- Laissez-faire*, the doctrine of, 249, 276, 278, 288
- Lambeth Reports on Industrial Problems, 285, 290
- League of Nations, its aims anticipated in thirteenth century by Dante, 94-6 in fourteenth century by Dubois, 184, 187, 197 in sixteenth century by Henri Quatre (on sully), 197 in eighteenth century by Saint-Pierre, 198, 200 in nineteenth century by Kant, 206
- Leibniz, his efforts to unite Catholics and Protestants, 199
- Ludlow, J. M., a leader of the Christian Socialist Movement, 250, 251, 252
- Luther, Martin, 126, 127 compared with Calvin, 133, 164, 192, 234, 236 his political influence, 135 relation to Treitschke's views, 210 his views on economics, 235 doctrines of, 235-7, 257-8
- Machiavelli, ideal State of, 99-100 his views compared with those of Marsilio, 117 his *Prince*, 120, 158 his admiration for Cæsar Borgia, 188 outcome of his political teaching, 233
- Malthus, 249, 252, 291
- Manning, Cardinal, 267
- Marsilio of Padua, a mediæval critic of the Papacy, 58, 93-4, 108, 115-19, 184 compared with John of Salisbury and Dante, 88 his views on Church and State, 98, 100 his idea of the Church similar to that of Ockham, 109 a precursor of Bodin with regard to Toleration, 158 the pioneer of the modern democratic State, 173 his affinity to Dubois, 186
- Marx compared with Nietzsche in his attitude towards Christianity, 282
- Maurice, Frederick Denison, his attitude as Churchman in relation to the State, 174 a leader of the Christian Socialist Movement, 250-1, 252-4, 273, 274, 277 rediscovers the social message of the Old Testament Prophets, 267-8
- Mazzini compared with Marsilio, 117 his patriotism, 214 teaching of, 230-3
- Meredith, George, 174-5
- Middle Ages, scope of the Church in the, 77-8, 80-1 characteristics of life in the, 78-9, 83, 84, 85, 86 sects of the, 126, 130
- Mill, John Stuart, 277
- More, Sir Thomas, an advocate of peace, 190
- Mysticism, 125, 129-31
- Netherlands, the, influence of Calvinism upon, 143, 149, 155, 160, 163-4, 213 promoters of international justice, 188-9
- Newman, John Henry, afterwards Cardinal, 252-3, 254, 257, 266-7, 287, 305
- Nietzsche, his taunts against Christianity, 19, 139, 209, 211, 232


- Nietzsche, his admiration for
 Caesar Borgia, 188
 compared with Marx in his
 attitude to Christianity,
 282
- Ockham, his philosophy op-
 posed to that of Aquinas,
 79-80
 the agent of disintegration,
 106-7
 his views on the Papacy,
 108-9
 his theology compared with
 that of Wyclif, 114-5
 his theology compared with
 that of Marsilio, 119
- Otto the Great, the reviver of
 Empire and Papacy, 50-1
- Oxford Movement, the, 172,
 248, 249, 250, 253
- Paine, Tom, his conception of
 the rights of man com-
 pared with that of Burke,
 228-9
- Papacy, the, in mediæval times,
 49, 54, 56-8
 removed to Avignon, 97
 failure of attempt to force
 mediæval constitutionalism
 upon, 109-12
 its attitude to the State of
 to-day, 284-5
- Patriotism, the right kind of,
 214-6
- Political, scope of the word as
 used in this book, vii
- "Politiques," a group of
 French statesmen of the
 sixteenth century, 156,
 158-60
- Pratt, Prof., quotation from
 his book *The Religious
 Consciousness*, 258
- Prayer Book, controversy on,
 178
- Property, Thomist views on,
 240, 287-9
- Prophets, Old Testament, dis-
 covery of their social
 message, 267-9
- Protestantism on its trial, 145-8
- Religion, its tendency to over-
 whelm the rest of our
 nature, 5-6
 its influence on political de-
 velopments, 76, 161
 its relation to art, 149-50
 intolerance produces freedom
 for, 151-4, 160
 the storm-centre of the six-
 teenth century, 219
- Renaissance, realism of the, 98-
 100, 120
 its atmosphere uncongenial
 to peace, 188
- Ricardo, 276-7
- Robertson, F. W., 266
- Rome, Imperial, its position in
 S. Augustine's *De Civitate
 Dei*, 30-5
- Rousseau, his affinity to Mar-
 silio, 118
 compared with Calvin, 135-8,
 139-40, 241
 his attitude to Christianity
 similar to that of Hobbes,
 137-9
 influence of his writings on
 the French Revolution, 140
 his affinity to Shelley, 194,
 224-5
 has little in common with
 Christianity, 304-5
- Ruskin, John, 251, 269-70, 273,
 274, 277
- Russian Church, the, 283
- Sacramentalism, its connection
 with Socialism, 256-8
 its relation to art, 259
 teaching of the Anglo-
 Catholics in regard to, 260
- Saint-Pierre, Abbé Charles
 Irénée de, an advocate of
 European peace, 198-201
- Scotland, the Church of, 141-2
- Shaw, George Bernard, 129,
 132, 274

- Shelley, his revolutionary spirit, 194, 222-5, 274, 293
- Smith, Adam, 276
- Socialism, its connection with Sacramentalism, 256-8
its affinity with Catholicity, 264-5
- Southey, the precursor of Christian Socialism, 252
- Spiritual element, a necessity in life, 296-300
- Stockholm Conference, importance of the, 286
- Stoicism, its connection with early Christianity, 17-18, 27, 45
its *Lex Naturæ*, 61-3, 123
compared with Lutheranism, 236
- Ter Meulen, Dr. Jacob, his book on workers for peace, 185 note, 200-1, 207 note
- Tertullian, the African Church Father, 30-1, 44, 61, 275
- Thomas Aquinas, S., his view of grace, 45
his description of Christ, 60
commentator on the works of Aristotle, 61, 63
defines the Law of Nature, 62
his philosophy, 79-80, 103-5, 118, 119
revival of his teaching especially in regard to property, 287
his philosophic principles applicable to modern conditions, 291-2
- Toleration, in religion, produced by intolerance, 151-4, 160
three types of advocates of, 155-6
- Treitschke, the Prussian historian, 210, 211
- Troeltsch, the late Prof., author's debt to his work *Die christliche Soziallehren*, ix
on Christian ethics, 14
his monograph on S. Augustine's *De Civitate Dei*, 39, 44
on the Stoic *Lex Naturæ*, 62
his appreciation of Thomism, 103-5
on mediæval sects, 127
on the de-orientalising of Christianity, 144
on the influence of Protestantism on the rise of the modern world, 237-8
- Tyndale, translator of the New Testament, 191-2
- Tyrrell, George, x
- Unity, mediæval ideal of, 56, 59-60, 72
- Vienna, Congress of, 202, 203, 204
- Voltaire, 199
- Warburton, Bishop, author of *The Alliance of Church and State*, 171
- Webb, Prof., allusion to his edition of John of Salisbury's *Policraticus*, ix
- Weldon, Bishop, Dean of Durham, allusion to his edition of S. Augustine's *De Civitate Dei*, ix
- Wells, H. G., 89, 131
- Westcott, Bishop, teaching of, 263-4, 300
- Westphalia, Peace of, significance of, 170, 194
- Whately, Archbishop, his belief in the dual existence of Church and State, 172-3
- Wyclif, the progenitor of Calvinism, 113-14, 117
his theology compared with that of Ockham, 114-15
his theory of "Dominion founded on Grace," 134-5

71
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5

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